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Economics Of Non-Neutrality In The Internet
Abstract
Net-neutrality on the Internet is the set of policies that prevents a paid or unpaid discrimination by Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) among different types of transmitted data. The recent moves to change the net
neutrality rules and the growing demand for data have driven the ISPs to provide differential treatment of
traffic to generate additional revenue streams from Content Providers (CPs). In this thesis, we consider
economic frameworks to investigate different questions about the departure toward a non-neutral regime
and its possible consequences. In particular, we i) assess whether different entities of the market have
the incentive to adopt a non-neutral pricing scheme; and if yes ii) what are the pricing strategies they
choose; and iii) how these changes affect the Internet market. First, we investigate the incentives of
different entities of the Internet market for migrating to a non-neutral regime. Thus, we consider early
stages of a non-neutral Internet. We consider a diverse set of parameters for the market, e.g. market
powers of ISPs, sensitivity of EUs and CPs to the quality of the content. The goal is to obtain founded
insights on whether there exists a market equilibrium, the structure of the equilibria, and how they depend
on different parameters of the market when the current equilibrium (neutral regime) is disrupted and
some ISPs have switched to a non-neutral regime. Then, we seek to investigate frameworks using which
ISPs and CPs select appropriate incentives for each other, and investigate the implications of these new
schemes on the entities of the Internet market. We analyze two non-neutral frameworks. In the first
framework, we focus on the price competition between ISPs in the presence of uncertainty in competition
and demand when CPs, i.e. demand, is merely price taker, i.e. passive in equilibrium selection. Then, in the
second framework, we consider the case in which CPs have an active role in the market, and decide on
the number of resources they want to reserve/buy from ISPs based on the price ISPs quote. In this case,
we also consider the coupling between limited resources and the quality of the content delivered to endusers and subsequently the strategies of the decision makers. We obtain strategies for ISPs and CPs
under a variety of market dynamics.
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ABSTRACT
ECONOMICS OF NON-NEUTRALITY IN THE INTERNET

Mohammad Hassan Lotfi
Saswati Sarkar

Net-neutrality on the Internet is the set of policies that prevents a paid or unpaid discrimination by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) among different types of transmitted data.
The recent moves to change the net neutrality rules and the growing demand for data have
driven the ISPs to provide differential treatment of traffic to generate additional revenue
streams from Content Providers (CPs). In this thesis, we consider economic frameworks
to investigate different questions about the departure toward a non-neutral regime and its
possible consequences. In particular, we i) assess whether different entities of the market
have the incentive to adopt a non-neutral pricing scheme; and if yes ii) what are the pricing strategies they choose; and iii) how these changes affect the Internet market. First,
we investigate the incentives of different entities of the Internet market for migrating to
a non-neutral regime. Thus, we consider early stages of a non-neutral Internet. We consider a diverse set of parameters for the market, e.g. market powers of ISPs, sensitivity
of EUs and CPs to the quality of the content. The goal is to obtain founded insights
on whether there exists a market equilibrium, the structure of the equilibria, and how
they depend on different parameters of the market when the current equilibrium (neutral
regime) is disrupted and some ISPs have switched to a non-neutral regime. Then, we
seek to investigate frameworks using which ISPs and CPs select appropriate incentives

vi

for each other, and investigate the implications of these new schemes on the entities of
the Internet market. We analyze two non-neutral frameworks. In the first framework, we
focus on the price competition between ISPs in the presence of uncertainty in competition
and demand when CPs, i.e. demand, is merely price taker, i.e. passive in equilibrium selection. Then, in the second framework, we consider the case in which CPs have an active
role in the market, and decide on the number of resources they want to reserve/buy from
ISPs based on the price ISPs quote. In this case, we also consider the coupling between
limited resources and the quality of the content delivered to end-users and subsequently
the strategies of the decision makers. We obtain strategies for ISPs and CPs under a
variety of market dynamics.
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Chapter 1

Introduction and Overview
1.1
1.1.1

Network Neutrality and Pricing of the Internet
Net Neutrality

Net-neutrality on the Internet is the set of policies that prevents a paid or unpaid discrimination by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) among different types of transmitted data.
This precludes ISPs from charging Content Providers (CPs) to carry their data to the
End-Users (EUs) in the last-mile. Since January 2014, when a federal appeals court struck
down parts of the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) rules for net-neutrality
[65], the net-neutrality debate has received more attention. In February 2015, the FCC
reclassified the Internet as a utility [55], providing the grounds for this agency to secure
even stricter net-neutrality rules. In Europe, in October 2015, the European parliament
has rejected legal amendments for strict net-neutrality rules, and passed a set of rules
that allow for sponsored data plans and Internet fast lanes for “specialized services” [61].
Further actions, from ISPs and Content Providers (CPs), are expected, since both
1

may have incentives to adopt a non-neutral regime: the growing demand for data and the
saturating revenue of ISPs have driven them to provide differential treatment of traffic
to generate additional revenue streams from CPs. In addition to the ISPs generating
revenue from the CPs, with such a model, CPs can ensure the quality of service they
provide for their end-users particularly when resources are scarce such as in wireless
networks. Offering a sponsored data plan by At&T in 2014 is an instance of departure
toward a non-neutral regime. In this plan, AT&T allows CPs to pay for the data bytes
that their users consume, thereby not eating into the users’ data quota.
In addition, net-neutrality rules are often considered to be vague. For example, in
February 2014, Comcast and Netflix negotiated a contract in which Netflix would pay
Comcast for a faster access to Comcast’s subscribers [66]. Both parties announced that
the contract is a peering agreement, and its goal is to resolve the traffic imbalance. However, after deploying the agreement, the average Netflix download speed improved significantly [59]. Note that a contract for resolving aggregate traffic imbalance at tier-1 ties
(particularly between an “eyeball” ISP and one serving a CP) in which the party receiving
the net traffic imbalance get paid is considered “neutral” [31, 28]. Thus, although the
Netflix-Comcast deal does not violate the net-neutrality rules, it has a non-neutral outcome of a side-payment between a residential ISP and a CP. This reveals a net-neutrality
loophole at tier-1 ties Service Level Agreements (SLAs).

1.1.2

Pricing of the Internet

New pricing schemes in the Internet market either target end-users or CPs. For the enduser side, different pricing schemes have been proposed to replace the traditional flat rate
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pricing [58], [17], [34]. These schemes can create additional revenue for SPs and provide
a more flexible data plan for end-users. However, SPs are reluctant in adopting such
pricing schemes due to the fact that these schemes are typically not user-friendly. Thus,
SPs mainly focus on changing the pricing structure of the CP side, for which they should
deal with net-neutrality rules.
Thus, and given the potential changes in net-neutrality policies in near future, the
pricing schemes on the Internet market are gradually departing from a one-sided pricing
to a two-sided scheme in which local ISPs which own the last mile charge both sides of
the network, i.e. CPs and end-users. Therefore, new regulations may fundamentally alter
the flow of the money and services among different stakeholders of the Internet market. A
schematic view of the two-sided pricing scheme on the Internet is presented in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1: Schematic view of the two-sided pricing scheme on the Internet

1.2

Summary of Contributions

It has almost been a decade that the advantages and disadvantages of the Internet
non-neutrality have been put on debate. Proponents of Net-Neutrality claim that nonneutrality kills the innovation on the CP side, decreases the competition among CPs, and
undermines the so called “free Internet”. On the other hand, those who advocate relaxing
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the net-neutrality rules claim that the Internet neutrality, as it is perceived commonly, is
a barrier to further developments on the Internet since it decreases the incentives of ISPs,
as the pipe-line holders of the Internet, to invest on their infra-structure. This debate
has mostly been conducted on a qualitative level without rigorous economic and technical analyzes. A survey of the works on economic analysis of the net-neutrality debate is
presented in [57].
In this dissertation, we consider economic frameworks to investigate different questions about the departure toward a non-neutral regime and its possible consequences. In
particular, we i) assess whether different entities of the market have the incentive to adopt
a non-neutral pricing scheme; and if yes ii) what are the pricing strategies they choose;
and iii) how these changes affect the Internet market.
We first consider the migration to a non-neutral Internet and its consequences on
different entities of the Internet market. Then, we consider and analyze two different
non-neutral frameworks for a non-neutral Internet market. In particular:

• In Chapter 2, we investigate the incentives of different entities of the Internet market
for migrating to a non-neutral regime. Thus, we consider early stages of a nonneutral Internet. We model the interaction between ISPs and CPs in a non-neutral
regime in the presence of asymmetric competition between ISPs when some of the
ISPs are non-neutral and some are neutral. In addition, we consider CPs that can
differentiate between ISPs by controlling the quality of the content they are offering
on each one. We consider a diverse set of parameters for the market, e.g. market
powers of ISPs, sensitivity of EUs and CPs to the quality of the content. The
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goal is to obtain founded insights on whether there exists a market equilibrium,
the structure of the equilibria, and how they depend on different parameters of the
market when the current equilibrium (neutral regime) is disrupted and some ISPs
have switched to a non-neutral regime. Insights from our work can be used by the
regulator in designing efficient rules for the Internet market.

Adopting non-neutrality gives rise to new distinctive environments where ISPs can
increase their profit by pricing the service they provide for the CPs, and CPs can provide
their users a better reception quality in exchange of monetary incentives for ISPs. We
subsequently seek to investigate frameworks using which ISPs and CPs select appropriate incentives for each other (Figure 1.1), and investigate the implications of these new
schemes on the entities of the Internet market. Thus, we consider a market consisting of
ISPs, CPs, and end-users in which ISPs sell the bandwidth to CPs in exchange of financial
incentives:

• In Chapter 3, we study the case in which ISPs compete with each other to set
appropriate prices for CPs to sell/rent their bandwidth where the competition and
demand are uncertain. In this case, CPs have a passive role, in the sense that they
cannot alter their demand in accordance with the price set by ISPs. However, CPs
have the ability to choose amongst the ISPs based on their price.
• In Chapter 4, we consider the case in which CPs have an active role in the market,
and decide on the number of resources they want to reserve/buy from the ISPs
based on the price ISPs quote. In addition, we consider the coupling between
limited resources and the strategies of the decision makers. We obtain strategies for
5

ISPs and CPs under a variety of market dynamics.

We now present and motivate the problems in more detail, and summarize our contributions and related literature corresponding to each case:

1.3
1.3.1

Migration to a Non-Neutral Internet
The Research Challenges and Goals

Note that in reality, at initial stages of migration to a non-neutral regime, some ISPs
would adopt a non-neutral regime before others. Thus, we need to consider a model in
which some of the ISPs are neutral and some are non-neutral. We consider the market
with two ISPs, one neutral and one non-neutral. This can represent two groups of ISPs,
neutral and non-neutral, that are competing against each other. We also consider a
“big” CP with high market power that chooses her strategies to influence the equilibrium
outcome of the market. All other CPs are considered to be passive in the equilibrium
selection process, and their effects are modeled using a common factor in the utility of
End-Users (EUs). In addition, we consider a continuum of EUs that decide on the ISP
they want to buy Internet subscription from. We assume that EUs have different levels
of innate preferences for each ISP which can be because of initial set-up costs of a new
service upon switching the ISP or the reluctancy of EUs to change the existing ISP. These
innate preferences capture the degree by which EUs are locked in with a particular ISP.
Market powers of ISPs are defined as a function of these innate preferences.
In our model, both ISPs offer a free service for CPs up to a threshold on quality. In
addition, the non-neutral ISP offers a premium quality in exchange of a side payment from
6

the CP. This side-payment can be negative or positive, where a negative side-payment
means a net payment from the non-neutral ISP to the CP. For instance, a negative side
payment can arise in a scenario that the non-neutral ISP wants to make sure that the
monopolistic CP offers with a premium quality and exclusively for her EUs. We assume
that the CP generates revenue through advertisements, and the advertisement profit of
the CP is an increasing function of the quality she offers to EUs.
We formulate a four-stage sequential game and seek the Sub-game Perfect Nash Eequilibrium (SPNE) of the sequential game using backward induction.
Note that the equilibrium outcome has a complex dependency on a wide range of
parameters. Thus, the structure, the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium is
not apriori clear. One can expect different equilibrium outcomes in which either (i) the
CP offers her content only with a free (best effort) quality, or (ii) the CP offers her content
with free quality on the neutral and with premium quality on the non-neutral ISP, or (iii)
the CP offers with a premium quality only on the non-neutral ISP. Moreover, different
equilibrium Internet access fees and side payments can be selected by the ISPs whose value
directly affects the welfare of EUs. For example, the non-neutral ISP can select a small
Internet access fee to increase the number of her EUs and generates most of her revenue
through the side-payment she charges the CP. In this case, because of competition, the
neutral ISP should decrease her Internet access fee. Thus, the welfare of EUs would
be high. Or, the non-neutral ISP may select a small side-payment (possibly negative)
to make sure that the CP offers with a premium quality, and generate her revenue by
increasing Internet access fees for EUs, which enables the neutral ISP to increase her
price for EUs. Thus, this scenario yields a small welfare for EUs. Note that equilibrium
7

outcomes determine the division of EUs between ISPs, and some divisions maybe more
desirable for the CP. Thus, the CP can have an active role in choosing the desirable
equilibrium outcome (as well as the division of EUs with ISPs) by controlling the quality
of her content on each ISP appropriately.

1.3.2

Contributions

Analytical Results
We show that if an SPNE exists, it would be one of the five possible strategies each of
which we explicitly characterize. In some of these strategies, the CP offers her content on
only the non-neutral ISP, and in the rest she offers her content on both ISPs. In addition,
in one of the outcomes, all EUs pay the Internet access fee to the non-neutral ISP, i.e. the
neutral ISP is driven out of the market. However, in the rest, both ISPs receive a positive
share of EUs, i.e. both ISPs are active. In addition, by providing specific instances, we
shows that an SPNE does not always exist.
We prove that when EUs have sufficiently low inertia for ISPs, i.e. when the preferences are “relatively” small and do not over rule major discrepancies on price and quality,
the game has a unique SPNE. In this SPNE, the CP offers her content with premium
quality on the non-neutral ISP while she does not offer her content on the neutral ISP, to
attract all EUs to the non-neutral ISP on which users can receive a better quality. Thus,
the neutral ISP would be driven out of the market. This implies that when inertias are
small, upon switching to a non-neutral regime by an ISP, the neutral ISPs are forced to
either leave the market or adopt a non-neutral regime.
We also consider the case that EUs have sufficiently high inertia for at least one of the
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ISPs, and EUs cannot easily switch between ISPs. This case often happens in practice
in the Internet market, e.g. when ISPs bundle Internet access with other services (e.g.
cable, phone). In this case, an EU may incur additional expenses for other services if
she buys Internet access from another ISP. Another example of high inertia of EUs is the
case in which EUs require different devices to access the Internet through different ISPs
(e.g. different devices for cable and DSL services), i.e. high set up costs. We prove that
there exists a unique SPNE with a non-neutral outcome, and we explicitly characterize
the SPNE. In the unique SPNE, both ISPs are active, and the CP offers her content with
free quality on the neutral ISP and with premium quality on the non-neutral ISP.
In addition, we consider a benchmark case in which both ISPs are neutral. In this
case, we prove that there exists a unique SPNE, in which the CP offers her content over
both ISPs with free quality, and both ISPs would be active. We use the results of this
case as a benchmark for assessing the extent of benefit of switching to non-neutrality for
different entities of the market.

Numerical Results
Numerical results confirm our theoretical results that when the inertias of EUs for ISPs
are small (respectively, high) enough, then the SPNE (respectively, the SPNE with a
non-neutral outcome) exists and is unique. Numerical results also help pinpoint which of
the five possible SPNE strategies occurs when the inertias are between these two extreme
cases (high and low inertias). More specifically, results yield that if the inertia are between
these two extreme cases but still on the lower end of the region in between, the game has
an SPNE outcome in which both ISPs are active, but the CP offers her content with
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premium quality and only on the non-neutral ISP. Results also reveal that if the inertia
are between the two extreme cases but on the upper end of the region in between, then
the game has no SPNE. Results of simulation over large sets of parameters also suggest
that in all scenarios, the SPNE is unique if it were to exist.
Numerical results reveal that the neutral ISP loses payoff in all SPNE outcomes in
comparison to the benchamrk case. In addition, for a wide range of parameters, the nonneutral ISP receives a better payoff under a non-neutral scenario. This implies that it is
beneficial for ISPs to operate as non-neutral, if they have the choice. However, switching
to a non-neutral regime is not always profitable for ISPs. If EUs or the CP are not
sensitive to the quality of the content delivered and the market power of the non-neutral
ISP is small, then ISPs are better off staying neutral.
Results also reveal that the sensitivity of the EUs and the CP, and the market power
of ISPs substantially influences the welfare of EUs (EUW) in neutral and non-neutral
scenarios. The EUW would be higher in a non-neutral setting (as compared to the
neutral setting) if (i) the market power of the non-neutral ISP is low, (ii) the sensitivity
of the CP to the quality is high, or (iii) EUs are not very sensitive to the quality, or a
combination of these conditions. In these cases a cheaper Internet access fee would be
charged to the EUs by the non-neutral ISP which yields a higher EUW. In the absence
of these conditions, the EUW of the neutral scenario would be higher.

1.3.3

Related Works

This work falls in the category of economic models for a non-neutral Internet [57]. This
line of work can be divided into two broad categories: those that consider a non-neutral
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regime in which (a) a non-neutral ISP blocks the content of the CPs that do not pay
the side-payment, examples are [11], [52], [35], and those that consider (b) a non-neutral
ISP that provides quality differentiations for CPs and do not necessarily block a content,
examples are [43, 44, 32, 54, 7, 48, 2, 18, 8, 6]. Note that in reality and because of
FCC restrictions on blocking the content, we expect the latter scenario (differentiation in
quality) to emerge. Thus, in this work, we consider the second scenario.
These works can also be further divided into two other categories: (i) those that consider monopolistic ISPs: [44, 32, 54, 7, 20, 48, 2], and (ii) those that consider competition
between ISPs: [43, 11, 52, 18, 8, 6, 35]. Our work belongs to the latter case.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is one of the few works that considers the
problem of migration to a non-neutral regime, i.e. when some of the ISPs are neutral
and some are non-neutral. The focus of previous works is on the social welfare analysis
of the market when all ISPs are neutral and/or all are non-neutral, without considering
the incentives of individual ISPs to adopt a non-neutral regime. The excpetion is [43]
in which the authors consider competition between a neutral (public option) ISP with
non-neutral ISPs. They argue that the existence of a non-neutral ISP alongside of a
neutral ISP increases the customer surplus in comparison to a neutral scenario in which
all ISPs are neutral. However, parameters such as different market powers of ISPs and
the sensitivity of EUs and CPs to the quality of the content are important in determining
the welfare of EUs which are absent in the model of [43]. We consider these parameters in
our model. Contrary to their results, we show that the competition between the neutral
and non-neutral ISPs would not always increase the customers welfare.
In addition, in contrast to the previous works, we consider competition between ISPs
11

that have different market powers, i.e. an asymmetric competition (Market power is the
ability of a decision maker to raise the market price for a good or service.). Moreover,
in most of the previous works, CPs have a passive role, i.e. they are only price-takers.
However, in our model, we consider the quality of the content that a CP offers for EUs of
each ISP as the strategy by which she can influence the equilibrium of the market. For
example, a CP can select a particular ISP and offer with a high quality on this ISP, and
stop offering her content on other ISPs. By doing so, the CP might be able to migrate
EUs of other ISPs to the selected ISP.

1.4

Non-Neutrality Framework I- Uncertain Price Competition in an Internet Market

1.4.1

The Research Challenges and Goals

We consider a market with two ISPs (henceforth denoted by sellers), where each seller
offers multiple units of resources for sale to CPs (henceforth denoted by buyers or customers). We investigate the price selection strategy for sellers in presence of uncertainty in
competition using Game Theory. Customers shop around for the lowest available prices.
Therefore sellers seek to set prices that will ensure that their commodities are sold and also
fetch adequate profit. Often times, a seller is not aware of the number of units available
to her competitor before quoting her price. Thus, the competition that each seller faces is
uncertain, and different sellers have different number of resources available (heterogeneous
availability). Each seller selects the price per unit depending on the number of units she
has available for sale, the statistics of the availability process for her competitor, and the
12

demand. In general, each seller chooses her price randomly using different probability
distributions for different availability levels. Thus, the strategy of each player is a vector
of probability distributions. For instance, if a seller can potentially offer up to three units
of resources, her vector of strategies would be (Φ1 (.), Φ2 (.), Φ3 (.)), where Φi (.) is the price
selection probability distribution when the seller offers i units.
Due to uncertainty in competition, quoting a high price by a seller enhances the risk
of not being able to sell the resources offered by that seller. On the other hand, although
selecting a low price increases the chance of winning the competition, it also decreases the
profit earned by the seller. Therefore, pricing in presence of uncertainty in competition
is a risk-reward tradeoff. It is not apriori clear that how offering multiple number of
units affects the price selection by sellers. For instance, a seller with a large number of
available units may be motivated to quote a low price, since in the event of winning the
competition, a small amount of profit per unit would result in a large total profit. On
the other hand, a seller may also be enticed to select a high price when the availability is
high to significantly increase her overall profit, even at the risk of not being able to sell
the available units. We focus on investigating the impact of heterogeneous availability
and uncertain competition on the aforementioned risk-reward tradeoff.
Note that uncertainty in competition is an integral feature not only a non-neutral
Internet but also a diverse sets of application such as microgrid and secondary spectrum
markets. We later discuss about how our model captures these applications.
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1.4.2

Contributions

In our work, sellers are allowed to have different probability distributions for different
availability levels (asymmetric market). Note that since the utility of sellers is not a
continuous function of their strategy, classical theorems for existence and uniqueness of
NE cannot be used. We identify key properties that every NE pricing strategy should
satisfy when demand is greater than the maximum possible availability level (necessary
conditions). The properties reveal that the sellers randomize their price using probability
distributions whose support sets are mutually disjoint and in decreasing order of the number of availability. In the context of the aforementioned risk-reward tradeoff, sellers opt
for low-risk pricing when they have high availability. We also prove that any strategy profile that satisfies these properties constitutes an NE regardless of the relation between the
demand and the number of available units (sufficiency condition). This sufficiency result
naturally leads to an algorithm for computing the strategies that satisfy the mentioned
properties (If such a strategy exists, it is an NE).
In addition, We consider a symmetric market and prove that these properties are
also necessary conditions for a NE regardless of the relation between the demand and
the number of available units. We prove that the symmetric NE exists uniquely, and
obtain an algorithm for explicitly computing it. Note that the uniqueness is specific to
the symmetric market- our analysis reveals that an asymmetric market allows for multiple
Nash equilibria.
Furthermore, we propose a strategy for sellers in a symmetric oligopoly that satisfies
the necessary and sufficient properties identified for a symmetric NE in a symmetric
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duopoly market. Numerical evaluations reveal that this strategy constitutes a fairly good
approximation for the symmetric NE of a symmetric oligopoly. Finally, we generalize the
results to the case of random demand.

1.4.3

Related Works

Price competition among different entities has been extensively studied in [10, 19, 13,
60, 50, 51, 69, 47, 67, 16, 64]. In economics literature as also in the context of specific
applications, uncertainty in competition has been investigated when the availability level
is either zero or one [23, 29, 25, 27, 26]. The strategy profile of each seller consists of only
one probability distribution since sellers need to select a price only when they have one
unit available for sale. We, however, characterize the Nash equilibrium pricing strategies
when sellers have arbitrary and potentially different number of available units for sale
(not merely zero or one). In this case, different price selection strategies may be required
for different number of available units. Thus, the pricing strategy profile of each seller is
a collection of probability distributions, one for each availability value. Therefore both
results and proofs are substantially different from previous works.
Another genre of work allows sellers to control the amount of commodities they would
generate for sale [9, 30, 62, 15, 21, 3]. In these works, sellers (e.g. power generators) bid a
supply function

1

to a central auctioneer. Based on the demand and the bids submitted,

the auctioneer solves an optimization problem to determine the number of units needed
to be generated by the sellers and subsequently the price that should be paid to them. In
1

A supply function is a function that maps the price of the commodity under sale to the amount a

producer will produce for sale.
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[9, 30, 62], the setting is a uniform-price procurement auction in which the price is equal
for different sellers, i.e. the clearing price. However, in [15, 21, 3], authors investigate a
pay-as-bid (discriminatory) procurement auction, in which the central entity accepts the
offers submitted by the sellers and pays the accepted offers based on the bid submitted. In
[3], authors provide a characterization of mixed equilibria over increasing supply curves.
In other words, in their characterization, the price per infinitesimal unit of the commodity
is increasing, i.e., the higher the number of units produced, the higher the price per unit.
We instead consider scenarios where sellers do not control the amount of commodities they
produce2 . Thus, each seller quotes a price depending on the number of available units
and her belief about other sellers. The distinctions in the setup lead to major differences
in the formulation, analyses, and results. Our results reveal that the Nash equilibrium
pricing of our model is in stark contrast with the optimal curves found in [3]. Specifically,
we show that sellers with high availability quote a lower price.
Note that the setting considered in this chapter is an asymmetric discriminatory multiunit auction in which sellers are the bidders. As stated in [22]: “Unfortunately, computing
equilibrium strategies in (asymmetric) discriminatory multi-unit auctions is still an open
question”. In this chapter, we provide an algorithm to compute the equilibrium strategies
for a duopoly case. Using the results for duopoly, we provide an algorithm to compute
the equilibrium strategies for a symmetric duopoly.
2

This implies that in [3] the market will be cleared (firms produce up to the point that satisfies the

demand), while in our case, there is no guarantee that all the available units would be sold.
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1.5
1.5.1

Non-Neutrality Framework II- Quality Sponsored Data
The Research Challenges and Goals

In this work, we consider the cases in which ISPs can increase their profit by charging
CPs for the service they provide, and the CPs can provide their users a better reception
quality in exchange of monetary incentives for ISPs. In contrary to the previous case,
we consider the CPs to have an active role in the market, and decide on the number of
resources they want to reserve/buy from ISPs based on the price that ISPs quote. We
refer to this model as the quality-sponsored data (QSD) model, wherein spectral resources
at ISPs are sponsored to ensure quality for the data bytes being delivered to the end
users.
Hence, the over-arching goal of this work is to analyze and understand the implications
of the QSD model on the market dynamics. Using game-theoretic [45] tools, we study the
market equilibria and dynamics under various scenarios and assumptions involving the
three key players of the market, namely the CPs, ISPs and end users. We investigate the
scenarios under which the QSD model is plausible, and one can expect a stable outcome
for the market that involves sponsoring the quality of the content by CPs. In addition,
we discuss about the division of profit between ISPs and CPs in two cases (1) when the
decision makers do not cooperate and at least one of them is myopic optimizer, and (2)
when both cooperatively maximize the payoff in the long-run. In the process, we devise
strategies for the CPs (respectively, ISPs) to determine if they should participate in QSD,
what quality to sponsor, and how the ISPs should price their resources.
In our model, ISPs make a portion of their resources available for sponsorship, and
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price it appropriately to maximize their payoff. Their payoff depends on monetary revenue
and satisfaction of end-users both for the non-sponsored and sponsored content. Note
that the QSD model couples market decisions to the scarce (wireless) resources. Thus,
resources allocated to sponsored contents will affect those allocated to non-sponsored
content and hence their quality. Thus, one should consider the impact of the quality of
the two types of data (sponsored and non-sponsored) on satisfaction of end-users.

1.5.2

Contributions

We consider one CP and one ISP. We consider that the CP has an advertisement revenue
model3 , and characterize the myopic pricing strategies for the CP and the ISP given the
quality of the content that needs to be guaranteed and the available resource using a noncooperative sequential game framework. Assuming the demand for content to be dynamic,
wherein the change in the demand is dependent on the quality end-users experience, we
investigate the asymptotic behavior of the market when at most one of the decision makers
(ISP or CP) is short-sighted, i.e. not involving the dynamics of demand in their decision
making. We show that depending on certain key parameters, such as the importance
of non-sponsored data for ISPs and the parameters of the dynamic demand, the market
can be asymptotically (in long run) stable or unstable. Furthermore, four different stable
outcomes are possible: 1. no-sponsoring, 2. maximum bit sponsoring: the CP sponsors
all the available resources, 3. minimum quality sponsoring: the CP sponsors minimum
resources to deliver a minimum desired rate to her users, and 4. Interior solution in
which the CP sponsors more than the minimum but not all the available resources. We
3

A CP that earns money through advertisements.
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characterize the conditions under which each of these asymptotic outcomes is plausible.
The effects of different market parameters on the asymptotic outcome of the market is
investigated through numerical simulations.
Note that there may exist multiple equilibria, and a non-cooperative framework may
lead to a Pareto-inefficient outcome. Thus, when both of the decision makers are longsighted, it is natural to consider a cooperative scheme such as a bargaining game framework. Thus, we investigate the role of a CP and an ISP with long-sighted business models4
in stabilizing the market and equilibrium selection. We characterize the Nash Bargaining
Solution (NBS) of the game to determine the profit sharing mechanism between the ISP
and CP.

1.5.3

Related Works:

Works related to the emerging subject of sponsored content are scarce. In [24], [5], [4],
and [68], authors investigate the economic aspects of content sponsoring in a framework
similar to At&t sponsored data plans. Note that in At&t sponsored data plan, the CP
pays for the quantity of the data carried to the end-users, while in our scheme the CP
pays for the quality of the data, and end-user is responsible for paying for the quantity.
We take into the account the quality of the content and the coupling it has with scarce
resources. We consider more strategic CPs that decide on the portion of ISP’s resources
they want to sponsor, based on the price ISPs quote and the demand from end-users.
This work falls in the category of economic models for a non-neutral Internet. Most
4

in which decision makers maximize their payoff in long-run considering the dynamics of the demand

for the content.
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of the works in this area study the social welfare of the market under neutrality and nonneutrality regimes. In these works the decision of CPs does not depend on the demand
for the content, and simply is a take-it-or-leave-it choice, i.e. either the CP pays for the
premium quality or uses the free quality. In addition, most of the works do not consider
the coupling between limited resources available to ISPs and the strategies of the decision
makers. Exceptions are [32] and [43]. We consider that CPs decide on the number of
resources they want to sponsor based on the dynamics of their demand. Depending on
the demand and number of resources available with the ISP, the number of sponsored
resources by the CP determines the quality of experience for users of sponsored and
non-sponsored contents. Thus, we consider the coupling between market decisions and
the limited wireless resources. Moreover, we study problems like stability of the market
and the effects of being short-sighted or long-sighted. Therefore, we focus on one-to-one
interaction between CPs and ISPs, and its implications on the payoff of individual decision
makers.
The closest work to ours is [12] in which authors study the interaction between an ISP
and a CP when the CP can sponsor a quality higher than the minimum quality under a
private contract with the ISP. Their main focus is to compare the social welfare of the
sequential game when either the ISP or the CP is the leader, with the Pareto optimal
outcome resulting from a bargaining game between the ISP and the CP. Authors assume
that the number of subscribers to the ISP is an increasing function of the quality it
provides for the CP. In other words, as the quality for the sponsored content enhances,
end-users of the ISP become more satisfied. However, in our work, the main focus is
the coupling between the limited resources and the quality. Thus, providing a better
20

quality for a sponsored content may degrade the quality of non-sponsored contents in
peak congestion times. Therefore, in our model, the satisfaction of end-users which is a
function of both sponsored and the non-sponsored content is not necessarily increasing
with respect to the sponsored quality. This changes the nature of the problem.
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1.6

Publications

• Chapter 2 is based on [39]. The shorter versions have been published in [35] and
[40].
• Chapter 3 is based on [37]. The shorter version has been published in [36].
• Chapter 4 is based on [42]. THe shorter version has been published in [41].
• Other published papers are [34] and [38].
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Chapter 2

Migration to a Non-Neutral
1

Internet
We consider early stages of migrating to non-neutrality in which some ISPs would adopt
a non-neutral regime before others. In this setting, we assess the benefits of different
entities in an emerging non-neutral network. Such an assessment is crucial in whether a
non-neutral Internet would be adopted. Thus, we consider a system in which there exists
two ISPs, one “big” CP, and a continuum of End-Users (EUs). One of the ISPs is neutral
and the other is non-neutral. We consider that the CP can differentiate between ISPs by
controlling the quality of the content she is offering on each one. We also consider that
EUs have different levels of innate preferences for ISPs. We formulate a sequential game,
and explicitly characterize all the possible Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of
the game. We prove that if an SPNE exists, it would be one of the five possible strategies
1

Presented in W-PIN+NetEcon 2014 (as a poster)[35], the Information Science and Systems conference

(CISS) [40], and submitted to Operations Research [39].
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each of which we explicitly characterize. We prove that when EUs have sufficiently low
innate preferences for ISPs, a unique SPNE exists in which the neutral ISP would be
driven out of the market. We also prove that when these preferences are sufficiently high,
there exists a unique SPNE with a non-neutral outcome in which both ISPs are active.
Numerical results reveal that the neutral ISP receives a lower payoff and the non-neutral
ISP receives a higher payoff (most of the time) in a non-neutral scenario. However, we
identify scenarios in which the non-neutral ISP loses payoff by adopting non-neutrality.
We also show that a non-neutral regime yields a higher welfare for EUs in comparison to
a neutral one if the market power of the non-neutral ISP is small, the sensitivity of EUs
(respectively, the CP) to the quality is low (respectively, high), or a combinations of these
factors.
The chapter is organized as follows: First, in Section 2.1, we present the model. Then,
we find the SPNE(s) strategies in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we present the results for the
benchmark case, i.e. both ISPs neutral. In Section 2.4, we summarize and discuss about
the key results of the work. We provide numerical examples in Section 2.5. Finally, we
comment on some of the assumptions of the model and their generalizations in Section 2.6.
All proofs are presented in the Appendix (Section 2.7).

2.1

Model and Formulations

We consider two ISPs, a CP, and a continuum of EUs.
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ISPs:
We consider one of the ISPs to be neutral (ISP N) and the other to be non-neutral (ISP
NoN), i.e. the latter can offer a premium quality for CPs in exchange of a side-payment.
The strategies of the neutral and non-neutral ISPs are to determine Internet access fees
for EUs, i.e. pN and pN oN , respectively. We show that most of the results will depend on
the difference in the Internet access fees, i.e. ∆p := pN oN − pN .
In addition, the non-neutral ISP determines p̃, i.e. the side-payment per quality. Note
that p̃ can be positive or negative, in which a negative side-payment implies a reverse flow
of money from the non-neutral ISP to the CP. The CP will pay premium quality fee, i.e.
the side-payment, to the non-neutral ISP if she chooses to offer a quality higher than the
free quality threshold (q̃f ), and can offer with up to the quality q̃f for free on both ISPs.
The side-payment paid to the non-neutral ISP is considered to be a linear function of the
quality. Thus,
Side Payment =




 p̃q if q > q̃f


 0

Otherwise

We assume that the neutral ISP generates her profit from EUs, and the non-neutral
generates her profit from EUs and potentially from the CP (if p̃ > 0 and the CP is willing
to pay for a premium quality). The payoff of the neutral and non-neutral ISPs are as
follows:

πN (pN ) = (pN − c)nN

&

πN oN (p̃, pN oN ) = (pN oN − c)nN oN + z p̃qN oN

(2.1)

where nN and nN oN are the fraction of EUs that have access to Internet via the neutral
and non-neutral ISPs, respectively. The parameter qN oN is the quality of the content
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on the non-neutral ISP, and c is the marginal cost of providing Internet for EUs. The
parameter z indicates whether the CP chooses to offer her content with premium quality
(z=1 when the CP offers with premium quality, and z = 0 otherwise). From (2.1), for a
positive payoff, pN ≥ c, and pN oN ≥ c, if z = 0. However, if z = 1, there may exist cases
that even with pN oN < c, the payoff of ISP NoN would be positive.

The CP:
The CP can potentially offer different quality levels on different ISPs. The strategy
of the CP is to choose a quality of qN ∈ {0, q̃f } on the neutral ISP, and a quality of
qN oN ∈ {0, q̃f , q̃p } on the non-neutral ISP, with ∆q := qN oN − qN . In our model, the CP
generates revenue through advertisement. We also assume that the advertising profit that
the CP receives is a function of the number of EUs and the content quality she delivers
to these EUs 2 . Thus, the advertising profit is proportional to qN and qN oN (As seen
in the first two terms of (2.2)). In addition, the CP pays (or receive if p̃ < 0) a sidepayment to the non-neutral ISP based on the side-payment per quality fee determined by
the non-neutral ISP and the quality. Thus, the profit of the CP is,
πCP (qN , qN oN , z) = nN κad qN + nN oN κad qN oN − z p̃qN oN

(2.2)

where κad is a constant 3 , z = 0 if qN oN = {0, q̃f } (using free quality) and z = 1 if
qN oN = q̃p (using premium quality).
2

Note that we are assuming that advertisements are quality-dependent. For example they are video or

sound. Some examples of the CPs that provide these types of ads are YouTube and Spotify.
3

We assume a linear dependency between the quality and the advertising revenue and the cost. Thus,

κad can be considered to be κad = κad,rev − κad,cost .

26

It may appear from (2.2) that the CP would lose nothing by choosing at least a free
quality on both ISPs. However, this is not the case. As we explain later, nN and nN oN are
dependent on qN and qN oN , and there is a negative correlation between them. In other
words, increasing one of them (e.g. nN ), decreases the other one (e.g. nN oN ). Therefore,
the CP may stop offering her content on the neutral ISP to move EUs to the non-neutral
ISP on which they can receive a better quality. This may lead to higher advertisement
revenues for the CP.

End-Users:
The strategy of an EU is to choose one of the ISPs to buy Internet access from. We
assume that the neutral ISP is located at 0, the non-neutral one is located at 1, and EUs
are distributed uniformly along the unit interval [0, 1]. The closer an EU to an ISP, the
more this EU prefers this ISP to the other. Note that the notion of closeness and distance
is used to model the preference of EUs and market power of ISPs, and may not be the
same as the physical distance.
More formally, the EU located at x ∈ [0, 1] incurs a transport cost of tN x (respectively,
tN oN (1 − x)) when joining the neutral ISP (respectively, non-neutral ISP), where tN
(respectively, tN oN ) is the marginal transport cost for the neutral (respectively, nonneutral) ISP. Two possible interpretations of the transport costs are reluctancy of EUs
to change their ISP and initial set-up costs of a new service upon switching the ISP. In
sum, we consider tN and tN oN as the reluctancy of EUs for connecting to the neutral and
non-neutral ISPs, respectively.
We consider a common valuation for connecting to the Internet for EUs regardless of
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the content of the CP. This common valuation also models the valuation of EUs for CPs
other than the CP considered in this work, i.e. the valuation for connecting to the Internet
regardless of the status of the CP considered. Let v ∗ denote this common valuation.
The overall valuation of an EU located at x ∈ [0, 1] for connecting to the Internet via
the neutral ISP (respectively, non-neutral ISP) is considered to be v ∗ + κu qN − tN x
(respectively, v ∗ + κu qN oN − tN oN (1 − x)). Thus, the utility of an EU who connects to the
ISP j ∈ {N, N oN } located at distance xj of the ISP, and is receiving the content with
quality qj , is:
uEU,j (xj ) = v ∗ + κu qj − tj xj − pj ,

j ∈ {N, N oN }

(2.3)

This model is generally known as the hotelling model. A symmetric version (tN =
tN oN ) of this model is used in the context of the Internet market in [6].
Note that the lower tN and tN oN , the easier EUs can switch between ISPs, and thus
the lower would be the inertia of EUs. Therefore, high transport cost for an ISP is
associated with EUs that are locked in with the other ISP. We consider the ratio of tN
and tN oN as the relative bias of EUs for ISPs. More specifically, the higher
(respectively,

tN oN
tN +tN oN ),

tN
tN +tN oN

the higher the bias of EUs for connecting to the Internet via ISP

NoN (respectively, ISP N). We define the market power of an ISP to be the relative biases,
i.e. the market power of the neutral and non-neutral ISPs are
respectively.
A schematic of the market is presented in Figure 2.1.
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tN oN
tN +tN oN

and

tN
tN +tN oN ,

Figure 2.1: A schematic of the market - red (solid) lines are the flow of the money and
blue (dashed) lines are the flow of the content.

Formulations:
We assume that ISPs are the leaders of the game, and the CP and EUs are followers.
Thus, the sequence of the game is as follows:
1. The neutral and non-neutral ISPs determine Internet access fees for EUs (pN and
pN oN ).
2. The non-neutral ISP announces the premium quality fee side-payment (p̃).
3. The CP decides on the quality of the content (qN and qN oN ) for EUs of each ISP.
4. EUs decide which ISP to join.
We assumed the selection of Internet access fees to happen before the selection of the
side-payment because of the rate of change in these selections. Note that the Internet
access fees are expected to be kept constant for a longer time horizons in comparison to
the side-payment that is expected to change more frequently depending on the demand
and the network specifications.
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In the sequential game framework, we seek a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SPNE) using backward induction.
Definition 1. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE): A strategy is an SPNE if and
only if it constitutes a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of every subgame of the game.
Definition 2. Backward Induction: Characterizing the equilibrium strategies starting
from the last stage of the game and proceeding backward.
We also assume that each EU chooses exactly one ISP to buy Internet access. This
is known as the full market coverage of EUs by ISPs. This assumption is common in
hotelling models and is necessary to ensure competition between ISPs. An equivalent
assumption is to consider the common valuation v ∗ to be sufficiently large so that the
utility of EUs for connecting to the Internet is positive regardless of the choice of ISP.

2.2

The Sub-Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium

In this section, we seek a sub-game perfect equilibrium using backward induction. In
Sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.4, we characterize the equilibrium strategies of each stage in a reverse
order starting from Stage 4. For each stage, we assume that each decision maker is aware
of the strategies chosen by other decision makers in previous stages.

2.2.1

Stage 4: Customers decide which ISP to join

In this subsection, we characterize the division of EUs between ISPs in the equilibrium,
i.e. nN and nN oN , using the knowledge of the strategies chosen by the ISPs and the
CP in Stages 1, 2, and 3. To do so, we characterize the location of the EU that is
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indifferent between joining either of the ISPs, xn . Thus, EUs located at [0, xn ) join the
neutral ISP, and those located at (xn , 1] joins the non-neutral ISP. The EU located at
xn ∈ [0, 1] is indifferent between connecting to the neutral and non-neutral ISP (Recall
that we assumed full market coverage by ISPs) if:
v ∗ + κu qN oN −tN oN (1 − xn ) − pN oN = v ∗ + κu qN − tN xn − pN
tN oN + κu (qN − qN oN ) + pN oN − pN
⇒ xn =
tN oN + tN
Thus, the fraction of EUs with each ISP (nN and nN oN ) is:




0
if xn < 0




tN oN +κu (qN −qN oN )+pN oN −pN
nN =
&
if 0 ≤ xn ≤ 1
tN oN +tN






 1
if xn > 1

2.2.2

nN oN = 1 − nN

(2.4)

(2.5)

Stage 3: The CP decides the qualities to offer over each ISP (qN
and qN oN )

In this section, we characterize qN , qN oN in the equilibrium using the knowledge of the
vector of access fees p~ = (pN , pN oN ) and p̃ from stages 1 and 2. Recall that z = 1 if qN oN >
q̃f , and z = 0 otherwise. First, we find the strategies that maximize πCP (qN , qN oN , z)
(2.2). Then, using appropriate tie-breaking assumptions, we characterize the equilibrium
strategies in Theorems 1 and 2.
∗ , q∗
Note that the CP maximizes (2.2) by choosing the optimum strategies, (qN
N oN ),

from the sets F0 or F1 :
F0 = {(0, 0), (0, q̃f ), (q̃f , 0), (q̃f , q̃f )}
(2.6)
F1 = {(0, q̃p ), (q̃f , q̃p )}
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Conditions
xN ≤ 0


N oN
qN oN − qN ≥ ∆p+t
κu

xN ≥ 1

0 < xN < 1


∆p−tN
κu

< qN oN − qN <

∆p+tN oN
κu





qN oN − qN ≤

∆p−tN
κu



All EUs join Non-neutral

EUs divide between both ISPs

All EUs join Neutral

S
Union ( )

z=0

F0L

F0I

F0U

F0

z=1

F1L

F1I

F1U

F1

S
Union ( )

FL

FI

FU

F

Table 2.1: Notations for different subsets of the feasible set. Expressions in parenthesis
are equivalent form of the conditions, e.g. xN ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ qN oN − qN ≥

∆p+tN oN
.
κu

Note that F0 and F1 are the set of strategies by which z = 0 and z = 1, respectively.
Each of the sets F0 and F1 is further divided into three subsets, FiL , FiI , and FiU , for
i ∈ {0, 1}, depending on whether xN ≤ 0, 0 < xN < 1, or xN ≥ 1 (using (2.4)). Since
xN is a function of qN and qN oN , these conditions on xN lead to constraints on qN and
qN oN . In Table 2.1, we present the division of the feasible set into the above-mentioned
subsets and the constraints on qN and qN oN for each subset. Note that F0L ∪ F1L = F L ,
F0I ∪ F1I = F I , and F0U ∪ F1U = F U .
Next, we present the tie-breaking assumptions used to prove these results (Section 2.2.2).
Then, we present the statement of the main results in Section 2.2.2. We prove the results
in Appendix 2.7.1.

Tie- Breaking Assumptions
We assume that for choosing the equilibrium strategy, the CP uses the following tiebreaking assumptions that one can expect to arise in practice.
L
∗
∗
U
∗
∗ , q∗
First note that (qN
N oN ) ∈ F (respectively, (qN , qN oN ) ∈ F ) yields that nN = 0
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(respectively, n∗N oN = 0). Thus, in this case, the quality that the CP offers on the neutral
ISP (respectively, non-neutral ISP) is of no importance. Therefore:
∗ , q∗
L (respectively, (q ∗ , q ∗
U
Assumption 1. If (qN
N oN ) ∈ F
N N oN ) ∈ F ), then without loss
∗ = 0 (respectively, q ∗
of generality, qN
N oN = 0).

In addition, in practice, it is natural to expect that the CP prefer higher qualities to
lower ones, e.g. z = 1 over z = 0, if this selection does not affect the payoff.
Assumption 2. If the optimum solutions exist in F0 and F1 , then the CP chooses the
ones in F1 . In other words, if z = 1 and z = 0 yield equal maximum payoffs for the CP,
then the CP will pick z = 1, i.e. will use the premium quality.
The following tie-breaking assumptions are based on the natural assumption that the
CP would prefer to diversify her content over different ISPs if she is indifferent:
Assumption 3. If there exists global optimum solutions in F I , then they are preferred by
the CP over global optimum solutions in F L and F U . In other words, if the outcome in
which only one ISP is operating and the outcome by which both ISPs are operating yield
the global maximum payoff for the CP, then the CP chooses the strategies by which the
latter outcome occurs.
0 , q0
0
Assumption 4. Consider two strategies: (i) (qN
N oN ) such that at least one of qN or
0
00
00
00
00
qN
oN is zero, and (ii) (qN , qN oN ) such that qN > 0 and qN oN > 0. If these two strategies

yield the same payoff for the CP, then the CP chooses (ii), i.e. the one with positive
quality on both ISPs.
In the following tie-breaking assumption, we assume that the CP takes into the account
the welfare of EUs for tie-breaking between strategies.
33

Assumption 5. If the payoff of the CP when only the neutral ISP is operating is equal
to the payoff when only the non-neutral is operating, then the CP prefers the strategy
by which the ISP that offers the lower Internet access fee, i.e. pi ,

i ∈ {N, N oN }, is

operating. In other words, the CP chooses the strategy that yields a higher social welfare
for EUs.
The above-mentioned assumptions over-ride each other in the order specified. For
example, if two strategies one in F1L and the other in F0I are both global maximum, then
Assumption 2 suggests that the CP chooses the strategy in F1L , and Assumption 3 suggests
that the CP chooses the strategy in F0I . Since Assumption 2 comes before Assumption 3,
the CP chooses the strategy in F0L . Next, using these tie-breaking assumptions, we
characterize the equilibrium strategies:

Main Results
First, we define certain thresholds that appear in the results:
Definition 3.

• p̃t,1 = κad (1 −

• p̃t,2 = κad (nN oN −

q̃f
q̃p )

• p̃t,3 = κad nN oN (1 −

q̃f
q̃p )

, where nN oN =

q̃f
q̃p ),

tN +κu q̃p −∆p
tN +tN oN .

where nN oN =

tN +κu (q̃p −q̃f )−∆p
.
tN +tN oN

• ∆pt = κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN
We would observe that, when characterizing the optimum strategies, p̃t,1 , p̃t,2 , and p̃t,3
would be thresholds on side-payment, and ∆pt would be a threshold on the difference in
the access fees.
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In Theorem 1, we characterize the equilibrium strategies of the CP by which z eq = 0
for different values of ∆p. Then, using these results, in Theorem 2, we characterize the
equilibrium strategies of the CP in general case for different regions of ∆p.
eq eq
Theorem 1. If (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F0 , then:
eq eq
1. if −tN oN < ∆p < tN , then (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃f ) ∈ F0I .
eq eq
2. if ∆p ≥ tN , (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , 0) ∈ F0U .
eq eq
3. if ∆p ≤ −tN oN , (qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃f ) ∈ F0L .

In addition, the utility of the CP by each candidate equilibrium strategy is κad q̃f .
For proving this theorem, we characterize optimums strategies among all (qN , qN oN ) ∈
F0 . Then, using these optimum strategies and tie-breaking assumptions, we characterize
eq eq
, qN oN ). Later, we will see that this theorem also characterizes the optimum strategies
(qN

of the CP in the benchmark case in which both ISPs are forced to be neutral.
Intuitively, as ∆p increases, the number of EUs with ISP NoN decreases. Thus, as the
results of Theorem 1 confirms, as ∆p increases, the outcome of the market moves from
F0L , i.e. all EUs join ISP NoN, to F0I , i.e. both ISPs have positive share of EUs, and to
F0U , i.e. all EUs join the ISP N.
In Theorem 2, we characterize the equilibrium strategy of the CP in general case.
We prove that results are threshold-type: when the side-payment, i.e. p̃, is less than a
threshold, the CP chooses the premium quality, i.e. z eq = 1, and when p̃ is higher than
the threshold, z eq = 0 and the CP chooses the strategies according to Theorem 1. We
also characterize the value of this thresholds for different regions of ∆p. Note that as ∆p
increases, the number of EUs with ISP NoN decreases. This affects the payoff of the CP,
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and subsequently the value of the side-payment that ISP NoN charges to the CP. Thus,
the value of the threshold on the side-payment depends on ∆p.
Theorem 2. Let the thresholds ∆pt , p̃t,1 , p̃t,2 , and p̃t,3 as characterized in Definition 3,
then:
1. If ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN :
eq eq
• if p̃ ≤ p̃t,1 , then z eq = 1, and (qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1L .
eq
eq
• if p̃ > p̃t,1 , then z eq = 0, and qN
and qN
oN are determined by Theorem 1.

2. If κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆p < tN + κu q̃p , and q̃f ≤

tN +tN oN
:
κu

(a) if κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆p < tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ), and:
i. if ∆p ≥ ∆pt :
eq eq
• if p̃ ≤ p̃t,3 , then z eq = 1 and (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1I .
eq
eq
• if p̃ > p̃t,3 , then z eq = 0, and qN
and qN
oN are determined by Theo-

rem 1.
ii. if ∆p < ∆pt :
eq eq
• if p̃ ≤ p̃t,2 , then z eq = 1 and (qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I .
eq
eq
• if p̃ > p̃t,2 , then z eq = 0, and qN
and qN
oN are determined by Theo-

rem 1.
(b) if tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) ≤ ∆p < tN + κu q̃p :
eq eq
i. if p̃ ≤ p̃t,2 , then z eq = 1, and (qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I .
eq
eq
ii. if p̃ > p̃t,2 , then z eq = 0, and qN
and qN
oN are determined by Theorem 1.
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3. If κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆p < tN + κu q̃p , and q̃f >

tN +tN oN
:
κu

eq eq
(a) if p̃ ≤ p̃t,2 , then z eq = 1, and (qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I .
eq
eq
(b) if p̃ > p̃t,2 , then z eq = 0, and qN
and qN
oN are determined by Theorem 1.
eq
eq
4. If ∆p ≥ tN + κu q̃p , then z eq = 0, and qN
and qN
oN are determined by Theorem 1.

Note that the thresholds p̃t,1 , p̃t,2 , and p̃t,3 are decreasing with respect to
as theorem implies, the higher

q̃p
q̃f ,

q̃f
q̃p .

Thus,

the higher would be the threshold on p̃ after which

the CP chooses the free quality over the premium one. In addition, with high q̃p and low
tN oN , the CP prefers to choose the strategy by which the neutral ISP is driven out of the
market.

2.2.3

Stage 2: ISP NoN determines the side-payment, p̃:

In this stage, ISP NoN chooses the equilibrium strategy p̃ = p̃eq , with the knowledge of
pN oN and pN , to maximize her payoff:
πN oN (pN oN , p̃) = (pN oN − c)nN oN + z p̃qN oN

(2.7)

First, we introduce a tie-breaking assumption (Assumption 6) for ISP NoN. In Theorem 3, we characterize the necessary and sufficient condition on p̃eq by which z eq = 1,
i.e. the CP chooses the premium quality. Subsequently, in Theorem 4, we characterize
p̃eq by which z eq = 1. Note that if z eq = 0, (2.7) would be independent of p̃. Thus, we
only need to characterize p̃eq by which z eq = 1. The proofs of theorems are presented in
Appendix 2.7.2.
The following tie-breaking assumption for ISP NoN is used to determine the optimum
strategy in this stage. In this tie-breaking assumption, we assume that because of legal
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complexities of a non-neutral regime, whenever ISP NoN is indifferent between z eq = 0
and z eq = 1, she chooses p̃ such that z eq = 0, i.e. choosing neutrality over non-neutrality4 .
eq eq
eq eq
Assumption 6. If p̃1 by which (qN
, qN oN )∈ F1 , i.e. z eq = 1, and p̃2 by which (qN
, qN oN ) ∈

F0 yield the same payoff for ISP NoN, this ISP chooses p̃2 , i.e. the one that yields z eq = 0.
Recall that in Definition 3, we characterized some threshold values for the side payment. For each value of ∆p, the actual threshold on the side payment is equal to one
of the thresholds characterized. We define and characterize the actual threshold, i.e. p̃t ,
based on the results in Theorem 2:
Definition 4. We define p̃t = p̃t,1 if conditions of item 1 of Theorem 2 is met, p̃t =
p̃t,2 if the conditions of items 2-a-ii, 2-b, and 3 of Theorem 2 is met, and p̃t = p̃t,3 if
the conditions of the item 2-a-i of Theorem 2 is met. Note that p̃t,1 , p̃t,2 , and p̃t,3 are
characterized in Definition 3, respectively.
The following Theorem characterizes a necessary and sufficient condition on p̃t by
which z eq = 1.
Theorem 3. z eq = 1 if and only if πN oN (pN oN , p̃t ) > πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃) and ∆p <
tN + κu q̃p , where πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃) is the payoff of ISP NoN when z eq = 0.
The theorem implies that ∆p being less than a threshold and the existence of p̃ by
which the payoff of ISP NoN is greater than the payoff of this ISP when z = 0 are
necessary and sufficient conditions for z eq = 1. The reason for the former is explained
after Theorem 4. The latter follows from the fact that, if the payoff of ISP NoN is not
4

Although the new rules are not final yet, it is expected that non-neutrality would be accepted by the

FCC only under extensive traffic monitoring by the FCC. This introduces an implicit cost for the ISPs.
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greater than the payoff of this ISP when z = 0, in an NE strategy, ISP would not choose
p̃ such that z eq = 1, since the strategy of choosing an extremely large p̃ by which z = 0
yields a better payoff.
eq eq
In the following theorem, we characterize p̃ chosen by ISP NoN by which (qN
, qN oN ) ∈

F1 , and also necessary conditions for p̃ by which z eq = 1.
Theorem 4. If z eq = 1, then p̃eq = p̃t , πN oN (pN oN , p̃t ) > πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃), and ∆p <
tN + κu q̃p , where πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃) is the payoff of ISP NoN when z eq = 0.
Thus, the necessary conditions are: (i) in each region, p̃eq is the maximum side payment by which the CP chooses z eq = 1, i.e. the threshold defined in Definition 4, (ii) the
payoff of ISP NoN with p̃eq should be strictly larger than the payoff when z eq = 0, and
(iii) ∆p should be smaller than a threshold (if not the number of EUs on ISP NoN would
be zero, and trivially the CP does not offer her content on this ISP).
Remark 1. Note that, if z eq = 0, then the payoff of ISP NoN (2.1) is independent of p̃.
Thus, πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃) is independent of p̃.

2.2.4

eq
Stage 1: ISPs determine peq
N and pN oN :

First, in Theorem 5, we prove that if inertias are small, then there is no NE by which
z eq = 0. Then, in Theorem 6, we characterize the NE strategies by which z eq = 1 for the
case that the inertias are small. In Theorem 6, we prove that if inertias are sufficiently
small, then a unique NE exists. If not, only under certain conditions a unique NE exists.
Numerical simulations under a wide range of parameters (presented in Section 2.5.1)
reveal that these conditions are always satisfied.
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Then, we focus on the case that inertias are not small. In Theorem 7, we characterize
all possible NE strategies by which z eq = 1. In Theorem 8, we prove that when one of the
inertias is large, the only NE strategy by which z eq = 1 is the third candidate strategy
of Theorem 7. Then, in Theorem 9, we characterize the only candidate NE strategy by
which z eq = 0.
By (2.1) and without loss of generality, in the equilibrium, peq
N ≥ c. In addition, if
eq eq
I
z = 0, peq
N oN ≥ c. If 0 ≤ xn ≤ 1, i.e. (qN , qN oN ) ∈ F , from (2.5), the payoff of neutral

and non-neutral ISPs are:
πN (pN ) = (pN − c)

πN oN (pN oN , p̃) = (pN oN − c)

tN oN + κu (qN − qN oN ) + pN oN − pN
tN + tN oN

(2.8)

tN + κu (qN oN − qN ) + pN − pN oN
+ zqN oN p̃
tN + tN oN

(2.9)

First, given the strategies of the CP and EUs described in previous sections, we prove
that if inertias are small, then there is no NE by which z eq = 0:
eq eq
, qN oN ) ∈ F0 , i.e. z eq = 0.
Theorem 5. If tN + tN oN ≤ κu q̃p , there is no NE by which (qN

Next, we characterize the NE strategies by which z eq = 1 when inertias are small:
eq
eq eq
Theorem 6. If tN +tN oN ≤ κu q̃p , the NE strategies, peq
N and pN oN by which (qN , qN oN ) ∈

F1 , i.e. z eq = 1, are:
eq
1. peq
N oN = c + κu q̃p − tN oN and pN = c if and only if q̃p ≥

2. peq
N oN = c +
q̃p <

tN oN +2tN +q̃p (κu −2κad )
3

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad ,

and peq
N = c+

d
d
and πN (peq
N ) ≥ pt −c where pt =
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tN +2tN oN
κu +κad .

2tN oN +tN −q̃p (κu +κad )
3

if and only if

κad q̃f (tN +tN oN )
+peq
N oN −tN oN −κu q̃p .
peq
N oN −c+κad q̃p

We show in Corollary 2 that both sets of strategies are associated with the case that
the CP offers with premium quality on ISP NoN and with zero quality on ISP N. In the
first set, ISP N would be driven out of the market, while with the second set, ISP N would
be active.
Now, we focus on the case that inertias are not small. In the following theorem, we
characterize the NE strategies by which z eq = 1:
Theorem 7. If q̃p <

tN +tN oN
,
κu

eq eq
then the only possible NE strategies by which (qN
, qN oN ) ∈

F1 , i.e. z eq = 1, are:
eq
1. If ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN , then peq
N oN = c + κu q̃p − tN oN and pN = c.

2. If (i) κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆peq < κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN or tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) < ∆peq <
tN + κu q̃p , then peq
N oN = c +

tN oN +2tN +q̃p (κu −2κad )
3

and peq
N = c+

2tN oN +tN −q̃p (κu +κad )
,
3

eq
eq
and πN
oN = πN oN (p̃N oN , p̃t,2 ). The necessary conditions: (ii) q̃p ≤

2tN oN +tN
κu +κad ,

and

eq
eq
(iii) πN
oN > πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃).

3. If (i) κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN < ∆peq < tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ), then peq
N oN = c +
tN oN +2tN +(q̃p −q̃f )(κu −2κad )
3

and peq
N = c +

2tN oN +tN −(q̃p −q̃f )(κu +κad )
,
3

πN oN (p̃eq
N oN , p̃t,3 ). The necessary conditions: (ii) q̃p − q̃f ≤

eq
and πN
oN =

2tN oN +tN
κu +κad ,

and (iii)

eq
eq
πN
oN > πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃).

eq
eq
eq
4. peq
N oN = c and pN = c − κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) + tN oN , and πN oN = πN oN (p̃N oN , p̃t,3 ). The

necessary conditions: (i) 2q̃p − q̃f ≤

tN oN
κu

eq
eq
and (ii) πN
oN > πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃).

We show in Corollary 3 that the first two sets of strategies are associated with the
case that the CP offers with premium quality on ISP NoN and with zero quality on ISP
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N. With the first set, ISP N would be driven out of the market, while with the second,
ISP N would be active. The third and fourth sets of strategies are associated with the
case that both ISPs are active and the CP offers her content with premium quality on
ISP NoN and with free quality on ISP N.
Next, we prove that when either of the transport costs is large enough, then the only
NE strategy by which z eq = 1 is the third candidate strategy of the previous theorem:
Theorem 8. When either tN or tN oN is large enough, for the case that q̃p <
the only NE strategy by which z eq = 1 is peq
N oN = c +
peq
N =c+

tN +tN oN
,
κu

tN oN +2tN +(q̃p −q̃f )(κu −2κad )
3

and

2tN oN +tN −(q̃p −q̃f )(κu +κad )
.
3

Remark 2. Note that when at least one of tN and tN oN is large, then the effect of q̃p can
be ignored. Thus, this scenario can be considered to be similar to the case that both ISPs
are neutral, i.e. the benchmark case. Later, in Theorem 10, we prove that a unique SPNE
exists in this case, and it is similar to the NE strategies characterized in Theorem 8 with
q̃p = q̃f .
Now, we characterize the equilibrium strategy by which z eq = 0 when inertias are not
small:
Theorem 9. If q̃p <

tN +tN oN
,
κu

eq eq
the only possible NE strategy by which (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F0 , i.e.

eq
1
1
z eq = 0 is peq
N = c+ 3 (2tN oN +tN ) and pN oN = c+ 3 (2tN +tN oN ). The necessary condition
eq
for this strategy to be a candidate NE strategy is πN oN (peq
N oN , z = 0) ≥ πN oN (pN oN , p̃t ).

Remark 3. Note that the candidate strategies listed in Theorems 7 and 9 are NE if and
only if the conditions listed in the theorem hold and no unilateral deviation is profitable
for each ISPs.
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2.3

Benchmark Case: A Neutral Regime

In this section, we consider a benchmark case in which both ISPs are forced to be neutral.
Our goal is to find the SPNE when both ISPs are neutral. We compare the results of
the benchmark case with the results we found in the previous section. Note that we do
not restrict the analysis of this section to any particular range of transport costs, and the
analysis is done for a general case.
The main result of this section is Theorem 10. In order to characterize the equilibrium
in this case, we can consider a simple change to our previous model and use some of the
previous results. We assume that in this case, the CP chooses z eq = 0, regardless of the
eq eq
strategy of ISPs. Thus, (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F0 , and as a result both ISPs are neutral.

Note that in this case, the equilibrium strategy of Stage 4 is similar as before, and the
equilibrium strategy of Stage 3 is characterized in Theorem 1. Recall that in Theorem 1,
we characterize the equilibrium strategies within F0 without considering the strategies in
F1 . In addition, note that the strategy of Stage 2 is of no importance since with z eq = 0,
the effect of p̃ would be eliminated in all analyses. Thus, we only need to find the new
equilibrium strategies in Stage 1 of the game:
1
Theorem 10. The unique NE strategies chosen by the ISP are peq
N = c + 3 (2tN oN + tN )
1
and peq
N oN = c + 3 (2tN + tN oN ).

2.4

The Outcome of the Game and Discussions

First, in Section 2.4.1, we summarize, discuss, and interpret the possible outcomes of the
model characterized in the previous section. Then, in Section 2.4.2, we summarize and
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discuss the results for a benchmark case in which both ISPs are neutral.

2.4.1

Possible Outcomes of the Market

In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we have characterized all the possible SPNE strategies. Using
these strategies, we have characterized the SPNE outcomes in Appendix 2.7.5. In this
section, we summarize, discuss, and interpret these possible outcomes.
eq
eq = 1, i.e. the
Candidate Outcome (a): peq
N oN = c + κu q̃p − tN oN , pN = c, z

CP pays for the premium quality, p̃eq = p̃t,1 = κad (1 −

q̃f
q̃p ),

eq eq
(qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1L ,

eq
neq
N = 0, and nN oN = 1 (outcome associated with Theorem 6-1 and Theorem 7-1).

Note that from Theorems 5 and 6, this outcome is the unique SPNE of the game if
tN and tN oN are sufficiently small, i.e. EUs are not locked-in with ISPs. This outcome
represents the case in which the CP offers the content with premium quality and pays
the side-payment to the non-neutral ISP. Note that EUs can receive a better quality of
content on the non-neutral ISP, and that yields a better advertisement revenue for the
CP. Thus, in the equilibrium, the CP offers her content only on the non-neutral ISP to
increase the number of EUs connecting to the Internet via the non-neutral ISP. By doing
so, given the conditions of this candidate outcome, all EUs would join the non-neutral
ISP and the neutral ISP would be driven out of the market.
In addition, note that the Internet access fee chosen by ISP NoN (peq
N oN ) increases
with (i) increasing the sensitivity of end-users to the quality (κu ), (ii) increasing the value
of the premium quality (q̃p ), and (iii) decreasing the transport cost of ISP NoN (tN oN ).
Recall that tN oN has an inverse relationship with the market power of ISP NoN if tN is
fixed.
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Moreover, note that the side-payment charged for the premium quality (p̃eq q̃p ) is
positive, and is dependent on (i) the sensitivity of the payoff of the CP to the quality of
the advertisement, i.e. κad , and (ii) the difference between the premium and free quality,
i.e. q̃p − q̃f . The latter implies that ISP NoN chooses the side-payment in proportion to
the additional value created for the CP.
Candidate Outcome (b):
2tN oN +tN −q̃p (κu +κad )
,
3

neq
N =

peq
N oN

= c +

tN oN +2tN +q̃p (κu −2κad )
,
3

z eq = 1, p̃eq = p̃t,2 = κad (neq
N oN −

tN +2tN oN −q̃p (κu +κad )
,
3(tN +tN oN )

and neq
N oN =

q̃f
q̃p ),

peq
N = c +

eq eq
(qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I ,

2tN +tN oN +q̃p (κu +κad )
3(tN +tN oN )

(outcome associated with

Theorem 6-2 and Theorem 7-2).
Candidate outcome (b) represents the case in which both ISPs are active. However,
similar to (a), with this outcome, the CP does not offer her content over the neutral
ISP, and offers her content only over the non-neutral ISP with premium quality. Thus,
although the CP stops offering her content on the neutral ISP, she cannot move all EUs
to ISP NoN. The loss in the number of EUs would be compensated by receiving higher
advertisement revenue (due to the premium quality) and paying a lower side payment
(will be explained in the associated paragraph).
It is noteworthy to observe that if tN (respectively, tN oN ) increases, peq
N oN (respectively,
2
peq
N ) increases with a rate 3 rd the rate of the growth of this transport cost. This is intuitive.

The higher tN (while tN oN fixed), the higher would be the market power of ISP NoN, and
subsequently the higher would be peq
N oN . In addition, counter-intuitively, pN (respectively,
pN oN ) also increases with a rate 31 rd of the rate of growth of tN (respectively, tN oN ). This
counter-intuitive result (Internet access fee of an ISP being an increasing function of the
transport cost of this ISP) is because of competition between ISPs. For example, with
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the increase of tN oN , EUs have more incentive to join the neutral ISP and less incentive
to switch to the non-neutral ISP. Thus the neutral ISP can set a higher price for EUs.
This allows her competitor, i.e. ISP NoN, to increases her price, but with a rate lower
than the rate by which the price of ISP N increases.
In addition, note that peq
N is a decreasing function of q̃p , κu , and κad : The higher
the premium quality or the sensitivity of EUs and the CP to the quality, the lower
would be the Internet access fee of ISP N. On the other hand, the relationship between
these parameters and peq
N oN is more complicated. The Internet access fee of ISP NoN is
increasing with respect to the sensitivity of EUs to the quality, and is decreasing with
respect to the sensitivity of the CP to the quality. Thus, the more the CP is sensitive
to the quality, the more the ISP NoN provides subsidies for EUs (cheaper Internet access
fees), and compensates the payoff through charging the CP. In addition, note that peq
N oN
is decreasing or increasing with respect to the amount of premium quality (q̃p ) depending
on the sensitivity of EUs and the CP to the quality: If the sensitivity of EUs to the quality
dominates the sensitivity of the CP (κu > 2κad ), then peq
N oN is increasing with respect
to q̃p . If not, then ISP NoN generates more revenue from the CP, and thus provide a
cheaper Internet access fee for EUs. The higher this sensitivity, the higher would be the
side payment from the CP (can be seen from the expression of p̃eq ), and the higher would
be the discount on the Internet access fees for EUs.
Moreover, note that the side-payment charged for the premium quality (p̃eq q̃p ) is
increasing with respect to (i) κad (the sensitivity of the CP to the quality), (ii) the
premium quality (q̃p ), and (iii) number of EUs with the non-neutral ISP (neq
N oN ), and is
decreasing with respect to the free quality (q̃f ). Note that since in this case nN oN < 1,
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the side payment would be lower than the side payment in candidate outcome (a). This
side-payment can be positive or negative. However, as we explain later, the numerical
results reveal that the side-payment is positive whenever this candidate outcome is an
SPNE.
In addition, note that nN oN is increasing with respect to the premium quality, i.e. q̃p ,
and the sensitivity of the CP and EUs to the quality, i.e. κu and κad . The relationship
between nN oN (and thus nN ) and the transport costs, i.e. tN and tN oN is more complex
and is discussed in Section 2.5.2.
Candidate Outcome (c): peq
N oN = c +
2tN oN +tN −(q̃p −q̃f )(κu +κad )
,
3

F1I , neq
N =

tN oN +2tN +(q̃p −q̃f )(κu −2κad )
,
3

z eq = 1, p̃eq = p̃t,3 = κad neq
N oN (1 −

tN +2tN oN −(q̃p −q̃f )(κu +κad )
,
3(tN +tN oN )

and neq
N oN =

q̃f
q̃p ),

peq
N = c +

eq eq
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈
(qN

2tN +tN oN +(q̃p −q̃f )(κu +κad )
3(tN +tN oN )

(outcome as-

sociated with Theorem 7-3). Recall that in Theorem 8, we proved that when either of tN
or tN oN is large, then the only candidate outcome by which z eq = 1 is (c).
Candidate outcome (c) represents the case that both ISPs are active, and the CP
offers her content with free quality on the neutral ISP and with premium quality on the
eq
non-neutral one. The dependencies of the access fees (peq
N and pN oN ) to tN , tN oN , κu , and

κad are the same as what described for candidate outcome (b). In addition, note that peq
N
is decreasing with the difference between the premium and free qualities, i.e. q̃p − q̃f , and
peq
N oN is decreasing or increasing with respect to the difference in the qualities depending
on the sensitivity of EUs and the CP to the quality (similar to the description for the
candidate outcome (b)).
Moreover, note that the side-payment charged for the premium quality (p̃eq q̃p ) is
increasing with respect to (i) κad (the sensitivity of the CP to the quality), (ii) the
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difference between the premium and free qualities (q̃p − q̃f ), (iii) number of EUs with
the non-neutral ISP (neq
N oN ). This side-payment is always positive. The dependencies of
nN oN to the parameters are similar to what described for candidate outcome (b), with
the difference that nN oN depends on the difference in the qualities, i.e. q̃p − q̃f , instead
of only q̃p .
Note that when either of tN or tN oN is large, then (c) is the only candidate outcome
by which z eq = 1. First, recall that the payoff that an ISP receives depends on both the
number of EUs and the Internet connection fee of that ISP. In addition, we discussed that
when either of tN or tN oN is large, then both of the Internet connection fees would be
large in candidate outcomes (b) and (c). It turns out that when tN or tN oN is large, ISPs
prefer candidate outcomes (b) and (c) to the outcomes by which they discount the price
heavily to attract EUs ((a) and (d)).
Moreover, when both ISPs are active, large tN oN or tN decreases the effect of quality
of the content on the decision of EUs (both through high transport costs and increase in
the Internet access fees). Thus, the CP cannot control the number of EUs with each ISP
by strategically controlling her quality. Therefore the CP simply chooses to provide with
maximum possible quality on both ISPs instead of choosing strategic qualities to control
the equilibrium. Thus, (c) is expected to occur.
eq
eq = 1,
Candidate Outcome (d): peq
N oN = c, pN = c − κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) + tN oN , z

p̃eq = p̃t,3 = κad neq
N oN (1 −
tN +tN oN −κu q̃p
tN +tN oN

q̃f
q̃p ),

eq eq
(qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1I , neq
N =

κu q̃p
tN +tN oN ,

and neq
N oN =

(outcome associated with Theorem 7-4).

Candidate outcome (d) represents the scenario in which the non-neutral ISP is forced
to provide a low Internet access fee for EUs. This strategy can only be valid when tN oN is
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large (so that peq
N ≥ c). In other words, the only scenario that this strategy is possible is
when EUs are reluctant joining the non-neutral ISP. Thus, this ISP should provide large
discounts for EUs. Note that in this case, both ISPs are active, and the CP offers her
content over both ISPs, with free quality on the neutral ISP and with premium quality
on the non-neutral one.
In this case, peq
N is decreasing with respect to κu and q̃p , and increasing with respect
to q̃f and tN oN . In addition, the side payment is similar to the one in candidate outcome
(c).
eq
In this candidate outcome, peq
N oN is fixed, while pN is decreasing with respect to q̃p

and κu . In addition, the rate of decrease of peq
N is twice of the rate of increase of utility of
EUs from κu and q̃p when connecting to ISP NoN. Thus, The rate of increase in the utility
of EUs for ISP N is higher than that of ISP NoN, and as result confirms, neq
N would be
increasing with respect to the premium quality and the sensitivity of EUs to the quality.
eq
In addition, peq
N is increasing with tN oN . Thus, as results confirm, nN would be decreasing

with respect to the transport cost of ISP NoN5 . Finally, note that the Internet access fees
are independent of tN , but the utility of EUs connecting to neutral ISP is decreasing with
tN (2.3). Thus, as result confirms, the number of EUs with the neutral ISP, i.e. neq
N , is
decreasing with respect to both tN .
eq
1
1
Candidate Outcome (e): peq
N oN = c + 3 (2tN + tN oN ), pN = c + 3 (2tN oN + tN ),
5

Note that the utility of EUs connecting to ISP NoN is also decreasing with tN oN (2.3). However, the

rate of decrease in the utility of EUs connecting to ISP NoN (tN oN is multiplies to a coefficient smaller
than one) is lower than the rate of increase of the price of the neutral ISP (multiplied by one). Thus,
overall, the number of EUs with the neutral (respectively, non-neutral) ISP is decreasing (respectively,
increasing).
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eq eq
z eq = 0, (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃f ) ∈ F0L , neq
N =

2tN oN +tN
3(tN oN +tN ) ,

neq
N oN =

2tN +tN oN
3(tN +tN oN ) ,

and since

z eq = 0, p̃eq is of no importance (outcome associated with Theorem 9).
This case characterizes the only possible SPNE outcome by which z eq = 0. This
outcome is similar to the benchmark one (Section 2.4.2). Outcome (c) would be reduced
to (e), if q̃p = q̃f .
Remark: Note that candidate strategies in different theorems (defined for different
regions of tN and tN oN ) can be similar and yield similar outcomes, e.g. Theorem 6-1 and
Theorem 7-1. In addition, there is no outcome in which the CP offers her content only on
the neutral ISP. From the expression of payoff of the CP (2.2), the CP can get at most
κad q̃f by offering only on the neutral ISP. On the other hand, the CP can guarantee a
payoff of this amount by offering on both ISPs and z = 0. Assumption 4, i.e. the CP
prefers to offer on both ISP whenever she is indifferent, yields that the CP never choose
the strategy in which she offers only on the neutral ISP.
Interplay Between Sensitivities to Quality and the Outcome: Intuitively,
we expect that high sensitivity of EUs and the CP to the quality, i.e. large κu and
κad , respectively, yields high payoff for the non-neutral ISP, since this ISP can provide
a premium quality and charge the EUs accordingly to increase her payoff. Thus, the
payoff can be collected from EUs or the CP, or both. Results reveal that in all candidate
outcomes ISP NoN charges the CP in proportion to her sensitivity to the quality of the
content. In addition, in candidate outcomes (a) to (c), the payoff collected from EUs
through the Internet connection fees is always increasing with respect to the sensitivity
of the EUs to the quality. In candidate outcomes (b) and (c), the Internet connection
fees are decreasing with respect to the sensitivity of the CP to the quality. Thus, in these
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candidate outcomes, EUs receive a discount in proportion to the sensitivity of the CP to
the quality. In candidate outcome (d), the Internet connection fee of ISP NoN does not
depends on the qualities, but it is as low as the marginal cost.
Existence of NE: An SPNE may not always exist. For example, for parameters
q̃f = 1, q̃p = 1.5, c = 1, κu = 1, κad = 0.5, tN = 3, and tN oN = 2, none of the candidate
outcomes listed above would be an SPNE. The reason is that there exists a profitable
deviation for at least one of the ISPs for those candidate strategies that their conditions
are satisfied given these parameters. Later in Section 2.5.1, we identify the regions with
no SPNE.

2.4.2

Benchmark: A Neutral Scenario

In the benchmark case, i.e. when both ISPs are neutral, we proved that there exists a
unique SPNE, and the unique equilibrium outcome of the game is (the subscript B refers
to “Benchmark”):
1
• Stage 1 - Internet access Fees chosen by ISPs: peq
N,B = c + 3 (2tN oN + tN ) and
1
peq
N oN,B = c + 3 (2tN + tN oN ).

• Stage 2 - Side Payment chosen by ISP NoN is of no importance.
eq
eq
• Stage 3 - Qualities chosen by the CP: qN
oN,B = q̃f and qN,B = q̃f .

• Stage 4 - Fractions of EUs with ISPs: neq
N,B =

2tN oN +tN
3(tN oN +tN )

and neq
N oN,B =

2tN +tN oN
3(tN oN +tN ) .

Note that this case is similar to candidate outcome (e), i.e. the only candidate outcome
of our model by which z eq = 0. In this case, both ISPs are active and the CP offers the
free quality on both ISPs. Note that in this case, the asymmetries of the model only arise
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from the asymmetry in tN and tN oN . Thus, EUs are divided between ISPs depending on
tN and tN oN , and the Internet access fees (pN and pN oN ) are a function of transport costs
(tN and tN oN ). Also, similar to the candidate outcome (b) of the previous section, if tN
(respectively, tN oN ) increases, pN oN (respectively, pN ) increases with a rate 23 rd the rate
of the growth of this transport cost. Also, counter-intuitively, pN (respectively, pN oN )
increases with a rate 13 rd of the rate of growth of tN (respectively, tN oN ).
In this case, Internet access fees are independent of the quality provided for EUs, i.e.
q̃f . Recall that in contrast, in a non-neutral regime, the Internet access fee quoted by
ISP NoN is dependent on the quality she provides (q̃p ). The reason lies in the product
differentiation in the latter. The non-neutral ISP can charge for the quality she provides
for EUs through differentiating her product from the neutral ISP. While in a neutral
regime, no ISP can charge for the quality they provide because of competition. It is
eq
noteworthy that if tN oN &tN → 0, peq
N oN,B &pN,B → c. In other words, in the absence of

inertias, since there is no differentiation between the quality offered by the ISPs in the
neutral regime, price competition drives the access fees to the marginal cost. This implies
that by removing the inertias (tN and tN oN ), the model would be similar to a Bertrand
competition [45]. Thus, considering the inertias brings a realistic dimension to the model.
eq
The relationship between neq
N and nN oN and the transport costs are similar to that of

candidate outcomes (b) and (c) of the previous section, and is investigated in Section 2.5.1.
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2.5

Numerical Results

First, in Section 2.5.1, using numerical analysis, we find the NE strategies of Stage 1 for
various parameters. Recall that strategies of Stage 1 yield one of the outcomes (a)-(e). In
Section 2.5.2, we complement the discussions in Section 2.4.1, by providing more intuitions
eq
about neq
N oN , p̃ , and the payoff of ISPs, based on the numerical results. We assess the

benefits of non-neutrality by comparing the results of the model with the benchmark case
in Section 2.5.3. In Section 2.5.4, we provide regulatory comments based on the results.

2.5.1

NE Strategies

Recall that if SPNE exists, it would of the form of outcomes (a)-(e) (Section 2.4.1). Now,
we check whether these outcomes are indeed SPNE. We only need to check whether the
candidate strategies of Stage 1 are NE. For doing so, we check for any profitable deviation
for each ISPs. To check for unilateral deviations, we consider different regions of ∆p
(regions characterized in Theorem 2). In each region, we can identify potential profitable
deviations (using first order condition for some regions, and the fact that payoff of ISPs
are monotonic in other regions). Thus, the search for the best deviations is equivalent
to comparing the payoff of finite number of candidate deviations with the payoff of the
candidate equilibrium. We also check conditions listed in Theorems 6, 7, and 9.
We now present two illustrative examples. In Figure 2.2a, we identify the NE strategies
of stage 1 for different regions of tN and tN oN when κu = 1 and κad = 0.5. In Figure 2.2b,
we identify the NE strategies when κu = 0.5 and κad = 1. For the figures, we consider
q̃f = 1, q̃p = 1.5, and c = 1. Numerical results for a large set of parameters reveal that
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(a) κu = 1 and κad = 0.5

(b) κu = 0.5 and κad = 1

Figure 2.2: NE strategies of Stage 1 for various tN and tN oN

the pattern of NE strategies for different values of parameters is similar to one of the two
pattern presented in Figures 2.2a and 2.2b. Overall, the outcome in which the neutral
ISP is driven out of the market occurs when tN and tN oN are small. As tN and tN oN
increases, we expect to have equilibrium outcomes in which both ISPs are active. Next,
we discuss about the trends we observe in the results.
Note that in Theorem 6, we proved that, for q̃p ≥

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad

and q̃p ≥

tN +tN oN
,
κu

candidate strategy (Theorem 6-1) is an NE. Numerical results for a large set of parameters
also reveal that for q̃p ≥

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad

and q̃p <

tN +tN oN
,
κu

candidate strategy (Theorem 7-1)

is also an NE strategy. Note that these two strategies are the same and are listed under
candidate outcome (a). Therefore, when

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad

≤ q̃p , (a) is an SPNE outcome. In this

case, since the transport costs are low, EUs can easily switch ISPs. Thus, ISP NoN is
able to attract all EUs by discounting the Internet access fee for EUs using some of the
side payment received from the CP. Therefore, the neutral ISP would be driven out of
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the market.
With increase in tN or tN oN , EUs have more inertia. Thus, one of the ISPs should
provide a low Internet access fee for EUs to attract them all. However, in this case, ISPs
prefer to maintain a high Internet access fee for EUs6 , and split the EUs. Thus, as tN and
tN oN increases, we expect to have equilibrium outcomes in which both ISPs are active.
Numerical results reveal that if q̃p <

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad

and q̃p ≥

tN +tN oN
,
κu

candidate strategy

(Theorem 6-2) is an NE. In addition, consider the lines tN + 2tN oN = q̃p (κu + κad ) and
tN + tN oN = κu q̃p . Results reveal that when the point (tN , tN oN ) is just above these lines,
the candidate strategy (Theorem 7-2) is an NE strategy. When (tN , tN oN ) is substantially
above these lines, then candidate strategy (Theorem 7-3) is an NE strategy. This result
have been proved in Theorem 8. In addition, when (tN , tN oN ) is above these lines, but is
in an intermediate range, then no NE exists.
Numerical results for large set of parameters also reveal that the NE is unique, if it
were to exist (in Figures there exists only one NE in each region). In addition, extensive
numerical results reveal that candidate outcomes (d) and (e) are never SPNE. Thus,
henceforth we do not include (d) and (e) in our discussions about the results.

2.5.2

eq
Dependencies of neq
N oN , p̃ , and Payoffs of ISPs to tN and tN oN

Note that in Section 2.4.1, we explained that the relationship between neq
N oN and the
transport costs is not obvious from the expressions. Thus, in this section, we provide
eq and the payoffs of ISPs with
intuitions for the behavior of neq
N oN , and subsequently p̃
6

As we discussed, when both ISPs are active, the Internet connection fees are increasing with the

transport costs. In other words, each ISP lock in some EUs and charge high Internet access fees to them.
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Figure 2.3: neq
N oN with respect to tN and tN oN
respect to tN and tN oN .
eq
Numerical Results on neq
N oN : Numerical results reveal that nN oN is non-increasing

with respect to both transport costs. For instance, in Figure 2.3, we plot the value of
eq
eq
neq
N oN with respect to tN oN and tN , when q̃f = 1 and q̃p = 1.5. Recall that nN = 1−nN oN .

Thus, we only plot neq
N oN .
Note that for candidate outcome (a), as we know from the results, neq
N oN = 1. To
understand the results for candidate outcomes (b) and (c), note that from (2.5) the
number of EUs with each ISP has a decreasing relation with (i) the transport costs of the
ISP, and (ii) the Internet access fee of the ISP which itself is increasing with both transport
costs. In addition, the number of EUs with the ISP has an increasing relation with respect
to the same parameters for the other ISP. Thus, different factors, some decreasing and
some increasing with respect to the transport cost of an ISP, play a role in determining
the number of EUs with each ISP. Overall, it turns out that the effect of increasing either
of the transport costs decreases the incentive of EUs to join ISP NoN. Thus, in candidate
outcomes (b) and (c), neq
N oN is decreasing with respect to both transport costs.
Numerical Results on p̃eq : Note that the higher the number of EUs with ISP NoN,
the higher would be the benefit of the CP from the premium quality. Thus, we expect
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Figure 2.4: p̃eq with respect to tN and tN oN
the side-payment, i.e. p̃eq to be increasing with respect to number of EUs with ISP NoN.
Results in Section 2.4.1 also confirms this fact. Thus, the relationship between p̃eq and
the transport costs is similar to the relationship between neq
N oN and the transport costs.
Therefore, in candidate outcome (b) and (c), the higher one of the transport costs, the
lower would be the side payments. For instance, in Figures 2.4, we plot the value of p̃eq
with respect to tN oN and tN , respectively, when q̃f = 1 and q̃p = 1.5.
Note that as we discussed in Section 2.4.1, in candidate outcome (b), p̃eq can be
positive or negative. However, numerical results for a large set of parameters reveal that
p̃eq is positive, whenever this candidate outcome is SPNE.
Numerical Results on the Payoffs of ISPs: Numerical results for the case q̃f = 1
and q̃p = 1.5 are plotted in Figure 2.5. If there is no NE strategy, we plot the payoff of
ISPs in the benchmark case, i.e. when both ISPs are neutral.
Note that when the market of power ISP NoN is small, i.e. the fraction

tN
tN +tN oN

is

small, then the payoff of ISP NoN would be lower than the payoff of ISP N (Figure 2.5left).
For candidate outcome (a), the payoff of ISP N is zero (since the number of EUs
with this ISP is zero), and the payoff of ISP NoN is independent of tN (since ISP N is
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Figure 2.5: Payoff of ISPs with respect to tN and tN oN
out of the market), but decreasing with respect to tN oN (since peq
N oN is decreasing with
tN oN ). Intuitively, we expect the utility of an ISP to be decreasing with respect to the
transport cost of that ISP, and increasing with respect to the transport cost of the other
ISP. However, for some parameters and some of the candidate outcomes, results reveal
that the payoff of an ISP is increasing with the transport cost of the ISP. Next, we explain
the underlying reasons for this counter-intuitive behavior.
Note that the payoff of an ISP is increasing with (i) the number of EUs with the ISP
and also (ii) the Internet access fee charged to the EUs. Recall that for the neutral ISP, in
candidate outcomes (b), (c), and the benchmark case, both of (i) and (ii) are increasing
with respect to both transport costs. Thus, the payoff of ISP N is increasing with respect
to both transport costs. On the other hand, for ISP NoN, the number of EUs is decreasing
and the Internet access fee is increasing with the transport costs. Thus, depending on
which of these factors overweights the other one, the payoff of ISP NoN can be decreasing
or increasing with respect to the transport costs.
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2.5.3

Profits of Entities Due to Non-neutrality

We compare the results of the model and the benchmark case in which both ISPs are
neutral. We compare Internet access fees, payoff of ISPs, the welfare of EUs, and the
payoff of the CP:

Internet Access Fees
In a non-neutral case, the neutral ISP would always decrease her Internet access fee, while
that of the non-neutral ISP could be higher or lower depending on the parameters of the
market. We now provide insights on when each of these scenarios happens.
First, note that the discount that ISP N provides for EUs in a non-neutral case, i.e.
eq
peq
N,B − pN , is always positive for candidate outcomes (a), (b), and (c) (using previous

results). Thus, the neutral ISP would always decrease her Internet access fee in a nonneutral scenario in order to compete with the non-neutral ISP which is now offering a
better quality.
In a non-neutral regime, if (a) occurs, then the discount that ISP NoN provides for
eq
1
EUs in a non-neutral case is peq
N oN,B − pN oN = 3 (5tN oN + tN ) − κu q̃p (using the previous

results). This discount can be negative or positive, and is decreasing with κu and q̃p , and
increasing with tN oN and tN . Thus, if (i) EUs are not sensitive to the quality, i.e. small
κu , (ii) ISP NoN does not provide a high premium quality, i.e. small q̃p , (iii) end-users
cannot switch between ISPs easily, i.e. tN and tN oN large enough, or a combination of
these factors, then ISP NoN provides a cheaper Internet access fee for EUs in comparison
to the neutral scenario.
For candidate outcome (b) (respectively, (c)), using the results in Sections 2.4.1 and
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eq
eq
1
2.4.2, the amount of discount is peq
N oN,B − pN oN = 3 q̃p (2κad − κu ) (respectively, pN oN,B −

peq
N oN =

1
3 (q̃p

− q̃f )(2κad − κu )). Thus, if 2κad > κu , i.e. the sensitivity of the CP is

high enough, then the discount is positive and is increasing with the premium quality
(respectively, the difference between the premium and free quality). On the other hand,
if the sensitivity of the CP is low, then the discount is negative, i.e. ISP NoN charges
higher access fees to the EUs. The reason is that if the CP is sensitive to the quality, ISP
NoN can charge higher side-payments to the CP. Thus, she can provide some of these
new revenue to EUs as a discount even though they receive a premium quality. This is
not possible when the CP is not sensitive to the quality of her content. In this case, ISP
NoN charges the premium quality to the EUs directly, i.e. higher Internet access fees for
EUs.

Payoff of ISPs
Consider the payoffs of ISPs N and NoN under both neutral and non-neutral scenarios.
The difference in the payoffs for the case κu = 0.5, κad = 1, q̃f = 1, q̃p = 1.5, and tN = 0.3
are plotted in Figure 2.6 (using different parameters values yields same intuitions).
Results reveal that the neutral ISP will lose payoff in all of the non-neutral NE strategies, i.e. those that yield z eq = 1 (Figure 2.6-right). Note that in case (a), ISP N would be
eq
eq
driven out of the market. Thus, πN
= 0, while πN,B
> 0. In cases (b) and (c), although

ISP N is active, she has to subsidize the Internet connection fee for EUs to be able to
compete with ISP NoN, while possibly can attract lower number of EUs. This yields a
loss in the payoff under a non-neutral scenario.
Results also reveal that for a wide range of parameters, ISP NoN receives a better payoff
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Figure 2.6: The difference between the payoff of ISPs for two scenarios with respect to
tN and tN oN

under a non-neutral scenario (Figure 2.6-left). We discussed that ISP NoN extracts the
additional profit of the CP (from the premium quality her EUs receive) in a non-neutral
scenario. In addition, we also explained that for some parameters (κu > 2κad ), ISP NoN
charges higher prices to EUs. Even when ISP NoN subsidizes the Internet access fee for
EUs (2κad > κad ), she would compensate through the side payment charged to the CP
(high κad yields a high side payment). Moreover, ISP NoN can potentially attract more
EUs by providing a cheaper fee or a premium quality (or both). Thus, overall we expect
the non-neutral ISP to receives a better payoff under a non-neutral regime.
However, we can find scenarios in which ISP NoN loses payoff by switching to nonneutrality. For example, with κu = κad = 0.85, q̃f = 1, q̃p = 1.03, tN = 0.05, and
eq
eq
tN oN = 0.8, then πN
oN < πN oN,B . In particular, the payoff of ISP NoN decreases in a

non-neutral regime if the outcome of the market is (a), and κu , κad , q̃p − q̃f , and

tN
tN +tN oN

(the market power of ISP NoN) are small.
We now explain the underlying reason for this counter-intuitive result. Note that
knowing that the other ISP has switched to non-neutrality, the neutral ISP would decrease
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her Internet access fee for EUs to compensate for the superior quality that her competitor
offers. On the other hand, the non-neutral ISP also has to significantly decrease her
Internet access fee for EUs (because of her low market power, competition, and low
sensitivity of EUs to the quality), while not generating enough revenue from the sidepayments received from the CP (because of low sensitivity of the CP to quality or a
premium quality that is not significantly better than a free quality). This makes both
ISPs, lose revenue in a non-neutral setting under the specified conditions. Note that the
non-neutral ISP still extracts the additional profit she creates for EUs.

EU’s Welfare
Recall that from (2.3), the utility of an EU who connects to the ISP j ∈ {N, NoN}
located at distance xj of the ISP, and is receiving the content with quality qj , is uEU,j =
v ∗ + κu qj − tj xj − pj . Now, let us define the Welfare of EUs (EUW) for an EU connected
to ISP j located at distance xj from this ISP to be uEU,j (xj ) − v ∗ = κu qj − pj − tj xj . Note
that we dropped the common valuation v ∗ since it is equal for all EUs in all scenarios,
and is only used to guarantee the full coverage of the market, i.e. to prevent negative
utility for EUs. Thus, the total welfare of EUs is:
Z
EU W =
0

nN


κu qN − pN − tN x dx +

Z

1


κu qN oN − pN oN − tN oN (1 − x) dx

nN

(2.10)

tN oN 2
tN 2
n + (κu qN oN − pN oN )nN oN −
nN oN
= (κu qN − pN )nN −
2 N
2

Note that since we dropped v ∗ , EUW could be negative. In Figures 2.7 and 2.8, we plot
the difference in the EUW of the non-neutral case with the benchmark case for various
parameters of the market, when q̃f = 1 and q̃p = 1.5.
Results reveal that in general, EUW would be higher in a non-neutral setting if (i) the
market power of ISP NoN is low, (ii) the sensitivity of the CP to the quality is high, or (iii)
62

Figure 2.7: Difference in EUW with respect to tN and tN oN

Figure 2.8: Difference in EUW with respect to tN and tN oN

EUs are not very sensitive to the quality, or a combination of these conditions. However,
when both transport costs are sufficiently small, or the sensitivity of EUs (respectively,
the CP) to the quality is high (respectively, low), then the benchmark case yields a better
EUW in comparison to the non-neutral case. We next explain the reasons behind these
results.
Consider the benchmark case. In this case, the welfare of EUs is dependent on the
transport costs and the Internet access fees determined by ISPs N and NoN. Recall that
both access fees are increasing with tN and tN oN . Thus, intuitively, EUW of the benchmark case is decreasing with tN and tN oN .7
7

Note that nN and nN oN are sum up to one. Thus, the effect of access fees on EUW is more than the

effect of number of EUs with each ISP.
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In case (a), in which only the non-neutral ISP is active, EUW is dependent on the
Internet access fee of ISP NoN, i.e. peq
N oN = c + κu q̃p − tN oN . Thus, EUW of the nonneutral scenario with outcome (a) is increasing with respect to tN oN . In other words,
if tN oN is large, ISP NoN should provide a cheaper Internet access fee (subsidizing the
access fee), to attract EUs and keep the neutral ISP out of the market. Thus, EUW
would be high. In addition, the EUW is independent of tN . Thus, as Figures 2.7 and 2.8
confirm , the difference between the EUW of the non-neutral scenario in case (a) and the
EUW of the benchmark case is increasing with respect to tN and tN oN .
We observe that when both transport costs are sufficiently small, the benchmark case
yields a higher EUW than the non-neutral scenario. Note that if tN oN is small, i.e. EUs
can join (switch to) ISP NoN without incurring high transport costs, ISP NoN attracts
all EUs even when quoting a high Internet access fee for EUs (since it offers a premium
quality). Thus, ISP NoN charges a high Internet access fee, and the EUW would be
small. On the other hand, if tN is also small, the EUW of the benchmark case would be
high (as discussed previously). Thus, when both transport costs are sufficiently small, we
expect the benchmark case to yield a better EUW in comparison to the non-neutral case.
Negative differences in Figures 2.7 and 2.8 confirm this intuition. Note that in Figure 2.8,
because of high sensitivity of EUs to the quality, EUW of the neutral scenario is higher
than the non-neutral scenario even when tN or tN oN are not small. Finally, observe that
the maximum difference in the EUWs is achieved for the highest tN and tN oN by which
the outcome of the game is (a), i.e. when only the non-neutral is active.
For candidate outcomes (b) and (c), similar to the benchmark case, the Internet access
fees are increasing with respect to tN and tN oN . Thus, EUW is expected to be decreasing
64

with respect to these transport costs. Results in the figures reveal that the difference in
EUWs is decreasing with respect to tN oN and tN . This means that EUW of the nonneutral case decreases more than EUW of the benchmark case. This difference is positive
when the sensitivity of the EUs to the quality is low, i.e. small κu (Figure 2.7), and
negative when κu is large (Figure 2.8). Recall that the non-neutral ISP provides discount
to EUs when the sensitivity of the CP to the quality is high enough. If not, ISP NoN
charges higher prices to EUs in comparison to the benchmark case. This is the reason
that EUW of the non-neutral case is lower than the benchmark case when EUs are highly
sensitive to the quality they receive.
Thus, the transport costs and the sensitivity of EUs and the CP to the quality are
the important factors in comparing the EUW of the neutral and non-neutral scenario.
As explained, the higher the sensitivity of the CP (respectively, EUs) to the quality, the
higher (respectively, lower) would be EUW in the non-neutral case.

Payoff of the CP
Using (2.2) and the candidate outcomes listed in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, we can calculate
the payoff of the CP in different outcomes. Results yield that the equilibrium payoff of
the CP in all the possible outcomes of the non-neutral scenario and also in the benchmark
eq
eq
scenario are equal and are πCP
= πCP,B
= κad q̃f . The reason is that the non-neutral ISP

is the leader in the this leader-follower game. Thus, knowing the parameters of the game
and the tie-breaking assumption 2 of the CP, it can extract all the profits of the CP and
make it indifferent between taking the non-neutral option and not taking it.
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2.5.4

Does the Market Need to be Regulated?

We showed that in the presence of a “big” monopolistic CP and when EUs can switch
between ISPs, if a non-neutral regime emerges, then neutral ISPs are likely to lose their
market share, and are expected to be forced out of the market. In addition, in any NE
outcome, the neutral ISP would lose payoff. Thus, if the regulator is interested in keeping
some of the neutral ISPs in the market8 , she should provide incentives for them. These
incentives could be in the form of monetary subsidies or tax deductions.
Although for many parameters, the payoff of the non-neutral ISP would be higher
by adopting a non-neutral regime, as explained before, with certain conditions on the
parameters, an ISP is likely to receive a lower payoff by switching to non-neutral regime.
These conditions are when (i) EUs are not sensitive to the quality, i.e. small κu , (ii)
the CP is not sensitive to the quality her EUs receive, i.e. small κad , (iii) ISP NoN
does not offer enough differentiation in the quality, i.e. small q̃p − q̃f , (iv) the market
power of the non-neutral ISP is low, or a combination of these factors. Thus, with
these conditions a non-neutral regime is unlikely to emerge, and there is no need for a
government intervention.

2.6

Discussions on Generalization of the Model

Note that we assumed qN ∈ {0, q̃f } and qN oN ∈ {0, q̃f , q̃p }. This assumption can be
generalized to selecting quality strategies from continuous sets, i.e. qN ∈ [0, q̃f ] and
8

For example, the reason could be to prevent non-neutral ISPs from becoming monopoly or it could

be the social pressure to preserve some neutrality in the market.
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qN oN ∈ [0, q̃p ]. In this case, the CP pays a side payment of p̃qN oN if she chooses qN oN ∈
(q̃f , q̃p ]. In Appendix 2.7.6, we prove that our results herein would continue to hold under
this generalization.
Recall that in our model, being neutral or non-neutral is fixed and is not a decision
variable for ISPs. This means that the non-neutral ISP has already have the infrastructure
for offering a premium quality to the CP. For this reason the fixed cost of investment on
the infrastructure for offering a non-neutral service is not considered in the utility of ISP
NoN (2.1). Even when considering this fixed cost, analyses yield that the results would
be the same as before. Even if we consider both the investment cost and the decision of
ISP NoN on being neutral or non-neutral, then the fixed cost of investment would affect
the comparison between the payoff of ISP NoN in neutral and non-neutral scenarios only
by a constant. This increases the regions of parameters in which an ISP would lose payoff
by switching to a non-neutral regime. The overall intuitions are expected to be the same
as before.
The result that over some parameters, an ISP can lose payoff by switching to a nonneutral regime is dependent on the assumption that the neutral and non-neutral ISPs
first decide on the Internet access fees, and then the non-neutral ISP decides on the
side-payment in the second stage. If we swap the order of these two stages, then the
non-neutral ISP would not lose payoff by switching to non-neutrality since in this case,
she would be the sole leader of the game. Thus, ISP NoN, in the worst case, obtains
the payoff of the neutral scenario. Recall that the reason for our choice of the orders of
the stages of the game is that Internet access fees are expected to be kept constant for a
longer time horizons in comparison to the side-payment.
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Recall that in the hotelling model, we considered EUs to be distributed uniformly
between zero and one. In the case of considering a non-uniform distribution, depending
on the skewness of the probability measure, results would be similar to small tN or tN oN .
For example, if the probability measure is skewed toward zero, i.e. EUs are distributed
close to the neutral ISP, results would be similar to uniform distribution and tN small.

2.7
2.7.1

Appendix
Proofs of Section 2.2.2- Stage 3

First, note that by (2.2), (qN , qN oN ) = (0, 0) yields a payoff of zero, while (q̃f , q̃f ) yields a
payoff of κad q̃f > 0. Thus, we can discard strategy (qN , qN oN ) = (0, 0) from the candidate
solutions in (2.6). In addition, we use tie-breaking Assumption 1 to discard (0, q̃f ) ∈ F0U ,
(q̃f , 0) ∈ F0L , (q̃f , q̃f ) ∈ F0U ∪ F0L , (0, q̃p ) ∈ F0U , and (q̃f , q̃f ) ∈ F1U ∪ F1L . Thus, the
candidate solutions in (2.6) can be divided into the sub-sets characterized in Table 2.1 as
follows:

(0, q̃f ) ∈ F0I ∪ F0L , (q̃f , 0) ∈ F0I ∪ F0U , (q̃f , q̃f ) ∈ F0I , (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I ∪ F1L , (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1I
(2.11)
Moreover, if 0 < nN oN < 1, then the expression for the payoff in (2.2), would be
(using (2.5)):
πCP (qN , qN oN , z) =

tN oN + κu (qN − qN oN ) + pN oN − pN
κad qN
tN + tN oN
+

tN + κu (qN oN − qN ) + pN − pN oN
κad qN oN − z p̃qN oN
tN + tN oN
(2.12)

The following lemmas are used in proving the main results of this section:
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Lemma 1. Let (q̃f , q̃p ) and (0, q̃p ) belong to the set F I , i.e. for them 0 < xN < 1. Then
πG (q̃f , q̃p , z = 1) ≥ πG (0, q̃p , z = 1) if and only if ∆p ≥ ∆pt , where ∆pt = κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) −
tN oN .
Proof. The proof is done by comparing the payoffs (note that in both cases 0 < xN < 1).
We use (2.12) to write the expression of πG (qN , qN oN , z):
πG (q̃f , q̃p , z = 1) ≥ πG (0, q̃p , z = 1) ⇐⇒


tN oN − κu (q̃p − q̃f ) + pN oN − pN κad q̃f + tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) + pN − pN oN κad q̃p

≥ tN + κu q̃p + pN − pN oN κad q̃p
⇐⇒ tN oN − κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) + pN oN − pN ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ∆p ≥ κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN = ∆pt

The result follows.
Lemma 2. Let (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1L , i.e. by which nN oN = 1. Then, πCP (0, q̃p , z = 1) ≥ κad q̃f if
and only if p̃ ≤ p̃t,1 , where p̃t,1 = κad (1 −

q̃f
q̃p ).

Proof. We use (2.2) to write the expression of the payoff of the CP:
πCP (0, q̃p , z = 1) ≥ κad q̃f ⇐⇒ κad q̃p − p̃q̃p ≥ κad q̃f ⇐⇒ p̃ ≤ κad (1 −

q̃f
) = p̃t,1
q̃p

Lemma 3. Let (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I , i.e. by which 0 < nN oN < 1. Then, πCP (0, q̃p , z = 1) ≥
κad q̃f if and only if p̃ ≤ p̃t,2 , where p̃t,2 = κad (nN oN −

q̃f
q̃p )

and nN oN =

tN +κu q̃p −∆p
tN +tN oN .

Proof. We compare the payoff with κad q̃f . We use (2.2) to write the expression of the
payoff of the CP:
πCP (0, q̃p , z = 1) ≥ κad q̃f ⇐⇒ nN oN κad q̃p − p̃q̃p ≥ κad q̃f ⇐⇒ p̃ ≤ κad (nN oN −

where, by (2.5), nN oN =

tN +κu q̃p −∆p
tN +tN oN .

The result follows.
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q̃f
) = p̃t,2
q̃p

Lemma 4. Let (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1I , i.e. by which 0 < nN oN < 1. Then, πG (q̃f , q̃p , z = 1) ≥
κad q̃f if and only if p̃ ≤ p̃t,3 , where p̃t,3 = κad nN oN (1 −

q̃f
q̃p )

and nN oN =

tN +κu (q̃p −q̃f )−∆p
.
tN +tN oN

Proof. We compare the payoff with κad q̃f . We use (2.2) to write the expression of the
payoff of the CP:
πG (q̃f , q̃p , z = 1) ≥ κad q̃f ⇐⇒ (1 − nN oN )κad q̃f + nN oN κad q̃p − p̃q̃p ≥ κad q̃f
⇐⇒ p̃ ≤ κad nN oN (1 −
where, by (2.5), nN oN =

tN +κu (q̃p −q̃f )−∆p
.
tN +tN oN

q̃f
) = p̃t,3
q̃p

The result follows.

Remark 4. The values of ∆pt , p̃t,1 , p̃t,2 , and p̃t,3 characterized in the above lemmas are
used in Definition 3.
∗ , q∗
We should distinguish between the solutions that maximize (2.2), i.e. (qN
N oN ) which

is not unique, and the strategy that is chosen by the CP in the equilibrium, which is a
unique choice among the optimum solutions. Thus, we denote the equilibrium strategy
eq eq
, qN oN ), which subsequently yields the equilibrium fraction of EUs with
of the CP by (qN
eq
eq
each ISP, i.e. xeq
N , NN , and NN oN .

Now, by comparing the payoffs of the candidate solutions and using tie-breaking assumptions, we prove one of the main results of this section, Theorem 1:
eq eq
Proof. Proof of Theorem 1: Note that an equilibrium strategy, i.e. (qN
, qN oN ), should be
∗ , q∗
a global maxima of (2.2). Suppose (qN
N oN ) ∈ F0 . First, in Part A, we separate the
∗ , q∗
L
I
U
cases that (qN
N oN ) is in F0 , F0 , or F0 , characterize the candidate optimum strategy,
∗ , q∗
L
I
U
i.e. (qN
N oN ), chosen by the CP in each of these subsets (Note that F0 ∪ F0 ∪ F0 = F0 ),

and identify the necessary condition on ∆p for each of these candidate optimums to be in
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a particular subset. In Part B, we summarize the candidate optimum strategies. Finally,
in Part C, by comparing the payoffs of the candidate strategies in different regions of ∆p
and using the tie-breaking assumptions, we characterize the equilibrium strategies.
∗ , q∗
I
∗
∗
∗
Part A: First, consider F0I . If (qN
N oN ) ∈ F0 , i.e. z = 0, then (qN , qN oN ), by

(2.11), is (a) (0, q̃f ), or (b) (q̃f , 0), or (c) (q̃f , q̃f ). Note that the necessary and sufficient
condition for each of these candidate outcomes to be in F0I is

∆p−tN
κu

< ∆q ∗ <

∆p+tN oN
κu

(Table 2.1). First consider case (a). Note that ∆q ∗ = q̃f . Thus, the necessary and
sufficient condition for (a) to be in F0I becomes

∆p−tN
κu

< q̃f <

∆p+tN oN
,
κu

which yields

κu q̃f − tN oN < ∆p < κu q̃f + tN . Similarly, For cases (b), the necessary and sufficient
condition is −κu q̃f − tN oN < ∆p < −κu q̃f + tN , and for (c) is −tN oN < ∆p < tN .
∗ , q∗
L
∗
∗
L
Now, consider F0L . If (qN
N oN ) ∈ F0 , then (qN , qN oN ), by (2.11), is (d) (0, q̃f ) ∈ F0 .

Note that, using the condition in Table 2.1, the necessary and sufficient condition for
(0, q̃f ) ∈ F0L is ∆p ≤ κu q̃f − tN oN .
∗ , q∗
U
∗
∗
Finally, consider F0U . If (qN
N oN ) ∈ F0 , then (qN , qN oN ), by (2.11), is (e) (q̃f , 0) ∈

F0U . Using the condition in Table 2.1, the necessary and sufficient condition for (q̃f , 0) ∈
F0U is ∆p ≥ tN − κu q̃f .
Part B: Note that, as mentioned before, the strategy that is chosen by the CP
in the equilibrium is a unique choice among the possible optimum solutions. Thus, if
eq eq
eq eq
(qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F0 , then (qN
, qN oN ) is of the form of one of the followings (the necessary

condition for each to be optimum is also listed):
(a) (0, q̃f ) ∈ F0I , if this is overall optimum then κu q̃f − tN oN < ∆p < κu q̃f + tN (the
necessary condition).
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(b) (q̃f , 0) ∈ F0I , the necessary condition: −κu q̃f − tN oN < ∆p < −κu q̃f + tN .
(c) (q̃f , q̃f ) ∈ F0I , the necessary condition: −tN oN < ∆p < tN .
(d) (0, q̃f ) ∈ F0L , the necessary condition: ∆p ≤ κu q̃f − tN oN .
(e) (q̃f , 0) ∈ F0U , the necessary condition: ∆p ≥ −κu q̃f + tN .
Part C: Now, we compare the payoffs of the CP at each candidate solutions, and use
tie-breaking assumptions whenever needed to get the equilibrium strategies of the CP.
The payoff of the CP, for each candidate solution, is as follows (by (2.2)):
πCP,(a) = nN oN κad q̃f
πCP,(b) = nN κad q˜f

& 0 < nN oN < 1
& 0 < nN < 1
(2.13)

πCP,(c) = κad q˜f
πCP,(d) = κad q˜f
πCP,(e) = κad q˜f

Next, we characterize the equilibrium strategies in different intervals of ∆p. First
consider −tN oN < ∆p < tN . Note that in this case, ∆p satisfies the necessary condition
of (c) being a candidate strategy, and also the necessary and sufficient condition of (c)
being in F0I . In addition, πCP,(c) > πCP,(a) and πCP,(c) > πCP,(b) . Thus, (a) and (b)
cannot be overall optimum solutions. Moreover, πCP,(c) = πCP,(d) and πCP,(c) = πCP,(e) .
Using tie-breaking assumption 3 yields that the CP prefers (c) to (d) and (e). Thus,
(q̃f , q̃f ) ∈ F0I is chosen as the equilibrium strategy in this interval, and case 1 of the
lemma follows.
Now, consider ∆p ≥ tN . Note that in this case, ∆p satisfies the necessary condition
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of (e) being a candidate strategy, and also the necessary and sufficient condition of (e) to
be in F0U . In addition, this condition rules out (b) and (c). However, for certain intervals
of ∆p ≥ tN , the necessary condition of candidate strategies (a) and (d) can be satisfied.
We now compare the payoff of (e) to (a) and (d). First note that πCP,(e) > πCP,(a) . Thus
candidate strategy (a) can be discarded. Also, πCP,(e) = πCP,(d) . Since ∆p = pN oN −pN ≥
tN > 0, and by using tie-breaking assumption 5, candidate strategy (e), i.e. (q̃f , 0) ∈ F0U
is chosen as the equilibrium strategy in this interval by the CP. Thus, case 2 of the lemma
follows.
Finally, consider ∆p ≤ −tN oN . Note that in this case, ∆p satisfies the necessary
condition of (d) to be a candidate strategy, and also the necessary and sufficient condition
of (d) to be in F0L . In addition, this condition rules out (a) and (c). However, for certain
intervals of ∆p ≤ −tN oN , the necessary condition of candidate strategies (b) and (e)
can be satisfied. We now compare the payoff of (d) to (b) and (e). First note that
πCP,(d) > πCP,(b) . Thus candidate strategy (b) can be discarded. Also, πCP,(d) = πCP,(e) .
Since ∆p = pN oN − pN ≤ −tN oN < 0, and by using tie-breaking assumption 5, candidate
strategy (d), i.e. (0, q̃f ) ∈ F0L is chosen as the equilibrium strategy in this interval by the
CP. Thus, case 3 of the lemma follows.
Note that by (2.13), πCP,(a) = πCP,(b) = πCP,(c) = κad q̃f and these are all the candidate
solutions.Thus, the utility of the CP by each candidate equilibrium strategy would be
κad q̃f . The result follows.
Now, we focus on characterizing the candidate strategies and the necessary condition
for each of them when z eq = 1.

73

eq eq
eq eq
Theorem 11. If (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F1 , then (qN
, qN oN ) is of the form of one of the followings:

(a) (0, q̃p ), the necessary condition: κu q̃p −tN oN < ∆p < κu q̃p +tN . In addition, (0, q̃p ) ∈
F1I if and only if κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆p < κu q̃p + tN .
(b) (q̃f , q̃p ), the necessary condition: κu (q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN < ∆p < κu (q̃p − q̃f ) + tN . In
addition, (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1I iff κu (q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN < ∆p < κu (q̃p − q̃f ) + tN .
(c) (0, q̃p ), the necessary condition: ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN . In addition, (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1L iff
∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN .
L
I
∗
∗
∗ , q∗
Proof. Suppose (qN
N oN ) ∈ F1 . We separate the cases that (qN , qN oN ) is in F1 , F1 ,

or F1U , characterize the candidate optimum solutions chosen by the CP in each of these
subsets, and identify the necessary condition on ∆p for each of these candidate optimum
strategies to be in a particular subset.
Note that by (2.11), no optimum strategy is chosen in the set F1U . Thus, we characterize the optimum strategies chosen in F1I and F1L by the CP.
∗ , q∗
I
∗
∗
Now, consider F1I . By (2.11), if (qN
N oN ) ∈ F1 , then (qN , qN oN ) is (a) (0, q̃p ) or

(b) (q̃f , q̃p ). The necessary condition for each of them to be optimum is to be in F1I . In
addition, the necessary and sufficient condition for each of these candidate outcomes to
be in F1I is

∆p−tN
κu

< ∆q ∗ <

∆p+tN oN
κu

(by Table 2.1). Thus, for case (a), the necessary

and sufficient condition is κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆p < κu q̃p + tN (note that ∆q ∗ = q̃p ), and for
case (b) is κu (q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN < ∆p < κu (q̃p − q̃f ) + tN . These yields candidate strategies
(a) and (b) and their conditions of the Theorem.
∗ , q∗
L
∗
∗
Consider F1L . By (2.11), if (qN
N oN ) ∈ F1 , then (qN , qN oN ) is (c) (0, q̃p ). Note

that the necessary and sufficient condition for (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1L is ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN (by the
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(q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1I

−tN oN + κu (q̃p − q̃f )

(0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I

tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f )

κu q̃p − tN oN

∆p
κu q̃p + tN

(0, q̃p ) ∈ F1L

Figure 2.9: A schematic view of the ordering of different candidate equilibrium stratwgies
characterized in Theorem 11 with respect to ∆p when q̃f >

tN +tN oN
κu

and z = 1.

condition in Table 2.1 and ∆q = q̃p ). The theorem follows.
The payoff of the CP in each candidate solution of Theorem 11 is as follows (using
(2.2)):
πCP,(a) = nN oN κad q̃p − p̃q̃p

& 0 < nN oN < 1

πCP,(b) = (1 − n0N oN )κad q˜f + n0N oN κad q̃p − p̃q̃p & 0 < n0N < 1

(2.14)

πCP,(c) = κad q̃p − p̃q̃p
Thus, the payoffs are a function of p̃ and ∆p. Now, to get the second main result
of this section, we compare the payoff of the candidate answers with the payoff of the
candidate strategies when z = 0 considering different values of p̃ and ∆p, and pick the
maximum as the equilibrium strategy of the CP. Thus Theorem 2 is proved as follows:
Proof of Theorem 2:
Proof. Now, for different regions of ∆p, we compare the payoffs of the candidate equilibrium strategies characterized in Theorem 11 to each other and also to the equilibrium
strategies in Theorem 1, and use tie-breaking assumptions (whenever needed) to characterize the equilibrium strategies of the CP.
First consider ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN . In this case, ∆p satisfies the necessary condition of
candidate strategy (c) in Theorem 11. In addition, note that by (2.14), πCP,(c) > πCP,(a)
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and πCP,(c) > πCP,(b) (by q̃p > q̃f ). Thus, for this region, (c) is chosen if and only
if this strategy yields a higher or equal (by tie-breaking assumption 2) payoff than the
payoff when z eq = 0, that is κu q̃f (by Theorem 1). Thus, using Lemma 2, z eq = 1, and
eq eq
(qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1L if p̃ ≤ p̃t,1 . Otherwise z eq = 0, since the payoff of (c) and

subsequently (a) and (b) are smaller than the payoff when z eq = 0. Thus, in this case,
the equilibrium strategy can be found using Theorem 1. This is item 1 of the theorem.
For ∆p ≥ tN + κu q̃p , the necessary condition of none of the candidate strategies in
Theorem 11 can be satisfied. Therefore, z eq = 0. This is item 4 of the theorem.
Now, for the rest of the proof, we consider κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆p < tN + κu q̃p . In this
case, the necessary condition of candidate strategy (c) of Theorem 11 cannot be satisfied.
Therefore, we can eliminate (c). On the other hand, the necessary and sufficient condition
of (a) of Theorem 11 can be met. Now, consider two different cases, q̃f ≤
q̃f >

tN +tN oN
κu

and

tN +tN oN
:
κu

• q̃f ≤

tN +tN oN
.
κu

This yields that κu q̃p − tN oN ≤ tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ). For this case,

consider two sub-cases:
– κu q̃p −tN oN < ∆p < tN +κu (q̃p −q̃f ). In this case, ∆p satisfies the necessary and
sufficient condition of (b) in Theorem 11. Now, we should compare πG,(a) and
πG,(b) . In Lemma 1, we compare the payoff of the two solutions. In addition,
by tie breaking assumption 4, when the payoffs are equal the CP chooses (b)
over (a). Thus, if ∆p ≥ ∆pt , (b), i.e. (q̃f , q̃p ) would be chosen versus (a).
Otherwise (a), i.e. (0, q̃p ) would be chosen. Now, we compare the payoff of the
one chosen with the payoff of the case z = 0, i.e. κad q̃f :
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∗ If ∆p ≥ ∆pt , then by Lemma 4 and tie-breaking assumption 2, z eq = 1
eq eq
and (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1I if p̃ ≤ p̃t,3 (by comparing the payoff of

strategy (b) by the payoff when z = 0, i.e. κad q̃f ). Otherwise z eq = 0, and
the equilibrium strategy can be found using Theorem 1. This is item 2-a-i
of the theorem.
∗ If ∆p < ∆pt , then by Lemma 3 and tie-breaking assumption 2, z eq = 1
eq eq
and(qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I if p̃ ≤ p̃t,2 (by comparing the payoff of

strategy (a) by the payoff when z = 0, i.e. κad q̃f ). Otherwise z eq = 0, and
the equilibrium strategy can be found using Theorem 1. This is item 2-a-ii
of the theorem.
– tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) ≤ ∆p < tN + κu q̃p : In this range, the necessary condition of
(b) of Theorem 11 cannot be satisfied. Thus, the only candidate solution by
which z = 1, whose necessary and sufficient conditions can be satisfied, is (a)
(as stated before). Therefore, we should compare the payoff of (a) with that of
when z eq = 0, i.e. κad q̃f . Using Lemma 3 and Assumption 2, if p̃ ≤ p̃t,2 then
eq eq
z eq = 1 and (qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I . Otherwise z eq = 0, and the equilibrium

strategy can be found using Theorem 1. This is item 2-b of the theorem.
• q̃f >

tN +tN oN
:
κu

In this case, κu q̃p − tN oN > tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ). Thus, the necessary

condition of (b) cannot be satisfied. Therefore, we can eliminate (c) (eliminated
before) and (b). On the other hand, the necessary and sufficient condition of (a) of
Theorem 11 can be met. Therefore, we should compare the payoff of (a) with that
of when z eq = 0, i.e. κad q̃f . Using Lemma 3 and Assumption 2, if p̃ ≤ p̃t,2 then
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eq eq
z eq = 1 and (qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I . Otherwise z eq = 0, since the payoff of (a) is

smaller than the payoff when z eq = 0. Thus, in this case, the equilibrium strategy
can be found using Theorem 1. This is item 3 of the theorem. The result follows.

The following lemma simplify item 2-a of Theorem 2, and is useful in the next stages:
Lemma 5. Consider κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆p < tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ). If q̃p ≥
∆p < ∆pt . If q̃p <

tN +tN oN
,
κu

tN +tN oN
,
κu

then

then κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆pt < tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ), where

∆pt = κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN characterized in Lemma 1.
Proof. Proof: First, consider q̃p ≥

tN +tN oN
.
κu

Note that:

∆pt − (tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f )) = κu q̃p − tN − tN oN ≥ 0
Thus for every ∆p such that ∆p < tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ), ∆pt > ∆p. This establish the first
part of the lemma.
Now, consider q̃p <

tN +tN oN
.
κu

In this case:

∆pt − (tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f )) = κu q̃p − tN − tN oN < 0
and
∆pt − (κu q̃p − tN oN ) = κu (q̃p − q̃f ) > 0

(since q̃p > q̃f )

Thus, κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆pt < tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ). The result follows.
Theorem 2 and Lemma 5 yields the following corollary:
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Corollary 1. Let q̃p ≥

tN +tN oN
.
κu

Then the structure of the optimum answers of the CP

(results in Theorem 2) for the case that q̃f ≤
q̃f >

tN +tN oN
κu

is the same as the results when

tN +tN oN
.
κu

Proof. Proof: Note that items 1 and 4 of Theorem 3 are the same for both cases, regardless
of q̃f . In addition by Lemma 5, when q̃p ≥

tN +tN oN
,
κu

then ∆p < ∆pt . Thus, 2-a-i in

Theorem 2 would not happen. Note that 2-a-ii and 2-b yields is similar to 3. Thus, the
two structures are similar, and the corollary follows.

2.7.2

Proofs of Section 2.2.3 - Stage 2

First, we prove Theorem 4. Then using the results of this theorem, we prove Theorem 3.

Proof of Theorem 4
It is sufficient to prove that if any one of the conditions (1) ∆p < tN + κu q̃p , (2) p̃eq = p̃t ,
or (3) πN oN (pN oN , p̃t ) > πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃) is not true, then z eq = 0. Thus, in each of
the following cases, we consider one of these conditions to be not true, and prove that
z eq = 0.
• Case 1-∆p ≥ tN + κu q̃p : By Theorem 2, when ∆p ≥ tN + κu q̃p , z eq = 0. This case
follows.
• Case 2-p̃eq 6= p̃t : if ∆p ≥ tN + κu q̃p , using case 1, z eq = 0. Now, consider ∆p <
tN + κu q̃p . In this case, either p̃eq > p̃t or p̃eq < p̃t . We claim that no p̃ such that
p̃ < p̃t can be an optimum solution (the claim is proved in the next paragraph).
Thus, p̃eq > p̃t . Note that p̃eq > p̃t yields z eq = 0 (by Theorem 2). Thus, the case
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follows.
Now, we prove that no p̃ such that p̃ < p̃t can be an optimum solution. Note that
by Theorem 2, when ∆p < tN + κu q̃p , for p̃ ≤ p̃t , the CP chooses z = 1. Thus,
the payoff of ISP NoN (2.7) is equal to (pN oN − c)nN oN + p̃q̃f , and is a strictly
increasing function of p̃ (note that pN oN is fixed and by (2.5), nN oN is independent
of p̃). Thus, every p̃ such that p̃ < p̃t , yields a strictly smaller payoff for ISP NoN
in comparison to the the payoff when p̃ = p̃t . Thus, no p̃ such that p̃ < p̃t can be
an optimum solution. The result follows.
• Case 3-πN oN (pN oN , p̃t ) ≤ πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃): In this case, either p̃eq 6= p̃t or p̃eq =
p̃t . Note that by Case 2, p̃eq 6= p̃t yields z eq = 0, which yields the result.
Now, consider p̃eq = p̃t . Note that by Theorem 2, the non-neutral ISP can ensure
z eq = 0, by choosing p̃ greater than max{p̃t,1 , p̃t,2 , p̃t,3 }. Thus, since p̃eq = p̃t ,
πN oN (pN oN , p̃t ) = πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃).9 By tie-breaking assumption 6, z eq = 0. The
theorem follows.

Proof of Theorem 3
First, note that by Theorem 4, if z eq = 1 then πN oN (pN oN , p̃t ) > πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃) and
∆p < tN + κu q̃p . To prove the reverse, note that if πN oN (pN oN , p̃t ) > πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃)
and ∆p < tN + κu q̃p , p̃ that yields z eq = 0 cannot be an optimum answer. Note that
by Theorem 2, when p̃ = p̃t , the ISP NoN can make sure that z eq = 1. Thus, in the
equilibrium, z eq = 1. The result follows.
9

if not, then p̃eq 6= p̃t , since p̃t is not optimum.
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2.7.3

Proofs of Section 2.2.4 - Stage 1

Proof of Theorem 5
We consider different regions of ∆p in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. For each region, we
prove that there is no NE.
First, consider ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN . Note that in this region, the payoff of non-neutral
ISP if z eq = 0 is at most peq
N oN −c (by (2.1)). On the other hand, by Theorem 2, by choosing
p̃0 = p̃t,1 , ISP NoN can ensure that the CP chooses z eq = 1. In this case, the payoff of
eq
non-neutral ISP (by (2.1)) is p0N oN − c + p̃t,1 q̃N oN = peq
N oN − c + κad (q̃p − q̃f ) > pN oN − c.
eq
eq = 1. Thus, in this
Thus, πN oN (peq
N oN , p̃t,1 ) > πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃), and by Theorem 3, z

case, there is no NE by which z eq = 0.
eq
eq = 0 and ∆peq > κ q̃ −
Now, Consider peq
u p
N and pN oN to be NE strategies by which z

tN oN . Note that tN + tN oN ≤ κu q̃p (assumption of the theorem) yields κu q̃p − tN oN ≥ tN ,
and ∆peq > tN . Thus, by item 2 of Theorem 1, neq
N = 1. Consider a unilateral deviation by
eq
0
neutral ISP such that p0N = peq
N + in which  > 0 such that pN oN −pN > κu q̃p −tN oN . Note
eq
eq
eq
0
0
, and qN
that the values of z eq , qN
oN is the same as before, since still ∆p = pN oN − pN >

tN . Thus, again neq
N = 1, and by (2.1), the payoff of neutral ISP is an increasing function
of pN . Thus, p0N is a profitable unilateral deviation. This contradicts the assumption that
eq
peq
N and pN oN is NE. Thus, the result of the theorem follows.

Proof of Theorem 6
Before proving the theorem, we state two lemmas with their proof which are used in the
proof of the theorem:
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Lemma 6. If pN oN = c + κu q̃p − tN oN and pN = c, then z eq = 1.
Proof. Proof: Note that in this case, ∆p = κu q̃p − tN oN . Thus, p̃t = p̃t,1 . Therefore, using
Theorem 3, it is sufficient to prove that πN oN (pN oN , p̃t,1 ) > πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃), where
πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃) is the payoff of ISP NoN when z eq = 0. Note that πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃) ≤
pN oN − c = κu q̃p − tN oN and πN oN (pN oN , p̃t,1 ) = κu q̃p − tN oN + κad (q̃p − q̃f ) (since by
Theorem 2, nN oN = 1, and by (2.1)). In addition, note that, q̃p > q̃f . Thus, this condition
holds, and the result follows.
Lemma 7. If pN oN = c +
tN +2tN oN
κu +κad ,

tN oN +2tN +q̃p (κu −2κad )
,
3

pN = c +

2tN oN +tN −q̃p (κu +κad )
,
3

q̃p <

and κu q̃p ≥ tN + tN oN , then z eq = 1.

Proof. Proof: Note that if κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆p < tN + κu q̃p , by definition of p̃t (Definition 4), p̃t = p̃t,2 . Thus, by Theorem 3, it is enough to prove that πN oN (pN oN , p̃t,2 ) >
πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃), where πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃) is the payoff of ISP NoN when z eq = 0.
First, we prove that πN oN (pN oN , p̃t,2 ) > pN − c + κu q̃p − tN oN + κad (q̃p − q̃f ):
πN oN (pN oN , p̃t,2 ) ≥ pN − c + κu q̃p − tN oN + κad (q̃p − q̃f )
2
tN oN + 2tN + q̃p (κu + κad )
tN − tN oN + 2q̃p (κu + κad )
≥
⇐⇒
9(tN + tN oN )
3
⇐⇒ (q̃p (κu + κad ) − tN − 2tN oN )2 ≥ 0

In addition, note that pN − c + κu q̃p − tN oN + κad (q̃p − q̃f ) > 0, since pN ≥ c (under the
condition q̃p <

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad ),

κu q̃p − tN oN ≥ tN > 0 (by the assumption of the lemma), and

q̃p > q̃f . Thus, πN oN (pN oN , p̃t,2 ) > 0.
Now, consider πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃). Note that by the assumption of the lemma κu q̃p ≥
tN + tN oN . Thus, ∆p > tN , and by item 2 of Theorem 1, if z eq = 0, nN oN = 0. Thus, by
(2.1), πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃) = 0. Therefore, πN oN (pN oN , p̃t,2 ) > πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃), and the
result follows.
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Now, we prove Theorem 6:
Proof. Proof of Theorem 6: We use the optimum strategies of the CP characterized in
Theorem 2 to characterize Nash equilibria. Note that for the case that κu q̃p ≥ tN + tN oN ,
by Corollary 1, the structure of the equilibrium strategies chosen by the CP is similar
to the case that κu q̃f > tN + tN oN . Thus, in this case, items 1, 3, and 4 of Theorem 2
characterizes the NE strategies chosen by the CP. Thus, henceforth we assume κu q̃p ≥
tN + tN oN , and use these items to prove the theorem.
We denote ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN by region A, κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆p < tN + κu q̃p by region
B, and ∆p ≥ tN + κu q̃p by region C. Using Theorem 2, if z eq = 1, then ∆p < tN + κu q̃p .
Thus, to characterize NE strategies by which z eq = 1, we should characterize any possible
NE strategies in regions A and B. In Case A, we prove that the only possible NE in
eq
region A is peq
N oN = c + κu q̃p − tN oN and pN = c. In addition, we prove that these

strategies are NE if q̃p ≥

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad .

If not, then there is no NE in region A. In Case B,

we prove that the only possible NE in region B is peq
N oN = c +
peq
N = c+

2tN oN +tN −q̃p (κu +κad )
.
3

strategies if q̃p ≥

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad .

tN oN +2tN +q̃p (κu −2κad )
3

and

In addition, we prove that these strategies can be NE

If not, then there is no NE in region B.

eq
eq
eq
Case A: We characterize the NE strategies peq
N and pN oN such that ∆p = pN oN −
eq = 1 the only possible NE
peq
N ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN . First, in Case A-1, we prove that if z
eq
eq is
in this region is peq
N oN = c + κu q̃p − tN oN and pN = c, and with these strategies, z

indeed equal to 1. In Case A-2, we characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions
by which there is no unilateral profitable deviation for ISPs. This provides the necessary
and sufficient condition for these strategies to be NE.
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eq eq
Case A-1: Note that by Theorem 2, for region A, (qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1L if

and only if p̃ ≤ p̃t,1 = κad (1 −
p̃t,1 = κad (1 −

q̃f
q̃p ).

q̃f
q̃p ).

In addition, by Theorem 4, if z eq = 1 then p̃eq =

Thus, in this region, if z eq = 1, the payoff of ISP NoN is equal to

pN oN −c+ q̃p p̃t,1 (by (2.1)) since nN oN = 1. Therefore, the payoff is an increasing function
of pN oN . In addition, note that in region A, nN = 0 and regardless of pN , the neutral
ISP receives a payoff of zero (by (2.1)). Thus, peq
N oN , i.e. the equilibrium Internet access
fee, should be such that the neutral ISP cannot get a positive payoff by increasing or
decreasing pN , and changing the region of ∆p to B or C. Using this condition, we find
the equilibrium strategy.
Note that increasing pN decreases ∆p, and cannot change the region of ∆p. We claim
that by decreasing pN to p0N such that pN oN − p0N > κu q̃p − tN oN , the ISP N can fetch a
positive payoff as long as p0N > c (the claim is proved in the next paragraph). Therefore,
0
in the equilibrium, peq
N oN is such that even with pN = c (the minimum plausible price),

∆p ≤ κu q̃p −tN oN . Thus, peq
N oN ≤ c+κu q̃p −tN oN . Given that the payoff of ISP NoN is an
increasing function of pN oN , we get peq
N oN = c + κu q̃p − tN oN . In addition, we claim that
eq
eq
eq
peq
N = c. If not, then pN > c. In this case, ∆p = pN − pN oN < κu q̃p − tN oN . We argued

that the payoff of ISP NoN is an increasing function of pN oN . Thus, by increasing pN oN
such that ∆p = κu q̃p − tN oN , ISP NoN can increase her payoff, which is a contradiction
eq
with peq
N and pN oN being NE strategies.

To prove the claim, note that if pN oN − p0N > κu q̃p − tN oN , then either (i) z eq = 0 or
(ii) z eq = 1. Note that ∆p > κu q̃p − tN oN ≥ tN , since q̃p ≥

tN +tN oN
.
κu

Thus, for case (i),

eq eq
(qN
, qN oN ) is of the form of part 2 of Theorem 1. Thus, nN = 1. Therefore ISP N can

fetch a positive payoff as long as pN > c (by (2.1)). Now consider case (ii), i.e. z eq = 1.
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Note that when pN oN − p0N > κu q̃p − tN oN , ∆p is either in region B or C. By Theorem 2,
the only deviation that yields z eq = 1 is p0N such that ∆p in region B. Note that in this
region, by item 3 of Theorem 2, nN > 0. Thus, ISP N can fetch a positive payoff as long
as pN > c (by (2.1)). This completes the proof of the claim that by decreasing pN to p0N
such that pN oN − p0N > κu q̃p − tN oN , the ISP N can fetch a positive payoff as long as
p0N > c.
eq
Therefore, the NE strategies are peq
N oN = c+κu q̃p −tN oN and pN = c, and the payoff of
q̃

the ISP NoN at this price by (2.1) and p̃t,1 = κad (1− q̃fp ) is equal to (note that nN oN = 1),
and
eq
πN
oN = κu q̃p − tN oN + q̃p p̃t,1 = κu q̃p − tN oN + κad (q̃p − q̃f )

which is strictly positive since q̃p ≥

tN +tN oN
κu

(2.15)

and q̃p > q̃f .

eq
eq = 1.
Note that Lemma 6 yields that with peq
N and pN oN z
eq
Case A-2: Now, in order to prove that peq
N and pN oN are indeed NE strategies, we

show that there is no unilateral profitable deviation for ISPs. First, in Case (A-2-i) we rule
out the possibility of a unilateral profitable deviation for ISP N. Then, in Case (A-2-ii)
we rule out a possibility of a downward unilateral profitable deviation, i.e. pN oN < peq
N oN ,
for ISP NoN. Finally, in Case (A-3-iii), we consider a deviation of the form pN oN > peq
N oN
for ISP NoN, and prove that the necessary and sufficient condition for this deviation to
be not profitable is q̃p ≥
Case A-2-i:

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad .

eq
The construction of strategies peq
N and pN oN yields that there is no

profitable deviation for ISP N. To prove this formally, note that the only deviation for
ISP N that might be profitable is pN > c. With this deviation, ∆p would be still in
region A, in which nN = 0, and the payoff of ISP N is zero. Thus, such a deviation is not
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profitable.
Case A-2-ii:

Now, consider a deviation by ISP NoN such that pN oN < peq
N oN . In

this case, ∆p is in region A, and the payoff of ISP NoN is equal to pN oN − c + q̃p p̃t,1
(by (2.1) and nN oN = 1). Thus, the payoff of ISP NoN is strictly increasing in region A.
eq
Therefore, peq
N oN dominates all prices pN oN < pN oN . Thus, this kind of deviation is not

profitable for ISP NoN.
Case A-2-iii:

In this case, we consider a deviation such that pN oN > peq
N oN . Thus,

∆p > κu q̃p − tN oN . Therefore, ∆p is either in Region B or C. First, in Case A-2-iii-a
we rule out the possibility of a profitable unilateral deviation in region C. Then, in Case
A-2-iii-b, we rule out the possibility of a profitable unilateral deviation in region B if
z eq = 0. Finally, in Case A-2-iii-c, we prove that a deviation to region B if z eq = 1 is not
profitable if and only if q̃p ≥

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad .

Case A-2-iii-a: Using item 4 of Theorem 2, if ∆p in region C, i.e. ∆p ≥ tN + κu q̃p ,
eq eq
, qN oN ) is of the form of part 2 of Theorem 1 (note that
then z eq = 0. In this case, (qN

κu q̃p ≥ tN + tN oN ). Thus, nN oN = 0. Therefore, the ISP NoN receives a payoff of zero,
and a deviation of this kind in not profitable for this ISP (since the equilibrium payoff is
positive.).
Case A-2-iii-b:

Consider a deviation to Region B by ISP NoN by which z eq = 0.

then by item 2 of Theorem 1, nN oN = 0. Therefore, the ISP NoN receives a payoff of
zero, and a deviation of this kind in not profitable for this ISP.
Case A-2-iii-c:

Now, consider Consider a deviation to Region B by ISP NoN by

which z eq = 1. In this case, by item 3 of Theorem 2, (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I , and by Theorem 4 and
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Lemma 3, p̃eq = p̃t,2 = κad (nN oN −

q̃f
q̃p )

and nN oN =

tN +κu q̃p −∆p
tN +tN oN .

Therefore, using (2.1):

πN oN (p̃0N oN , p̃t,2 ) = (p0N oN − c)nN oN + κad (nN oN q̃p − q̃f )
=
in which nN oN =

tN +κu q̃p −p0N oN +c
.
tN +tN oN

(p0N oN

(2.16)

− c + κad q̃p )nN oN − κad q̃f

The maximum πN oN (p̃0N oN , p̃t,2 ) can be found by

applying the first order condition on the payoff, which gives us:
1
p∗N oN = c + (tN + q̃p (κu − κad ))
2

(2.17)

eq
This deviation is a profitable deviation in region B if (i) πN oN (p̃∗N oN , p̃t,2 ) > πN
oN and

(ii) κu q̃p − tN oN < p∗N oN − c < tN + κu q̃p . We also claim (claim is proved in the next two
paragraphs) that if any deviation to region B is profitable, then (i) πN oN (p̃∗N oN , p̃t,2 ) >
eq
∗
πN
oN and (ii) κu q̃p − tN oN < pN oN − c < tN + κu q̃p . Thus, a deviation to this region is
eq
∗
profitable if and only if (i) πN oN (p̃∗N oN , p̃t,2 ) > πN
oN and (ii) κu q̃p − tN oN < pN oN − c <

tN + κu q̃p .
eq
Now, we prove the claim that (i) πN oN (p̃∗N oN , p̃t,2 ) > πN
oN and (ii) κu q̃p − tN oN <

p∗N oN − c < tN + κu q̃p . are necessary condition for a profitable deviation. First, we prove
that (ii) is a necessary condition. Suppose (ii) is not true. We claim that no p0N oN such
that κu q̃p −tN oN < p0N oN −c < tN +κu q̃p can be a profitable deviation. To prove this, note
that by concavity of (2.16), if p∗N oN is not such that κu q̃p − tN oN < p∗N oN − c < tN + κu q̃p ,
then all p0N oN such that κu q̃p − tN oN < p0N oN − c < tN + κu q̃p yields a strictly lower payoff
than the maximum of payoffs at the boundary points. Note that with the upper boundary
point, ∆p = p0N oN − c = tN + κu q̃p . In this case, by item 4 of Theorem 2, z eq = 0, and by
item 2 of Theorem 1, nN oN = 0. Thus, the payoff of ISP NoN is zero (by (2.1)). On the
other hand, in the lower boundary point, i.e. p0N oN = κu q̃p − tN oN + c is equal to peq
N oN .
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Thus, the maximum payoff at the boundary points is equal to the equilibrium payoff.
Therefore, if p∗N oN is not such that κu q̃p − tN oN < p∗N oN − c < tN + κu q̃p , then all p0N oN
such that κu q̃p − tN oN < p0N oN − c < tN + κu q̃p , yields a payoff which is strictly less than
the equilibrium payoff. The proof of (ii) being a necessary condition is complete.
Now, we prove that (i) is a necessary condition. Suppose (i) is not true and:
eq
πN oN (p̃∗N oN , p̃t,2 ) ≤ πN
oN

Then, either (ii) is true or not. If (ii) is not true, in the previous paragraph, we prove
that no p0N oN if Region B can be a profitable deviation, which yields the result. Now,
consider the case that (ii) holds. In this case, by concavity of the payoff, p∗N oN yields the
eq
highest payoff among pN oN ’s in Region B. Thus, πN oN (p̃∗N oN , p̃t,2 ) ≤ πN
oN yields that a

deviation to Region B cannot be profitable. This completes the proof of the claim.
eq
Thus, a deviation to region B is profitable if and only if (i) πN oN (p̃∗N oN , p̃t,2 ) > πN
oN

and (ii) κu q̃p −tN oN < p∗N oN −c < tN +κu q̃p . First we check (i) and then (ii). Using (2.16),
(2.17), and the expressions of nN oN , we find the payoff of ISP NoN after deviation and
compare it to the value of (2.25). We claim that (i) is always true unless q̃p =

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad .

Note that:
eq
πN oN (p̃∗N oN , p̃t,2 ) ≥ πN
oN ⇐⇒

⇐⇒
Thus, (i) is true if and only if q̃p 6=

(tN + q̃p (κad + κu ))2
≥ q̃p (κu + κad ) − tN oN
4(tN + tN oN )
(κu + κad )q̃p − tN − 2tN oN

2

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad .

Now, we check (ii). Note that p∗N oN − c < tN + κu q̃p since:
p∗N oN − c < tN + κu q̃p ⇐⇒ q̃p (κu + κad ) > −tN
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≥0

is always true. Now, we should check the lowerbound, i.e. κu q̃p − tN oN < p∗N oN − c:
κu q̃p − tN oN < p∗N oN − c ⇐⇒ q̃p (κu + κad ) < tN + 2tN oN
which is true if and only if q̃p <

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad .

Now, using the conditions for (i) and (ii) to be true, we can say that (i) and (ii) are
true if and only if κu q̃p − tN oN < p∗N oN − c. Thus, there is no profitable deviation to
region B if and only if q̃p ≥

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad .

eq
This completes the proof of item 1 of theorem that peq
N oN = c+κu q̃p −tN oN and pN = c

are NE strategies if and only if q̃p ≥

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad .

Case B: Now, we characterize any possible NE strategies in region B, i.e. κu q̃p −
tN oN < ∆p < tN + κu q̃p , by which z eq = 1. First, in case B-1 we prove that if z eq = 1,
the only possible NE in this region is peq
N oN = c +
2tN oN +tN −q̃p (κu +κad )
.
3

be a NE is q̃p <

tN oN +2tN +q̃p (κu −2κad )
3

and peq
N = c+

We also prove that the necessary condition for these strategies to

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad ,

and verify that these strategies yield z eq = 1. In case B-

2, we characterize the necessary and sufficient condition by which these is no unilateral
profitable deviation for ISPs.
Case B-1: Note that in this region, by item 3 of Theorem 2, if z eq = 1, then
eq eq
(qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I . In addition, by Theorem 4, p̃eq = p̃t,2 = κad (nN oN −

and nN oN =

tN +κu q̃p −∆p
tN +tN oN

q̃f
q̃p )

(by (2.5)). Thus, by (2.1), the payoff of ISP NoN in this

region is πN oN,B (pN oN , p̃t,2 ) = (pN oN − c)nN oN + p̃t,2 q̃p , and the payoff of ISP N is
πN,B = (pN − c)(1 − nN oN ). Note that p̃t,2 q̃p = κad (q̃p nN oN − q̃f ). Thus, using the
expression of nN oN , the payoffs are:
πN oN,B = (pN oN − c + κad q̃p )(

tN + κu q̃p + pN − pN oN
) − κad q̃f
tN + tN oN
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(2.18)

πN,B = (pN − c)(

tN oN − κu q̃p + pN oN − pN
)
tN + tN oN

(2.19)

Note that any NE inside this region should satisfy the first order optimality condition
(note that the payoffs are concave). Thus,
dπN
= 0 ⇒ tN oN − κu q̃p + pN oN − 2pN + c = 0
dpN
dπN oN,B
= 0 ⇒ tN + q̃p (κu − κad ) + pN − 2pN oN + c = 0
dpN oN

(2.20)

Solving the equation yields:
peq
N oN = c +

peq
N =c+

tN oN + 2tN + q̃p (κu − 2κad )
3

(2.21)

2tN oN + tN − q̃p (κu + κad )
3

(2.22)

The equilibrium payoffs for ISP are:
eq
πN
oN

2
tN oN + 2tN + q̃p (κu + κad )
− κad q̃f
=
9(tN + tN oN )

eq
πN

2
2tN oN + tN − q̃p (κu + κad )
=
9(tN + tN oN )

(2.23)

(2.24)

Now, we check the necessary conditions for these strategies to be NE. First, note
that if q̃p >

2tN oN +tN
κu +κad ,

eq
then peq
N < c, and pN cannot be an NE. Thus, the first necessary

condition for these strategies to be NE is q̃p ≤

2tN oN +tN
κu +κad .

The next necessary condition

eq
eq
is that ∆peq = peq
N oN − pN to be in region B, i.e. κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆p < tN + κu q̃p . We

claim that the upperbound always holds. To prove this consider:
∆peq < tN + κu q̃p ⇐⇒ 2tN + tN oN + q̃p (κu + κad ) > 0
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which is always true. Now, we check the lower bound:
1
κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆peq ⇐⇒ κu q̃p − tN oN < (tN − tN oN + q̃p (2κu − κad ))
3
tN + 2tN oN
⇐⇒ q̃p <
κu + κad
Thus, this necessary condition together with the previous necessary condition yields that
eq
if peq
N and pN oN , NE strategies, then q̃p <

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad .

eq
eq = 1.
In addition, note that by Lemma 7, peq
N and pN oN indeed yields z

Thus, if q̃p <

tN +2tN oN
κu +κad ,

eq
then the NE strategies can be peq
N and pN oN . To prove

that these strategies are NE, we should rule out the possibility of a unilateral profitable
deviation by both ISPs which we proceed to do in the next case.
Case B-2: In this case, we consider the possibility of a unilateral deviation by ISPs.
First, in Case B-2-i, we rule out the possibility of a profitable deviation by the non-neutral
ISP, and then in Case B-2-ii, we provide necessary and sufficient condition for a unilateral
deviation to be not profitable for the neural ISP.
Case B-2-i: A deviation by the non-neutral ISP can be to regions A, C, and other
prices in region B. In the following cases, we prove that a deviation by ISP NoN to each
of these regions si not profitable:
Case B-2-i-A: Consider peq
N fixed and decreasing pN oN such that ∆p in regions A,
i.e. ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN . Note that in A the payoff of the ISP NoN is an increasing
function of pN oN (as discussed in Case A). Thus, all other prices are dominated by p0N oN =
eq
0
peq
N + κu q̃p − tN oN . The payoff in this case is πN oN = pN + κu q̃p − tN oN − c + z q̃p p̃t,1

(by (2.1)), and p̃t,1 = κad (1 −

q̃f
q̃p )

(by definition 3). We claim that this deviation is not
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profitable for ISP NoN, since:
πN oN (pN oN , p̃t,2 ) ≥ peq
N − c + κu q̃p − tN oN + κad (q̃p − q̃f )
2
tN oN + 2tN + q̃p (κu + κad )
tN − tN oN + 2q̃p (κu + κad )
⇐⇒
≥
9(tN + tN oN )
3
⇐⇒ (q̃p (κu + κad ) − tN − 2tN oN )2 ≥ 0

which is true always. Thus, no deviation is profitable for ISP NoN.
Case B-2-i-B: Now, consider a deviation by ISP NoN inside region B. By optimality
of the solution inside B, if z eq = 1, since pN = peq
N is fixed, all other pN oN such that ∆p
eq = 0, then
in region B is dominated in payoff by pN oN = peq
N oN . If pN oN is such that z

nN oN = 0 (by item 2 of Theorem 1 and κu q̃p − tN oN ≥ tN ). Thus, the payoff of ISP NoN
is zero and this deviation is also not profitable.
Case B-2-i-C: In this case, consider a deviation to region C, i.e. ∆p ≥ tN + κu q̃p .
Fixing peq
N and increasing pN oN such that ∆p in regions C yields a payoff of zero to ISP
NoN (since by item 4 of Theorem 2, z eq = 0 in this region, and by Theorem 1, neq
N oN = 0.).
Thus, this deviation is also not profitable.
Case B-2-ii: Now, consider a unilateral deviation by the non-neutral ISP. Similar to
the case B-2-i, this deviation can be to regions A, C, and other prices in region B:
Case B-2-ii-A:

In this case, we consider the possibility of a deviation by ISP

N to region A, i.e. ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN . Note that in region A, πN oN (pN oN , p̃t,1 ) >
πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃), where πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃) is the payoff of ISP NoN when z eq = 0. To
prove this note that by q̃p p̃t,1 = κad (q̃p − q̃f ) > 0, we can write:
πN oN (pN oN , p̃t,1 ) = pN oN − c + q̃p p̃t,1 > pN oN − c > πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃)
Thus, in region A, πN oN (pN oN , p̃t,1 ) > πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃), and by Theorem 3, z eq = 1.
Thus, using Theorem 2, ib this region nN oN = 1. Therefore, nN = 0, and by (2.1), the
92

payoff of ISP N is zero. Thus, a deviation to this region is not profitable.
Case B-2-ii-B: Now, consider a deviation inside region B by ISP N. If z eq = 1, by
optimality of the solution inside B (since pN = peq
N is fixed) all other pN such that ∆p in
region B is dominated in payoff by pN = peq
N.
Now, consider the case that pN is such that z eq = 0. In this case, nN oN = 0 (by item
2 of Theorem 1 and κu q̃p − tN oN ≥ tN ), and such a deviation might be profitable.
eq
In order to have z eq = 0, by Theorem 3, πN oN (peq
N oN , p̃t,2 ) ≤ πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃), where
eq = 0. Note that by the assumption of the theorem
πN oN,z=0 (peq
N oN , p̃) is the payoff when z

(κu q̃p ≥ tN + tN oN ), and in this region ∆p > κu q̃p − tN oN ≥ tN . Thus, by Theorem 1,
if z eq = 0, then nN oN = 0. Therefore, by (2.1), πN oN,z=0 (peq
N oN , p̃) = 0. Using (2.18), we
can find πN oN (peq
N oN , p̃t,2 ), and compare the payoffs:
eq
eq
πN oN (peq
N oN , p̃t,2 ) ≤ πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃) ⇐⇒ (pN oN − c + κad q̃p )(

⇐⇒ p0N ≤

tN + κu q̃p + p0N − peq
N oN
) − κad q̃f ≤ 0
tN + tN oN

κad q̃f (tN + tN oN )
d
+ peq
N oN − tN oN − κu q̃p = pt
peq
N oN − c + κad q̃p

Therefore, a deviation is only profitable if p0N ≤ pdt . If this condition holds, we need
to check whether this deviation is indeed profitable. Note that in region B, if z eq = 0,
(as explained before) by Theorem 1, nN = 1. Thus, by (2.1), the payoff of ISP N is an
increasing function of pN , and is equal to p0N −c. Thus, p0N = pdt yields the maximum payoff
after deviation. Therefore, such a deviation is not profitable if and only if pdt −c ≤ πN (peq
N ).
Case B-2-ii-C: Now, consider a deviation by ISP N to region C, i.e. ∆p ≥ κu q̃p + tN .
Note that in region C, z eq = 0, and by item 2 of Theorem 1, nN = 1. Thus, the payoff
of ISP N (2.1) is an increasing function of pN . Thus, p0N = peq
N oN − κu q̃p − tN (by
definition of region C) yields the highest payoff after deviation. Note that by (2.34),
peq
N oN = c +

tN oN +2tN +q̃p (κu −2κad )
.
3

Therefore, p0N = c +
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tN oN −tN −2q̃p (κu +κad )
.
3

In addition,

note that by the assumption of the theorem, κu q̃p ≥ tN + tN oN . Thus, p0N < c, and by
(2.1), the payoff of neutral ISP is negative. Thus, this deviation is not profitable.
Therefore, we only need to check the condition in Case B-2-ii-B for ruling out profitable
deviations. This is item 2 of the theorem. The theorem follows.

Proof of Theorem 7
In this case, note that q̃f < q̃p <

tN +tN oN
.
κu

Thus, we characterize the optimum strategies

for the CP using items 1, 2, and 4 of Theorem 2.
First, note that by Lemma 5, since q̃p <

tN +tN oN
,
κu

κu q̃p −tN oN < ∆pt < tN +κu (q̃p −q̃f ),

where ∆pt = κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN characterized in Lemma 1. Thus, using this result, we
characterize the regions characterized in items 1, 2, and 4 of Theorem 2. We denote
∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN by region A, κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆p < κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN by region B1 ,
κu (2q̃p − q̃f )−tN oN ≤ ∆p < tN +κu (q̃p − q̃f ) by region C, tN +κu (q̃p − q̃f ) ≤ ∆p < tN +κu q̃p
by set B2 , and ∆p ≥ tN + κu q̃p by D. Using Theorem 2, if z eq = 1, then ∆p < tN + κu q̃p .
Thus, we characterize any possible NE strategies by which z eq = 1, in regions A and B1 ,
C, and B2 :
Case A: First, we consider ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN . In this case, we show that the
payoff of ISP NoN is an increasing function of ∆p. Then, we characterize the NE as
eq
peq
N oN = c + κu q̃p − tN oN and pN = c, using the fact that when choosing an NE, no player

can increase her payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy.
eq eq
Note that by Theorem 2, for region A, (qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1L if and only if

p̃ ≤ p̃t,1 = κad (1 −
κad (1 −

q̃f
q̃p )

q̃f
q̃p ).

In addition, by Theorem 4, if z eq = 1 then p̃eq = p̃t,1 =

(Definition 3). Thus, in this region, if z eq = 1, the payoff of ISP NoN is equal
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to pN oN − c + q̃p p̃t,1 (by (2.1)) since nN oN = 1. Therefore, the payoff is an increasing
function of pN oN . In addition, note that in region A, nN = 0 and regardless of pN , the
neutral ISP receives a payoff of zero (by (2.1)). Thus, peq
N oN , i.e. the equilibrium Internet
access fee, should be such that the neutral ISP cannot get a positive payoff by increasing
or decreasing pN , and changing the region of ∆p to B1 , B2 , or C. Using this condition,
we find the equilibrium strategy.
First consider a unilateral deviation by ISP N. Note that increasing pN decreases
∆p, and cannot change the region of ∆p. Thus, a deviation of this kind would not be
profitable. We claim that by decreasing pN to p0N such that pN oN − p0N > κu q̃p − tN oN ,
the ISP N can fetch a positive payoff as long as p0N > c (the claim is proved in the next
0
paragraph). Therefore, in the equilibrium, peq
N oN is such that even with pN = c (the

minimum plausible price), ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN . Thus, peq
N oN ≤ c + κu q̃p − tN oN (Otherwise,
there exists a p0N > c by which ∆p > κu q̃p − tN oN ). Given that the payoff of ISP NoN is
an increasing function of pN oN , we get peq
N oN = c+κu q̃p −tN oN . In addition, we claim that
eq
eq
eq
peq
N = c. If not, then pN > c. In this case, ∆p = pN − pN oN < κu q̃p − tN oN . We argued

that the payoff of ISP NoN is an increasing function of pN oN . Thus, by increasing pN oN
such that ∆p = κu q̃p − tN oN , ISP NoN can increase her payoff, which is a contradiction
eq
with peq
N and pN oN being NE strategies.

To prove the claim, note that if pN oN − p0N > κu q̃p − tN oN , then either (i) z eq = 0
or (ii) z eq = 1. For case (i), since κu q̃p − tN oN > −tN oN , when ∆p > κu q̃p − tN oN , then
eq eq
(qN
, qN oN ) is of the form of items 1 or 2 of Theorem 1. Thus, nN > 0. Therefore ISP

N can fetch a positive payoff as long as pN > c (by (2.1)). Now consider case (ii), i.e.
z eq = 1. In this case, if z eq = 1, then by using item 2 of Thoerem 2, nN > 0 (since
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solutions that yield z eq = 1 are in F I .). Thus, ISP N can fetch a positive payoff as long
as pN > c (by (2.1)). This completes the proof of the claim that by decreasing pN to p0N
such that pN oN − p0N > κu q̃p − tN oN , the ISP N can fetch a positive payoff as long as
p0N > c.
eq
Therefore, the NE strategies are peq
N oN = c+κu q̃p −tN oN and pN = c, and the payoff of
q̃

the ISP NoN at this price by (2.1) and p̃t,1 = κad (1− q̃fp ) is equal to (note that nN oN = 1),
and
eq
πN
oN = κu q̃p − tN oN + q̃p p̃t,1 = κu q̃p − tN oN + κad (q̃p − q̃f )

which is strictly positive since q̃p >

tN +tN oN
κu

(2.25)

and q̃p > q̃f . Note that Lemma 6 yields that

eq
eq = 1. The first item of the theorem follows.
with peq
N and pN oN , z

Case B1 and B2 : Now, consider regions B1 and B2 , i.e. κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆p <
κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN and tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) ≤ ∆p < tN + κu q̃p , respectively.
Note that in these regions, by items 2-a-ii and 2-b of Theorem 2, if z eq = 1, then
eq eq
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I . In addition, by Theorem 4, p̃eq = p̃t,2 = κad (nN oN −
(qN

and nN oN =

tN +κu q̃p −∆p
tN +tN oN

q̃f
q̃p )

(Definition 3). Thus, by (2.1), the payoff of ISP NoN in this

region is πN oN,B (pN oN , p̃t,2 ) = (pN oN − c)nN oN + p̃t,2 q̃p , and the payoff of ISP N is
πN,B = (pN − c)(1 − nN oN ). Note that p̃t,2 q̃p = κad (q̃p nN oN − q̃f ). Thus, using the
expression of nN oN , the payoffs are:

πN oN,B (pN oN , p̃t,2 ) = (pN oN − c + κad q̃p )(

πN,B (pN ) = (pN − c)(

tN + κu q̃p + pN − pN oN
) − κad q̃f
tN + tN oN

tN oN − κu q̃p + pN oN − pN
)
tN + tN oN

(2.26)

(2.27)

First, we rule out any NE such that ∆peq = tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ). Suppose that ∆peq =
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eq
eq
0
peq
N oN − pN = tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ). Consider a deviation by ISP N such that pN = pN +  > c
0
for  > 0 such that ∆p0 = peq
N oN − pN to be in region C. Note that by item 2-a-i of
eq eq
Theorem 2, in region C, (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1I . Thus, the payoff of this ISP with

this deviation is (by (2.8)):
πN (p0N ) = (peq
N +  − c)(

eq
tN oN − κu (q̃p − q̃f ) + peq
N oN − pN − 
)
tN + tN oN

Note that lim↓0 πN (p0N ) > πN,B (peq
N ). Thus, for  > 0 small enough, this deviation is
profitable. Thus, the strategies by which ∆peq = tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) cannot be NE.
Now, we characterize any NE in κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆p < κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN and
tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) < ∆p < tN + κu q̃p . Note that any NE inside this region should satisfy
the first order optimality condition (note that the payoffs are concave). Thus,
dπN
= 0 ⇒ tN oN − κu q̃p + pN oN − 2pN + c = 0
dpN
dπN oN,B
= 0 ⇒ tN + q̃p (κu − κad ) + pN − 2pN oN + c = 0
dpN oN

(2.28)

Solving the equation yields:
peq
N oN = c +

peq
N =c+
First, note that if q̃p >

tN oN + 2tN + q̃p (κu − 2κad )
3

(2.29)

2tN oN + tN − q̃p (κu + κad )
3

(2.30)

2tN oN +tN
κu +κad ,

eq
then peq
N < c, and pN cannot be an NE. Thus, the

first necessary condition for these strategies to be NE is q̃p ≤

2tN oN +tN
κu +κad .

In addition, by

eq
eq
eq = 1). The second
Theorem 3, πN
oN > πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃) (for these strategies to yield z

item of the theorem follows.
Case C: Now, consider region C, i.e. ∆pt = κu (2q̃p − q̃f )−tN oN ≤ ∆p < tN +κu (q̃p −
eq eq
q̃f ). Note that in this regions, by items 2-a-i of Theorem 2, if z eq = 1, then (qN
, qN oN ) =
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(q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1I . In addition, by Theorem 4 and Definition 4, p̃eq = p̃t,3 = κad nN oN (1 −
and nN oN =

tN +κu (q̃p −q̃f )−∆p
tN +tN oN

q̃f
q̃p )

(Definition 3). Thus, by (2.1), the payoff of ISP NoN in

this region is πN oN,C (pN oN , p̃t,3 ) = (pN oN − c)nN oN + p̃t,3 q̃p , and the payoff of ISP N
is πN,B = (pN − c)(1 − nN oN ). Note that p̃t,3 q̃p = κad nN oN (q̃p − q̃f ). Thus, using the
expression of nN oN , the payoffs are:
πN oN,C (pN oN , p̃t,3 ) = (pN oN − c + κad (q̃p − q̃f ))(

πN,C (pN ) = (pN − c)(

tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) + pN − pN oN
)
tN + tN oN

tN oN − κu (q̃p − q̃f ) + pN oN − pN
)
tN + tN oN

(2.31)

(2.32)

First, in Part C-1, we characterize any NE in region κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN < ∆p <
tN +κu (q̃p − q̃f ). Later, in Part C-2, we consider the case that ∆peq = κu (2q̃p − q̃f )−tN oN .
Part C-1: Note that any NE in region κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN < ∆p < tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f )
should satisfy the first order optimality condition (note that the payoffs are concave).
Thus,
dπN,C
= 0 ⇒ tN oN − κu (q̃p − q̃f ) + pN oN − 2pN + c = 0
dpN
dπN oN,C
= 0 ⇒ tN + (q̃p − q̃f )(κu − κad ) + pN − 2pN oN + c = 0
dpN oN

(2.33)

Solving the equation yields:
peq
N oN = c +

peq
N =c+

First, note that if q̃p − q̃f >

tN oN + 2tN + (q̃p − q̃f )(κu − 2κad )
3

(2.34)

2tN oN + tN − (q̃p − q̃f )(κu + κad )
3

(2.35)

2tN oN +tN
κu +κad ,

eq
then peq
N < c, and pN cannot be an NE. Thus,

the first necessary condition for these strategies to be NE is q̃p − q̃f ≤

2tN oN +tN
κu +κad .

In

eq
eq
addition, by Theorem 3, πN
oN > πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃) (in order for these strategies to yield

z eq = 1). The third item of the theorem follows.
98

eq
eq
eq = peq
Part C-2: Now, consider peq
N and pN oN such that ∆p
N oN − pN = κu (2q̃p −

q̃f ) − tN oN . These strategies are not NE if ISP NoN can strictly increase her payoff by
decreasing her price such that ∆p in region B1 . Note that using (2.31) and the expression
for ∆peq , the payoff of ISP NoN in this case is:
πN oN (peq
N oN , p̃t,3 ) = (pN oN − c + κad (q̃p − q̃f ))(

tN − κu q̃p + tN oN
)
tN + tN oN

(2.36)

By choosing p0N oN = peq
N oN −  such that  ↓ 0, ISP NoN can get a limit payoff of (since
∆p = ∆peq when  → 0, and it is in region B1 , and using (2.26)):
eq
eq
0
πN
oN = lim πN oN (pN oN − , p̃t,3 ) = (pN oN − c + κad q̃p )(
↓0

tN − κu (q̃p − q̃f ) + tN oN
) − κad q̃f
tN + tN oN

eq
eq
eq
eq
Thus, peq
N and pN oN such that ∆p = pN oN − pN = κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN are not NE

if:
0
eq
eq
πN
oN > πN oN (pN oN , p̃t,3 ) ⇐⇒ (pN oN − c + κad q̃p )

κu q̃f
κad κu q̃f q̃p
−
>0
tN + tN oN
tN + tN oN

⇐⇒ peq
N oN > c

Thus, the necessary condition for these strategy to be NE is peq
N oN ≤ c. Note that
from (2.31) and (2.32), since ∆p is fixed, the payoffs of ISP NoN and N are an increasing
eq
function of pN oN and pN , respectively. Thus, peq
N oN = c, and pN = c−κu (2q̃p − q̃f )+tN oN .
eq
Note that a necessary condition for peq
N to be an NE is that pN ≥ c. Thus, one necessary

condition is that 2q̃p − q̃f ≤

tN oN
κu .

eq
In addition, πN oN (p̃eq
N oN , p̃t,3 ) > πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃)

(using Theorem 3, in order for these strategies to yield z eq = 1). The forth item of the
theorem follows.

Proof of Theorem 8
We use Theorem 7 to prove the result. First, in Part 1, we prove that when one of tN or
tN oN is large, then strategies 1), 2), and 4) listed in Theorem 7 are not NE. In Part 2, we
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prove that when one of tN or tN oN is high, then strategy 3) of Theorem 7 is an NE. This
completes the proof of the theorem.
Part 1: We prove that strategies 1), 2), and 4) listed in Theorem 7 are not NE in
Parts 1-i, 1-ii, and 1-iii, respectively.
In this part, we prove that, item 1 of Theorem 7, i.e. peq
N oN = c +

Part 1-i:

κu q̃p − tN oN and peq
N = c is not an NE. We do so in Parts 1-i-a and 1-i-b, by introducing a
unilateral profitable deviation for ISP NoN for the cases that tN oN is large and tN is large,
eq eq
respectively. Note that in this case, by item 1 of Theorem 2, (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ (0, q̃f ) ∈ F1L .

Thus, nN oN = 1, and the payoff of ISP NoN is (by (2.1), Theorem 4, and Definition 3):
πN oN = κu q̃p − tN oN + κad (q̃p − q̃f )

(2.37)

Part 1-i-a: If tN oN is large, then (2.37) would be less than zero. A deviation to price
p0N oN = c yields a payoff of at least zero for the ISP NoN (by (2.1)). Thus, this is a
profitable deviation.
Part 1-i-b:
p0N oN =

1
2 tN

Now, consider tN to be large, and a deviation by ISP NoN such that
(Thus, ∆p = p0N oN − peq
N =

1
2 tN

− c). Note that in this case, ∆pt =

κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN < ∆p < tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ). Thus, by item 2-a-i of Theorem 2,
eq
I
(qneq , qN
oN ) = (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1 . Thus, by (2.1), the payoff of ISP NoN after deviation (by the

definition of p̃t,3 in Definition 3 and Theorem 4) is at least10 :
1
0
πN
oN = tN nN oN + κad nN oN (q̃p − q̃f )
2
, where nN oN =
10

1
t +κu (q̃p −q̃f )+c
2 N
tN +tN oN

(2.38)

. Thus, for tN large, nN oN → 21 . Thus, comparing (2.38)

Note that the payoff of NoN is equal to the maximum of the payoff when p̃eq = p̃t and when p̃eq > p̃t ,

i.e. when z eq = 0
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with (2.37) yields:
1
1
0
πN
oN = tN + κad (q̃p − q̃f ) > πN oN
4
2

since tN is large

Thus, this deviation is profitable .
Part 1-ii: In this part, we prove that item 2 of Theorem 7, i.e. peq
N oN = c +
tN oN +2tN +q̃p (κu −2κad )
3

and peq
N = c +

2tN oN +tN −q̃p (κu +κad )
3

is not an NE. We do so by

proving that ∆peq does not satisfy κu q̃p − tN oN < ∆peq < κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN and
tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) < ∆peq < tN + κu q̃p , in the cases that tN oN or tN is large.
First, note that:
1
eq
∆peq = peq
N oN − pN = (tN − tN oN + q̃p (2κu − κad ))
3

(2.39)

If ∆peq < κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN , then tN + 2tN oN < 3κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − q̃p (2κu − κad ), which is
not correct when tN oN or tN is large. Thus, (a) ∆peq ≥ κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN . In addition,
if tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) < ∆peq , then 2tN + tN oN < q̃p (2κu − κad ) − 3κu (q̃p − q̃f ), which is not
correct when tN oN or tN is large. Thus, (b) ∆peq ≤ tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ). Therefore, (a) and
(b) yields that ∆peq is not in the regions specified. Thus, item 2 cannot be an NE.
Part 1-iii: In this part, we prove that item 4 of Theorem 7, i.e. peq
N oN = c and
peq
N = c − κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) + tN oN is not an NE. To do so, we prove that there exists a
profitable unilateral deviation for ISP NoN. Note that, in this case, ∆peq = ∆pt . By item
eq eq
2-a-i of Theorem 2, when ∆pt ≤ ∆p < tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ), then (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1I .

Thus, the expression of the payoff of ISP NoN is (by p̃t = p̃t,3 , Definition 3, Theorem 4,
and (2.9)):
πN oN,C (pN oN , p̃t,3 ) = (pN oN − c + κad (q̃p − q̃f ))(
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tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) + pN − pN oN
)
tN + tN oN

Note that:
tN + (q̃p − q̃f )(κu − κad ) + pN − 2pN oN + c
dπN oN,C
=
dpN oN
tN + tN oN
Thus,
tN + tN oN + (q̃p − q̃f )(κu − κad ) − κu (2q̃p − q̃f )
dπN oN,C
|peq ,peq =
dpN oN N N oN
tN + tN oN
Note that

dπN oN,C
eq eq
dpN oN |pN ,pN oN

> 0, when either tN or tN oN are large enough. Thus, in this

case, the payoff is increasing with respect to pN oN . Thus, p0N oN = peq
N oN +  for  > 0
small, is a unilateral profitable deviation.
Part 2: We now prove that when one of tN or tN oN is large, then strategy 3) of
Theorem 7 is an NE. To do so, we check conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of strategy 3) of
Theorem 7, in Parts 2-i, 2-ii, and 2-iii, respectively. Later, in Part 2-iv, we prove that
there is no unilateral profitable deviation for ISPs. This completes the proof.
Part 2-i: In this part, we check the condition, i.e. κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN < ∆peq <
tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ). Note that in this case:
1
∆peq = (tN − tN oN + (q̃p − q̃f )(2κu − κad ))
3

(2.40)

Comparing the lower boundary yields that:
κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN < ∆peq ⇒ 2tN oN + tN + (q̃p − q̃f )(2κu − κad ) − 3κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) > 0
which is true when one of tN or tN oN is large. Now, consider the upper boundary:
∆peq < tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) ⇒ 2tN + tN oN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) − (q̃p − q̃f )(2κu − κad ) > 0
which is true when one of tN or tN oN is large. Thus, condition (i) of strategy 3) of
Theorem 7 is true.
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Part 2-ii: Condition (ii) of this strategy is q̃p − q̃f ≤

2tN oN +tN
κu +κad .

This condition holds

when one of tN or tN oN is large.
Part 2-iii: Now, we check the third condition, i.e.
eq
eq
eq
πN
oN = πN oN (p̃N oN , p̃t,3 ) > πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃)

eq
eq
We use (2.1) to find πN
oN = πN oN (p̃N oN , p̃t,3 ). Note that by using item 2-a-i of Theorem 2
eq eq
eq
(since z eq = 1), (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃p ). Thus, by the definition of peq
N oN , ∆p , p̃t,3 , using

Definition 3, and Theorem 4:
eq
πN
oN

2
tN oN + 2tN + (q̃p − q̃f )(κu + κad )
=
9(tN + tN oN )

(2.41)

eq = 0.
Now, we obtain πN oN,z=0 (p̃eq
N oN , p̃). Consider the case that p̃ is such that z

Note that since κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN < ∆peq < tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ), then −tN oN < ∆peq < tN
or ∆peq ≥ tN . Using item 2 of Theorem 1, if ∆peq ≥ tN , then nN oN = 0, and by (2.1),
eq
eq
πN oN,z=0 (p̃eq
N oN , p̃) = 0. Thus, πN oN > πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃), and this part follows. Now,

consider the case that −tN oN < ∆peq < tN . Using item 1 of Theorem 1, if −tN oN <
eq eq
eq eq
∆peq < tN , then (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃f ) ∈ F0I . Since (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F0I , we can use (2.9).
eq
eq
Thus, by using peq
N oN , ∆p , and , πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃) is:

πN oN,z=0 (p̃eq
N oN , p̃) =


1
2tN + tN oN + (q̃p − q̃f )(κu − 2κad )
9(tN + tN oN )
× 2tN + tN oN − (q̃p − q̃f )(2κu − κad )

(2.42)



Next, we prove that tN oN +2tN +(q̃p − q̃f )(κu +κad ) > 2tN +tN oN +(q̃p − q̃f )(κu −2κad )
and tN oN + 2tN + (q̃p − q̃f )(κu + κad ) > 2tN + tN oN − (q̃p − q̃f )(2κu − κad ). This yields
eq
eq
πN
oN > πN oN,z=0 (p̃N oN , p̃). To prove the inequalities, note that:

tN oN + 2tN + (q̃p − q̃f )(κu + κad ) > 2tN + tN oN + (q̃p − q̃f )(κu − 2κad ) ⇐⇒ 3κad (q̃p − q̃f ) > 0
tN oN + 2tN + (q̃p − q̃f )(κu + κad ) > 2tN + tN oN − (q̃p − q̃f )(2κu − κad ) ⇐⇒ 3κu (q̃p − q̃f ) > 0
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Since q̃p > q̃f , both inequalities hold. This completes the proof of this part.
Part 2-iv: In this part, we prove that there is no profitable unilateral deviation by ISPs
when one of tN or tN oN is large. To do so, first, in Part 2-iv-NoN, we rule out the
possibility of a profitable deviation by the non-neutral ISP. Then, in Part 2-iv-N, we rule
out profitable deviations by the neutral ISP.
eq
eq
Note that, by (2.41), the equilibrium payoff of ISP NoN, πN
oN = πN oN (p̃N oN , p̃t,3 ) is:

eq
πN
oN

2
tN oN + 2tN + (q̃p − q̃f )(κu + κad )
=
9(tN + tN oN )

eq
eq
eq eq
eq
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃p ), peq
In addition, using (qN
N , ∆p , and (2.8), we can find πN = πN (p̃N ),:

eq
πN

2tN oN + tN − (q̃p − q̃f )(κu + κad )
=
9(tN + tN oN )

2
(2.43)

eq
eq
Note that when tN and tN oN are large, πN
and πN
oN would be large.

Consider different regions in Theorem 2. We denote ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN by region A,
κu q̃p −tN oN < ∆p < ∆pt = κu (2q̃p − q̃f )−tN oN by region B1 , ∆pt = κu (2q̃p − q̃f )−tN oN ≤
∆p < tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) by region C, tN + κu (q̃p − q̃f ) ≤ ∆p < tN + κu q̃p by B2 , and
eq
∆p ≥ tN + κu q̃p by D. Recall that ∆peq = peq
N oN − pN is in region C. Note that the payoffs

are concave in C, and we found the strategies by solving the first order condition. Thus,
there is no unilateral profitable deviation in C.
Part 2-iv-NoN: Now, we consider unilateral deviations by ISP NoN. We prove that any
deviation to regions A, B1 , B2 , and D is not profitable in Cases 2-iv-NoN-A, 2-iv-NoN-B1 ,
2-iv-NoN-B2 , and 2-iv-NoN-D, respectively. This yields that no deviation is profitable for
ISP NoN.
Case 2-iv-NoN-A: First, we prove that in Region A, z eq = 1. Note that in this case, by
104

Definition 4, p̃t = p̃t,1 . Thus, πN oN (pN oN , p̃t ) = pN oN −c+ q̃p p̃t,1 = pN oN −c+κad (q̃p − q̃f )
(by (2.1), Definition 3, and since nN oN = 1 by item 1 of Theorem 2). On the other hand,
πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃) = (pN oN − c)nN oN . Thus, πN oN (pN oN , p̃t ) > πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃) (since
q̃p > q̃f and 0 ≤ nN oN ≤ 1). Thus, by Theorem 3, in region A, z eq = 1.
Now, consider peq
N fixed and decreasing pN oN such that ∆p in region A, i.e. ∆p ≤
κu q̃p − tN oN . Since in Region A, z eq = 1, and by Theorem 4, the payoff after deviation
0
is πN
oN = pN oN − c + q̃p p̃t,1 (by (2.1), Definition 3, and since nN oN = 1 by item 1 of

Theorem 2). Thus, the payoff of the ISP NoN is an increasing function of pN oN . Therefore,
all other prices are dominated by p0N oN = peq
N + κu q̃p − tN oN . The payoff in this case is
eq
0
πN
oN = pN + κu q̃p − tN oN − c + q̃p p̃t,1 (by (2.1)). Therefore:

1
0
πN
oN = (tN − tN oN ) + α
3

(2.44)

where α is a constant independent of tN and tN oN . Now, in Cases (i), (ii), and (iii), we
eq
0
prove that πN
oN > πN oN when (i) tN is sufficiently larger than other parameters, (ii)

tN oN is sufficiently larger than other parameters, and (iii) tN and tN oN are of the same
order of magnitude and both are sufficiently larger than other parameters, respectively.
Case (i): If tN is sufficiently larger than other parameters, then:
eq
πN
oN ≈

4tN
1
0
> πN
oN ≈ tN
9
3

Thus, this deviation is not profitable.
Case (ii): If tN oN is sufficiently larger than other parameters, then:
eq
πN
oN ≈

tN oN
1
0
> πN
oN ≈ − tN oN
9
3

Thus, this deviation is also not profitable.
Case (iii):

If tN and tN oN are of the same order of magnitude (tN ≈ tN oN ) and both
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are sufficiently larger than other parameters, then:
eq
πN
oN =

tN
tN
0
>
> πN
oN
2
3

Thus, this deviation is not profitable.
Thus, any deviation to region A by ISP NoN is not profitable. This completes the
proof of this case.
Case 2-iv-NoN-B1 : Now, consider a deviation by ISP NoN to region B1 , i.e. κu q̃p −
tN oN < ∆p < ∆pt = κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN . Note that with this deviation, p0N oN =
1
3 (tN

− tN oN ) + α, where αl < α < αu , in which αl and αu are bounded. In addition, by

(2.5), after the deviation, n0N oN =

tN +tN oN −β
tN +tN oN ,

where β > 0 is bounded (βl < β < βu , and

βl and βu bounded ). Therefore, for large tN and tN oN , n0N oN → 1. Thus, by (2.9), the
payoff of ISP NoN after deviation is:
1
0
πN
oN = (tN − tN oN ) + γ
3
where γ is bounded (Note that p̃ is independent of tN and tN oN ). This expression is
similar to (2.44). Thus, we can exactly repeat the arguments in Cases i, ii, and iii to
prove that any deviation to region B1 by ISP NoN is not profitable. This completes the
proof of this case.
Case 2-iv-NoN-B2 : Now, consider a deviation by ISP NoN to region B2 , i.e. tN +
κu (q̃p − q̃f ) ≤ ∆p < tN + κu q̃p . Note that with this deviation, ∆p0 = tN + α, and
p0N oN =

2tN oN +4tN
3

+ γ where κu (q̃p − q̃f ) ≤ α ≤ κu q̃p and thus γ is bounded. Thus, by

(2.5), after this deviation, n0N oN =

β
tN +tN oN ,

where β > 0 is a constant independent of

0
tN and tN oN , and the payoff of ISP NoN after deviation is πN
oN =

2tN oN +4tN
3(tN +tN oN ) β

+ η (by

(2.1) and considering that by Theorem 4, if z eq = 1, then p̃ = p̃t,2 ,, and independent of
106

tN and tN oN ), where η is a constant independent of tN and tN oN . Thus, when one of tN
eq
0
0
and tN oN is large, πN
oN → constant. Therefore, πN oN > πN oN . Thus, any deviation to

region B2 by ISP NoN is not profitable.
Case 2-iv-NoN-D: By item 4 of Theorem 2, in region D, nN oN = 0. Thus, a deviation
to this region, yields a payoff of zero, by (2.9) and z eq = 0. Thus, a deviation of this kind
is not profitable for ISP NoN.
Part 2-iv-N: Now, consider unilateral deviations by the neutral ISP. Similar to Part
2-iv-N, we prove that any deviation to regions A, B1 , B2 , and D is not profitable. We do
so in Cases 2-iv-N-A, 2-iv-N-B1 , 2-iv-N-B2 , and 2-iv-N-D, respectively.
Case 2-iv-N-A: Consider a deviation by ISP N to region A. In this case, by item 1 of
Theorem 2, nN = 0. Thus, the payoff of ISP N after deviation is zero (by (2.8)), and this
deviation is not profitable.
Case 2-iv-N-B1 : Now, consider a deviation by ISP N to region B1 , i.e. κu q̃p − tN oN <
∆p < ∆pt = κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) − tN oN . Note that with this deviation, ∆p = −tN oN + α, and
p0N =

4tN oN +2tN
3

+γ, where κu q̃p < α < κu (2q̃p − q̃f ) and thus γ is bounded. Thus, by (2.5),

n0N =

β
tN +tN oN ,

where β > 0 is bounded. By (2.1). The payoff of ISP N after deviation is

πN =

4tN oN +2tN
3(tN +tN oN ) β

0 → constant.
(by (2.1)). Thus, when one of tN and tN oN is large, πN

eq
0 . Therefore, any deviation to region B by ISP N is not profitable.
Thus, πN
> πN
1

case 2-iv-N-B2 : Now, consider a deviation by ISP NoN to region B2 , i.e. tN +
κu (q̃p − q̃f ) ≤ ∆p < tN + κu q̃p . Note that with this deviation, ∆p0 = tN + α, where
κu (q̃p − q̃f ) ≤ α < κu q̃p . Thus, p0N = 31 (tN oN − tN ) + β, where β is bounded. In addition,
by (2.5), after the deviation, n0N =

tN +tN oN −γ
tN +tN oN ,
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where γ > 0 is bounded. Therefore, for

large tN or tN oN , n0N → 1. Thus, by (2.8), the payoff of ISP N after deviation is:
1
0
πN
= (tN oN − tN ) + η
3

(2.45)

eq
0 when (i)
where η is bounded. Now, in Cases i, ii, and iii, we prove that πN
> πN

tN is sufficiently larger than other parameters, (ii) tN oN is sufficiently larger than other
parameters, and (iii) tN and tN oN are of the same order of magnitude and both are
sufficiently larger than other parameters, respectively.
Case i: If tN is sufficiently larger than other parameters, then:
eq
≈
πN

1
tN
0
> πN
≈ − tN
9
3

Thus, this deviation is not profitable.
Case ii: If tN oN is sufficiently larger than other parameters, then:
eq
πN
≈

4tN oN
1
0
> πN
≈ tN oN
9
3

Thus, this deviation is also not profitable.
Case iii: If tN and tN oN are of the same order of magnitude (tN ≈ tN oN ) and both are
sufficiently larger than other parameters, then:
eq
πN
=

tN oN
tN oN
0
>
> πN
2
3

Thus, this deviation is not profitable.
Thus, any deviation to Region B2 by ISP N is not profitable. This completes the proof
of this case.
Case 2-iv-N-D: Now, consider decreasing pN oN such that ∆p in region D, i.e. ∆p ≥
κu q̃p + tN . Note that by item 4 of Theorem 2, z eq = 0, and nN = 1. Thus, the payoff
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of ISP N is equal to pN − c (by (2.1)). Thus, the payoff of the ISP N is an increasing
function of pN . Therefore, all other prices are dominated by p0N = peq
N oN − (κu q̃p + tN ).
0 =
Thus, the payoff in this case is πN

1
3 (tN oN

− tN ) + α, where α is a constant and is

independent of tN and tN oN . This expression is similar to (2.45). Thus, we can exactly
repeat the arguments in Cases 2-iv-N-B2 -a, 2-iv-N-B2 -b, and 2-iv-N-B2 -c to prove that
any deviation to region D by ISP NoN is not profitable. This completes the proof of this
case. This completes the proof of this case, and the theorem.

Proof of Theorem 9
We consider different regions of ∆p in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. For each region, we
characterize all possible NE strategies.
First, consider ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN . Note that in this region, the payoff of non-neutral
ISP if z eq = 0 is at most peq
N oN −c (by (2.1)). On the other hand, by Theorem 2, by choosing
p̃0 = p̃t,1 , ISP NoN can ensure that the CP chooses z eq = 1. In this case, the payoff of
eq
non-neutral ISP (by (2.1)) is p0N oN − c + p̃t,1 q̃N oN = peq
N oN − c + κad (q̃p − q̃f ) > pN oN − c.
eq
Thus, πN oN (peq
N oN , p̃t,1 ) > πN oN,z=0 (pN oN , p̃). Therefore, in this case, there is no NE by

which z eq = 0.
Now, consider ∆p > κu q̃p − tN oN . Note that q̃p <

tN +tN oN
.
κu

Thus, two possibility may

arise: (i) −tN oN < ∆p < tN , and (ii) ∆p ≥ tN . We consider these two cases in Case 1
and 2, respectively.
eq eq
Case 1: In this case, −tN oN < ∆p < tN . By item 1 of Theorem 1, (qN
, qN oN ) =

(q̃f , q̃f ) ∈ F0I . Note that in this region, 0 < xN < 1, and an NE strategy for ISPs should
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satisfy the first order optimality conditions. Thus, using (2.8) and (2.9):
πN (pN ) = (pN − c)

tN oN + pN oN − pN
tN + tN oN

πN oN (pN oN , p̃) = (pN oN − c)

tN + pN − pN oN
tN + tN oN

Solving the first order optimality condition yields:
1
peq
N = c + (2tN oN + tN )
3
1
peq
N oN = c + (2tN + tN oN )
3

(2.46)

eq
eq =
which is unique. Note that peq
N ≥ c and pN oN ≥ c. First, note that −tN oN < ∆p
eq
peq
N oN − pN =

tN −tN oN
3

< tN .

The necessary condition for this strategy to be an NE is πN oN,z=0 (peq
N oN ) ≥
πN oN (peq
N oN , p̃t ) (by Theorem 3). The candidate strategies and this necessary condition
is listed in the statement of the theorem.
Case 2: Now, consider ∆p ≥ tN . We consider two cases ∆p = tN and ∆p > tN in
Cases 2-i and 2-ii, respectively.
Case 2-i: Now consider strategies pN oN and pN such that ∆p = tN . In this case, using
eq eq
case 2 of Theorem 1, (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , 0) ∈ F0U . Thus, nN oN = 0 and πN oN (pN oN , z =

0) = 0, i.e. the payoff of the non-neutral ISP is zero. Consider  > 0 such that p0N oN =
eq eq
pN oN −  > c. In this case, p0N oN − pN < tN . Thus, by Theorem 1, (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F0I
eq eq
or (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F0L . Thus, nN oN > 0, and πN oN (p0N oN , z = 0) > 0. Thus, p0N oN is a

profitable deviation for the non-neutral ISP. Therefore, as long as such a deviation exist
pN oN and pN such that ∆p = tN cannot be NE.
Case 2-ii: Now, consider ∆p > tN . Thus, by item 2 of Theorem 1, neq
N = 1. Consider
a unilateral deviation by neutral ISP such that p0N = peq
N +  in which  > 0 such that
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eq
eq
0
peq
N oN − pN > tN . Note that the values of qN and qN oN is the same as before, since still
eq
0
∆p0 = peq
N oN − pN > tN . Thus, again nN = 1, and by (2.1), the payoff of neutral ISP is an

increasing function of pN . Thus, p0N is a profitable unilateral deviation. This contradicts
eq
the assumption that peq
N and pN oN is NE. Thus, the result of the theorem follows.

2.7.4

Proof of Theorem 10

eq eq
The following lemmas allow us to characterize the NE when (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F0 , i.e. z eq = 0.

Lemmas 8 and 9 are useful in proving Theorem 10.
Lemma 8. No pN oN and pN such that ∆p = pN oN − pN ≤ −tN oN can be equilibrium
strategies.
Proof. Proof: First, we rule out the existence of an NE when ∆p < −tN oN , and then
when ∆p = −tN oN .
First, consider pN oN and pN such that ∆p < −tN oN . In this case, pN oN < pN − tN oN .
Note that the payoff of the non-neutral ISP when ∆p ≤ −tN oN is pN oN − c (by (2.1) and
nN oN = 1, using case 3 of Theorem 1), and is strictly increasing with respect to pN oN .
Thus, every price pN oN < pN − tN oN yields a strictly lower payoff for the non-neutral ISP
in comparison with the payoff of the this ISP when pN oN = pN −tN oN . Thus, there exist a
profitable deviation for the non-neutral ISP for strategies such that pN oN − pN < −tN oN .
Therefore, no pN oN and pN such that pN oN − pN < −tN oN can be NE strategies.
Now consider strategies pN oN and pN such that ∆p = −tN oN . In this case, using case
eq eq
3 of Theorem 1, (qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃f ) ∈ F0L . Thus, nN = 0 and πN (pN ) = 0, i.e. the

payoff of the neutral ISP is zero. Consider  > 0 such that p0N = pN −  > c. In this
eq eq
eq eq
case, pN oN − p0N > −tN oN . Thus, by Theorem 1, (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F0I or (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F0U .
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Thus, nN > 0, and πN (p0N ) > 0. Thus, p0N is a profitable deviation for the neutral ISP.
Therefore, as long as such a deviation exist pN oN and pN such that ∆p = −tN oN cannot
be NE. Now, we prove that such deviation always exist. This complete the proof. Note
that this deviation does not exist if and only if pN −  ≤ c for all  > 0. Therefore, this
deviation does not exist if only if pN ≤ c. Thus, pN oN ≤ c − tN oN < c, which contradicts
the fact that if z = 0, peq
N oN ≥ c (as mentioned in the beginning of the section). The
lemma follows.
Lemma 9. No pN oN and pN such that ∆p ≥ tN can be equilibrium strategies.
Proof. Proof: First, we rule out the existence of an NE when ∆p > tN , and then when
∆p = tN . Consider pN oN and pN such that ∆p > tN . In this case, pN < pN oN − tN .
Note that the payoff of the neutral ISP when ∆p ≥ tN is pN − c (by (2.1) and nN = 1,
using case 2 of Theorem 1), and is strictly increasing with respect to pN . Thus, every
price pN < pN oN − tN yields a strictly lower payoff for the neutral ISP in comparison
with the payoff of the this ISP when pN = pN oN − tN . Thus, no pN oN and pN such that
pN oN − pN > tN can be Ne strategies.
Now consider strategies pN oN and pN such that ∆p = tN . In this case, using case 2 of
eq eq
Theorem 1, (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , 0) ∈ F0U . Thus, nN oN = 0 and πN oN (pN oN , z = 0) = 0, i.e.

the payoff of the non-neutral ISP is zero. Consider  > 0 such that p0N oN = pN oN −  > c.
eq eq
eq eq
In this case, p0N oN − pN < tN . Thus, by Theorem 1, (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F0I or (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F0L .

Thus, nN oN > 0, and πN oN (p0N oN , z = 0) > 0. Thus, p0N oN is a profitable deviation
for the non-neutral ISP. Therefore, as long as such a deviation exist pN oN and pN such
that ∆p = tN cannot be NE. Now, we prove that such deviation always exist. This
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complete the proof. Note that this deviation does not exist if and only if pN oN −  ≤ c
for all  > 0. Therefore, this deviation does not exist if only if pN oN ≤ c. Therefore,
pN ≤ c − tN < c, which contradicts the fact that peq
N ≥ c (as mentioned after at the
beginning of the section.). The lemma follows.
Now, we proceed to prove Theorem 10:
Proof. Proof of Theorem 10: First, in Part 1, we characterize the candidate equilibrium
strategies by applying the first order condition on the payoffs. Then, in Part 2, we prove
that no unilateral deviation is profitable for ISPs. Thus, the strategies characterized in
Part 1 are NE.
Part 1: Note that z eq = 0. First note that by Lemmas 8 and 9, no pN and pN oN
such that ∆p ≤ −tN oN or ∆p ≥ tN can be Nash equilibrium. Thus, we consider −tN oN <
∆p < tN . Note that in this region, 0 < xN < 1, and an NE strategy for ISPs should
satisfy the first order optimality conditions. Thus, using (2.8) and (2.9), and item 1 of
Theorem 1:
1
peq
N = c + (2tN oN + tN )
3
1
peq
N oN = c + (2tN + tN oN )
3

(2.47)

eq
which is unique. Note that peq
N ≥ c and pN oN ≥ c. In order to prove that this is an NE,
eq
it is enough to prove that (i) −tN oN < ∆peq = peq
N oN − pN < tN , (ii) a deviation of one of

the ISPs by which ∆p is shifted to the region ∆p ≤ −tN oN or ∆p ≥ tN is not profitable
for that ISP.
The condition (i) can be proved by (2.47). From this equation, ∆peq =
Thus, ∆peq > −tN oN and ∆peq < tN . Therefore, (i) is true for this case.
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tN −tN oN
.
3

Part 2: Now, we should prove that condition (ii) holds, i.e. no unilateral deviation
is profitable. First, in Case 2-a, we rule out the possibility of a unilateral deviation when
−tN oN < ∆p < tN for both neutral and non-neutral ISPs. Then, we consider ∆p ≤ −tN oN
and ∆p ≥ tN , and in Cases 2-NoN and 2-N, we rule out the possibility of a unilateral
deviation in these regions for ISP N and NoN, respectively.
Case 2-a: First, note that by concavity of the payoffs (using (2.8) and (2.9)) as long
as −tN oN < ∆p < tN , i.e. 0 < xN < 1, a unilateral deviation by one of the ISPs from peq
N
or peq
N oN decreases this ISP’s payoff. Thus, we should consider the deviation by ISPs by
which ∆p ≤ −tN oN or ∆p ≥ tN .
Case 2-NoN: Now, consider the deviations by the non-neutral ISP. Fix pN = peq
N , and
consider two cases. In Case 2-NoN-i (respectively, Case 2-NoN-ii), we consider deviation
by ISP NoN such that ∆p ≥ tN (respectively, ∆p ≤ −tN oN ).
Case 2-NoN-i: Suppose the non-neutral ISP increases her price from peq
N oN to make
∆p ≥ tN . In this case, nN oN = 0, and the payoff of the ISP is zero (by (2.1)). Since in the
candidate equilibrium strategy this payoff is non-negative, this deviation is not profitable.
Case 2-NoN-ii: Now, consider the case in which the non-neutral ISP decreases her
price to make ∆p ≤ −tN oN . In this case, nN oN = 1 and πN oN (p0N oN , z = 0) = p0N oN − c
(by (2.1)). Thus, the payoff is a strictly increasing function of p0N oN , and is maximized at
eq
0
p0N oN = peq
N − tN oN . We show that πN oN (pN oN , z = 0) < πN oN (pN oN , z = 0). Note that

πN oN (p0N oN , z = 0) = 13 (tN − tN oN ). In addition, using (2.47), (2.1), 0 ≤ xN ≤ 1, (2.5),
eq
eq
eq
and the fact that with peq
N and pN oN , qN oN − qN = 0:

πN oN (peq
N oN , z = 0) =
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1 (2tN + tN oN )2
9 tN oN + tN

Thus:
2
2
2
2
πN oN (p0N oN , z = 0) < πN oN (peq
N oN , z = 0) ⇐⇒ 3(tN − tN oN ) < 4tN + tN oN + 4tN tN oN

⇐⇒ t2N + 4t2N oN + 4tN tN oN > 0
where the last inequality is always true. Thus, this deviation is not profitable for ISP
NoN.
These cases prove that no deviation form (2.47) is profitable for ISP NoN.
Case 2-N: Now, consider a deviation by the neutral ISP from (2.47). Similar argument can be done for the neutral ISP. Fix, pN oN = peq
N oN , and consider two cases. In Case
2-N-i (respectively, Case 2-N-ii), we consider deviation by ISP N such that ∆p ≤ −tN oN
(respectively, ∆p ≥ tN ).
Case 2-N-i: Suppose the neutral ISP increases her price from peq
N to get ∆p ≤ −tN oN .
In this case, nN = 0, and the payoff of this ISP is zero. Since in the candidate equilibrium
strategy the payoff is non-negative, this deviation is not profitable.
Case 2-N-ii: Now, consider the case in which the non-neutral ISP decreases her price
such that ∆p ≥ tN . In this case, nN = 1 and πN (p0N ) = p0N − c. Thus, the payoff is a
strictly increasing function of p0N , and is maximized at p0N = peq
N oN − tN . We show that
0
πN (p0N ) < πN (peq
N ). Note that πN (pN ) =

1
3 (tN oN

− tN ) (by (2.1)). In addition, using

eq
eq
eq
(2.47), (2.1), 0 ≤ xN ≤ 1, (2.5), and the fact that with peq
N and pN oN , qN oN − qN = 0:

πN (peq
N) =

1 (2tN oN + tN )2
9 tN oN + tN

Thus:
2
2
2
2
πN (p0N ) < πN (peq
N ) ⇐⇒ 3(tN oN − tN ) < 4tN oN + tN + 4tN tN oN

⇐⇒ t2N oN + 4t2N + 4tN tN oN > 0
115

where the last inequality is always true. Thus, this deviation is not profitable for ISP N.
Thus, there is no profitable deviation for ISP N. This completes the proof, and the lemma
follows.

2.7.5

Proofs of Corollaries Characterizing the Outcome of the Market

Now, using the equilibrium strategies characterized in previous theorems, we characterize
the equilibrium outcomes of the market for different parameters in the following corollaries:
Corollary 2. If tN + tN oN ≤ κu q̃p , the equilibrium outcome of the market is:
• If tN + 2tN oN ≤ q̃p (κu + κad ), then p̃eq = p̃t,1 = κad (1 −

q̃f
q̃p ),

eq eq
(qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈

eq
F1L , neq
N = 0, and nN oN = 1.

• If tN +2tN oN > q̃p (κu +κad ) and conditions of item 2 of Theorem 6 is satisfied, then
p̃eq = p̃t,2 = κad (neq
N oN −
and neq
N oN =

q̃f
q̃p ),

eq eq
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I , neq
(qN
N =

tN +2tN oN −q̃p (κu +κad )
,
3(tN +tN oN )

2tN +tN oN +q̃p (κu +κad )
.
3(tN +tN oN )

Proof. Proof: First, consider Strategy 1 of Theorem 6. Item 1 of Theorem 2 yields that
eq
eq eq
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1L . Thus, neq
(qN
N = 0, and nN oN = 1. In addition, by Theorem 4,

p̃eq = p̃t,1 = κad (1 −

q̃f
q̃p ).

Now, consider Strategy 2 of Theorem 6. Note that we constructed this strategy such
eq eq
that ∆p satisfies item 3 of Theorem 2. Thus, (qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I . In addition, by

Theorem 4, p̃eq = p̃t,2 = κad (nN oN −

q̃f
q̃p ).

eq
Using the expression for ∆p = peq
N oN − pN , and

eq
(2.5), the expressions for neq
N and nN oN follow.
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Corollary 3. If Strategy 1 of Theorem 7 is an NE, it yields p̃eq = p̃t,1 = κad (1 −

q̃f
q̃p ),

eq eq
eq
(qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1L , neq
N = 0, and nN oN = 1. If Strategy 2 of Theorem 7 is an NE, it
q̃

eq eq
eq
f
I
yields p̃eq = p̃t,2 = κad (neq
N oN − q̃p ), (qN , qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1 , nN =

and neq
N oN =

2tN +tN oN +q̃p (κu +κad )
.
3(tN +tN oN )

p̃t,3 = κad neq
N oN (1 −
and neq
N oN =

q̃f
q̃p ),

If Strategy 3 of Theorem 7 is an NE, it yields p̃eq =

eq eq
(qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1I , neq
N =

2tN +tN oN +(q̃p −q̃f )(κu +κad )
.
3(tN +tN oN )

p̃eq = p̃t,3 = κad neq
N oN (1 −

q̃f
q̃p ),

tN +2tN oN −q̃p (κu +κad )
,
3(tN +tN oN )

tN +2tN oN −(q̃p −q̃f )(κu +κad )
,
3(tN +tN oN )

If Strategy 4 of Theorem 7 is an NE, it yields

eq eq
(qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1I , neq
N =

κu q̃p
tN +tN oN ,

and neq
N oN =

tN +tN oN −κu q̃p
.
tN +tN oN

Proof. Proof: First, consider Strategy 1 of Theorem 7. Item 1 of Theorem 2 yields that
eq
eq eq
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1L . Thus, neq
(qN
N = 0, and nN oN = 1. In addition, by Theorem 4,

p̃eq = p̃t,1 = κad (1 −

q̃f
q̃p ).

Now, consider Strategy 2 of Theorem 7. Note that we constructed this strategy such
eq eq
that ∆p satisfies items 2-a-ii or 2-b of Theorem 2. Thus, (qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ) ∈ F1I .

In addition, by Theorem 4, p̃eq = p̃t,2 = κad (neq
N oN −

q̃f
q̃p ).

Using the expression for

eq
eq
eq
∆p = peq
N oN − pN , and (2.5), the expressions for nN and nN oN follow.

Consider Strategies 3 and 4 of Theorem 7. In this case, ∆p satisfies item 2-a-i of
eq eq
Theorem 2 (by construction of these strategies). Thus, (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈ F1I . In

addition, by Theorem 4, p̃eq = p̃t,3 = κad neq
N oN (1 −

q̃f
q̃p ).

Using the expression of ∆peq for

eq
each of the strategies, neq
N and nN oN follow.

eq eq
Corollary 4. If the strategy of Theorem 9 is an NE, it yields (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃f ) ∈ F0L ,

neq
N =

2tN oN +tN
3(tN oN +tN ) ,

and neq
N oN =

2tN +tN oN
3(tN +tN oN ) .

Since z eq = 0, p̃eq is of no importance.
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Proof. Proof: Note that we constructed this strategy such that ∆p satisfies item 1 of
eq eq
eq
Theorem 1. Thus, (qN
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , q̃f ) ∈ F0I . Using the expression for ∆p = peq
N oN − pN ,
eq
and (2.5), the expressions for neq
N and nN oN follow.

Corollary 5. If both ISPs are neutral, then in the equilibrium, ISPs chooses peq
N = c+
1
3 (2tN oN

1
+ tN ) and peq
N oN = c + 3 (2tN + tN oN ) as the Internet access fees. The CP

eq eq
chooses the vector of qualities (qN
, qN ) = (q̃f , q̃f ). The fraction of EUs with each ISP is

neq
N =

2tN oN +tN
3(tN oN +tN )

and neq
N oN =

2tN +tN oN
3(tN oN +tN ) .

Results follow from Theorem 1 (note that −tN oN < ∆peq < tN ), and (2.5).

2.7.6

Continuous Strategy Set for the CP

In this section, we consider qN ∈ [0, q̃f ] and qN oN ∈ [0, q̃p ]. In this case, the CP pays
a side payment of p̃qN oN if she chooses qN oN ∈ (q̃f , q̃p ]. The rest of the model is the
same as before. Note that in this case, the optimum strategies in Stage 4 of the game,
in which end-users decide on the ISP, is the same as before. We prove that the optimum
decisions made by the CP is similar to the decisions of the CP when she has a discrete
set of strategies. This yields that the results of the model would the same as before when
the CP chooses her strategy from a continuous set.
Therefore, we focus on characterizing the optimum strategies of the CP when she
chooses her strategy from continuous sets, i.e. qN ∈ [0, q̃f ] and qN oN ∈ [0, q̃p ]. The
following lemma is useful in defining the maximization and to characterize the optimum
answers.
Lemma 10. πCP (qN , q̃f,N oN , z = 0) ≥ πCP (qN , q̃f,N oN , z = 1).
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Remark 5. Note that although we considered z to be a dummy variable, in this lemma
and for the purpose of analysis, we treat it as an independent variable.
Proof. Proof: The lemma follows by (2.2), and comparing the expressions in these two
cases:
πCP (qN , q̃f,N oN , z = 0) − πCP (qN , q̃f,N oN , z = 1) = q̃f,N oN p̃ ≥ 0
Note that we used the fact that from (2.5), since the qualities are the same in both
cases, nN and nN oN are equal for both cases.
Lemma 10 provides the ground to formally define the maximization for the CP as:
max πCP (qN , qN oN , z) =

z,qN ,qN oN

max

z,qN ,qN oN

nN κad qN + nN oN κad qN oN − z p̃qN oN



s.t:
(2.48)

qN ≤ q̃f
if z = 1 q̃f < qN oN ≤ q̃p
if z = 0 qN oN ≤ q̃f

Existence of the maximum: Note that the mixed integer programming (2.48) can be
written as two convex maximizations, one for z = 0 and one for z = 1. In addition, note
that for the case z = 1, the feasible set is not closed (since q̃f < qN oN ≤ q̃p ). Thus, in this
case, we should use the “supremum” instead of “maximum”. However, using Lemma 10,
we prove that the maximum of (2.48) exists, and therefore the term maximum can be
used safely. To prove this, consider the closure of the feasible set when z = 1 formed by
adding q̃f to the set, i.e. F̃1 . Since the feasible set associated with z = 0 (F0 ) and the
closure of the feasible set associated to z = 1 (F̃1 ) are closed and bounded (compact) and
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the objective function is continuous for each z ∈ {0, 1}, using Weierstrass Extreme Value
Theorem, we can say that a maximum exists in each of these two sets and for the overall
optimization (2.48). If the maxima in F̃1 is not q̃f , then the maxima is in the original
feasible set (F1 ). Therefore the maximum of (2.48) exists. If not and q̃f is the maxima
in the set F̃1 , then by Lemma 10, the maximum in the set F0 dominates the maximum
of the set F̃1 . Thus, the maxima of (2.48) is in F0 . Therefore, the maximum of (2.48)
exists, and we can use the term maximum safely.
∗ , q̃ ∗
∗
Henceforth, the solution (q̃N
N oN , z ) of the maximization (2.48) would be called the

optimum strategies of the CP. This solution yields x∗N and subsequently n∗N and n∗N oN by
(2.5). In addition, we denote the feasible set of (2.48) by F.
Finding the optimum strategies of the CP: To characterize the optimum strategies, we
use the partition the feasible set in Table 2.1, and characterize the candidate optimum
strategies, i.e. the strategies that yield a higher payoff than the rest of the feasible
solutions, in each subset. The overall optimum, which is chosen by the CP, is the one
that yields the highest payoff among candidate strategies.
Note that although the maximum of the overall optimization exist, a maximum may
not necessarily exist in each of the subsets. We will show in the next set of lemmas that the
optimization in each subset of the feasible set can be reduced to a convex maximization
over linear constraints. Thus, only the extreme points of the feasible sets may constitute
the optimum solution. This means that the CP chooses her strategy among the discrete
strategies, qN ∈ {0, q̃f } and qN oN ∈ {0, q̃f , q̃p }.
We now characterize optimum strategies of the CP, by considering each of the subfeasible sets and characterizing the optimum solutions in each of them. In Lemma 13, we
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∗ , q∗
I
∗
∗
∗
∗
prove that if (qN
N oN ) ∈ F , then qN ∈ {0, q̃f }, qN oN ∈ {0, q̃f , q̃p }, and (qN , qN oN ) 6=
∗ , q∗
L
∗
∗
L
(0, 0). In Lemma 15, we prove that if (qN
N oN ) ∈ F , then qN oN = q̃f , if qN oN ∈ F0 ,
∗
∗
L
∗
and qN
oN = q̃p , if qN oN ∈ F1 . Moreover, 0 ≤ qN ≤

1
∗
κu (κu qN oN

− tN oN − ∆p), and

∗
∗
∗
U
∗
∆p ≤ κu qN
oN − tN oN . In Lemma 16, we prove that if (qN , qN oN ) ∈ F , then qN = q̃f
∗
and 0 ≤ qN
oN ≤

1
κu (κu q̃f

− tN + ∆p) and ∆p ≥ tN − κu q̃f . In addition, Lemmas 11 and

12 provide some results that are useful in proving Lemmas 13-16.
Lemma 11. In an optimum solution of (2.48), nN oN κad − z p̃ ≥ 0.
Proof. Proof: Suppose there exists an optimum answer such that nN oN κad −z p̃ < 0. Note
that 0 ≤ nN , nN oN ≤ 1 and qualities are non-negative. Thus, in this case, πCP < κad qN .
However, choosing z = 0 and qN oN = qN , yields a profit equal to κad qN . This contradicts
the solution with nN oN κad − z p̃ < 0 to be optimum. Thus, the Lemma follows.
Lemma 12. In an optimum solution, the CP offers the content quality equal to one of
∗ = q̃ OR (q ∗
∗
the threshold at least on one ISP, i.e. qN
f
N oN = q̃p XOR qN oN = q̃f ), where

XOR means only one the qualities is chosen.
Proof. Proof: Suppose not. Let the optimum qualities to be q̂N oN < q̃f if z = 0, or
q̃f < q̂N oN < q̃p if z = 1, and q̂N < q̃f . The difference between the qualities offered in two
0
0
platforms is ∆q = q̂N oN − q̂N . Consider qN
oN = q̂N oN +  and qN = q̂N +  in which  > 0
0
0
0
and is such that qN
oN ≤ q̃f if z = 0, or q̃f ≤ qN oN ≤ q̃p if z = 1, and qN ≤ q̃f . Note that
0
0
z remains fixed and qN
oN − qN = q̂N oN − q̂N = ∆q. Since ∆q is the same for two cases,

the number of subscriber to each ISP is the same for both cases by (2.5). Lemma 11,
0
(2.2), and the fact that nN , nN oN ≥ 0 yield that πCP
≥ π̂CP , where π̂CP (, respectively
0 ) is the payoff of the CP when the vector of qualities is (q̂ , q̂
πCP
N N oN ) (, respectively,
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0 , q0
(qN
N oN )).

We now prove if (q̂N , q̂N oN ) is the optimum solution, then the inequality is strict, i.e.
0
0
πCP
> π̂CP . Suppose not, and πCP
= π̂CP . This only happens if nN oN κad − z p̃ = 0 and
0
nN = 0. Note that in this case, πCP
= π̂CP = 0. However, in the previous paragraph, we

argued that with qN = q̃f and qN oN = q̃f , the CP can get a payoff of κad q̃f > 0. This
0
contradicts the assumption that (q̂N , q̂N oN ) is the optimum solution. Thus, πCP
> π̂CP .

This inequality contradicts the assumption that (q̂N , q̂N oN ) is the optimum solution.
Thus, the result follows.
Clearly, the decision of the CP about the vector of qualities depends on the parameter
xN (2.4), and subsequently on nN . First, we characterize the candidate strategies of
I
∗ , q∗
the CP when 0 ≤ xN ≤ 1, i.e. (qN
N oN ) ∈ F and therefore nN = xN . Then, we
∗ , q∗
L
consider the case of xN < 0 (nN = 0 and (qN
N oN ) ∈ F ) and xN > 1 (nN = 1 and
∗ , q∗
U
(qN
N oN ) ∈ F ). Finally, we combine both cases to determine the optimum strategies

of the CP. In the following lemma, we characterize the candidate optimum qualities in
F I , i.e. the strategies by which 0 ≤ xN ≤ 1.
∗ , q∗
I
∗
Lemma 13. If (qN
N oN ) ∈ F , i.e. optimum strategies are such that 0 < xN < 1, then
∗ ∈ {0, q̃ }, q ∗
∗
∗
qN
f
N oN ∈ {0, q̃f , q̃p }, (qN , qN oN ) 6= (0, 0).

∗ , q∗
Remark 6. Note that to be in F I and from (2.5), (qN
N oN ) should be such that
∗
∗
∆q ∗ = qN
oN − qN <

∆p+tN oN
.
κu

∆p−tN
κu

<

In Lemma 12, we have proved that the quality on at least

one of the ISPs is equal to a threshold. In this lemma, we prove that the qualities offered
on both ISPs are equal to thresholds or one of them is zero.
Proof. Proof: We would like to characterize the optimum qualities in F I = F0I
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S

F1I , i.e.

optimum strategies for which 0 < xN < 1. First note that by Lemma 12, either (a)
∗ = c and q ∗
∗
∗
qN
N oN = c + ∆q where c = q̃f , or (b) qN oN = c and qN = c − ∆q where

c ∈ {q̃f , q̃p }. Note that the feasible sets for each case can be rewritten as a function of
∆q. We characterize the candidate solutions for each case:

• Case (a): The feasible set for the case (a) is ∆q ∈ G0 = [−c, q̃f − c] (for z = 0) and
∆q ∈ G1 = (q̃f − c, q̃p − c] (for z = 1), where c = q̃f . Let G = G0 ∪ G1 . Note that if
0 ≤ xN ≤ 1, then nN = xN and nN oN = 1 − xN . Thus, (2.48) can be written as,

max

z,∆q∈G=G0 ∪G1

max

z,∆q∈G

πCP (c, c + ∆q, z) =


tN oN − κu ∆q + pN oN − pN κad c+

(2.49)


+ tN + κu ∆q + pN − pN oN κad (c + ∆q) − z p̃(c + ∆q)
Note that although the feasible set G1 is not closed, we used maximum instead of
supremum. We will show that the maximum of (2.49) exists. Thus, the term maximum can be used safely. Note that the objective functions of (2.49) is a strictly
convex functions of ∆q. Note that henceforth wherever we refer to maximum without further clarification, we refer to the solution of (2.48).
Let G̃1 be the closure of G1 , then G̃1 \G1 = {q̃f − c}. First, we prove that the
maximum of (2.49) exists. Note that G0 and G̃1 are closed and bounded (compact)
and the objective function of (2.49) is continuous with respect to ∆q for each z ∈
{0, 1}. Using Weierstrass Extreme Value Theorem, we can say that a maxima for
πCP (c, ∆q + c, z = 0) and πCP (c, ∆q + c, z = 1) exists in each of two sets G0 and
G̃1 , respectively. Thus, the overall maximum for the objective function of (2.49)
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over G0 and G̃1 exists. Now, consider two cases:
1. If the maxima of πCP (c, ∆q + c, z = 1) in G̃1 is not ∆q = q̃f − c, then the
maxima is in the original feasible set (G1 ). Therefore the maximum of (2.49)
exists (since G0 is closed).
2. If ∆q = q̃f − c is the maxima of πCP (c, ∆q + c, z = 1) in the set G̃1 , then by
Lemma 10, the maximum of πCP (c, ∆q + c, z = 0) in the set G0 greater than
or equal to the maximum of πCP (c, ∆q + c, z = 1) in G̃1 . Thus, the maxima of
(2.49) over G0 and G1 exists and is in G0 .
Now, that we have proved the existence of the maximum for (2.49), we aim to find
all the candidate optimum solutions. Note that the set G0 is closed. Thus, by the
strict convexity of the objective function of (2.49), the candidate optimums in G0
are the extreme points of G0 . Using the definition of this feasible set, the candidate
∗ = q̃ and q ∗
answers are (i) qN
f
N oN ∈ {0, q̃f }.

Now, consider the feasible set G̃1 , and consider two cases:
1. If ∆q = q̃f − c is not the unique maxima of (2.49) in G̃1 , then the maxima is
in G1 or G0 . The candidate answers in the set G0 are already characterized.
In addition, by strict convexity of the objective function, the maxima can only
be an extreme point of G̃1 . Since q̃f − c is not the unique maxima of (2.48)
in G̃1 , q̃p is a maxima of (2.48) in G1 . Thus, by strong convexity, for all
∆q ∈ G1 πCP (c, q̃p , z = 1) > πCP (c, ∆q + c, z = 1), and the only candidate
∗ = q̃ and
optimum solution over G1 is at ∆q = q̃p − c ∈ G1 which yields (ii) qN
f
∗
qN
oN = q̃p .
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2. If q̃f −c is the unique maxima in G̃1 , then πCP (c, q̃f , z = 1) > πCP (c, ∆q+c, z =
1) for ∆q ∈ G1 . By Lemma 10, πCP (c, q̃f , z = 0) ≥ πCP (c, q̃f , z = 1). Therefore, the overall maximum of (2.49) is in the set G0 , and is as characterized
previously.
• Case (b): The feasible set for the case (b) is ∆q ∈ Ĝ0 = [c − q̃f , c] where c = q̃f (for
z = 0), and ∆q ∈ Ĝ1 = [c − q̃f , c] where c = q̃p (for z = 1). For this case, (2.48) can
be written as:
max

πCP (c − ∆q, c, z) =

z,∆q∈Ĝ=Ĝ0 ∪Ĝ1



max κad tN oN − κu ∆q + pN oN − pN (c − ∆q) + κad c tN + κu ∆q + pN − pN oN − z p̃c
z,∆q∈Ĝ

(2.50)
Note that the feasible set is closed. Thus the term maximum is fine. In addition,
the objective functions of (2.50) are strictly convex functions of ∆q. Thus, using
the strict convexity and the definition of the feasible set, i.e. c − q̃f ≤ ∆q ∗ ≤ c
where c is q̃f and q̃p , respectively, we can get the other set of candidate answers,
∗
∗
∗
∗
(iii) qN
oN = q̃f and q̃N ∈ {0, q̃f }, and (iv) q̃N oN = q̃p and q̃N ∈ {0, q̃f }.

From, (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv), the result follows.

The following corollary follows immediately from Lemma 13:
Corollary 6. The possible candidate optimum strategies by which 0 < x∗N < 1, i.e.
∗ , q∗
I
∗
∗
(qN
N oN ) ∈ F , are (1) (0, q̃f ), (2) (q̃f , 0), and (3) (q̃f , q̃f ) when z = 0, i.e. (qN , qN oN ) ∈
∗ , q∗
I
F0I , and (1) (0, q̃p ) and (2) (q̃f , q̃p ) when z = 1, i.e. (qN
N oN ) ∈ F1 . Note that the
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necessary and sufficient condition for each of these candidate outcomes to be in F I is
∆p−tN
κu

< ∆q ∗ <

∆p+tN oN
.
κu

Note that Corollary 6 lists all the candidate answers by which 0 < xN < 1. In the
next three lemmas, we focus on the candidate answers when xN ≥ 1 or xN ≤ 0.
Lemma 14. If ∆p > κu q̃f − tN oN then xN > 0 for all choices of qN oN and qN in the
feasible set F0 (that is F0L is an empty set). Similarly, If ∆p > κu q̃p − tN oN then xN > 0
for all choices of qN oN and qN in the feasible set F1 (that is F1L is an empty set). In
addition, if ∆p < tN − κu q̃f then xN < 1 for all choices of qN oN and qN in the overall
feasible set F (that is F U is an empty set).
Proof. Proof: First note that from (2.5), xN > 0 is equivalent to:
∆p > κu (qN oN − qN ) − tN oN

(2.51)

Consider ∆p > κu q̃f − tN oN (respectively, ∆p > κu q̃p − tN oN ), if (qN , qN oN ) ∈ F0
(respectively, (qN , qN oN ) ∈ F1 ) then ∆p > κu q̃f − tN oN ≥ κu (qN oN − qN ) − tN oN (respectively, ∆p > κu q̃p − tN oN ≥ κu (qN oN − qN ) − tN oN ) for every choice of (qN , qN oN ) ∈ F0
(respectively, (qN , qN oN ) ∈ F1 ). The inequality ∆p > κu (qN oN −qN )−tN oN yields xN > 0.
The first result of the lemma follows.
Now, we prove the second statement. From (2.5), xN < 1 is equivalent to:
∆p < tN + κu (qN oN − qN )
Consider ∆p < tN − κu q̃f . Note that:
∆p < tN − κu q̃f ≤ tN + κu (qN oN − qN )
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(2.52)

for every choice of 0 ≤ qN ≤ q̃f and 0 ≤ qN oN ≤ q̃p which are all the possible choices in
F. The inequality ∆p < tN + κu (qN oN − qN ) yields that xN < 1. The result follows.
The following lemma characterizes all the candidate answers when x∗N ≤ 0, and characterize the necessary condition on parameters for this solutions to be feasible.
∗ , q∗
L
∗
∗
L
∗
∗
L
Lemma 15. Let (qN
N oN ) ∈ F . If (qN , qN oN ) ∈ F0 (respectively, if (qN , qN oN ) ∈ F1 ),
1
∗
∗
then qN
oN = q̃f (respectively, qN oN = q̃p ). Moreover, for every x ∈ [0, κu (κu q̃f − tN oN −

∆p)] (respectively, x ∈ [0, κ1u (κu q̃p − tN oN − ∆p)]) and ∆p ≤ κu q̃f − tN oN (respectively,
∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN ), (x, q̃f ) (respectively, (x, q̃p )) constitutes an optimum solution in F0L
(respectively, in F1L ).
Proof. Proof: From (2.5), xN ≤ 0 is equivalent to:
∆p ≤ κu (qN oN − qN ) − tN oN

(2.53)

Note that from (2.5), if xN ≤ 0 then nN = 0 and nN oN = 1. In this case, the payoff
of the CP is,
πG = κad qN oN − z p̃qN oN

(2.54)

Note that the value of the payoff is independent of qN as long as nN = 0, and from (2.5)
nN is a function of qN and qN oN . In addition, note that if there exist a qN oN that satisfies
0
the constraint ∆p ≤ κu (qN oN − qN ) − tN oN (and therefore nN = 0) then qN
oN ≥ qN oN
0
also satisfies this constraint. Therefore for qN
oN ≥ qN oN , nN = 0 and (2.54) is true. Note

that from Lemma 11, (2.54) is an increasing function of qN oN . Thus, if xN ≤ 0, then
∗
∗
∗
L
∗
∗
∗
L
qN
oN = q̃f if (qN , qN oN ) ∈ F0 or qN oN = q̃p if (qN , qN oN ) ∈ F1 (using the feasible sets in

Table 2.1 and their definitions).
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∗ , q∗
L
∗
∗
L
Using (2.53), (qN
N oN ) ∈ F0 (respectively, (qN , qN oN ) ∈ F1 ) if and only if,

∗
qN
≤

1
(κu q̃f − ∆p − tN oN )
κu



∗
respectively, qN
≤

1
(κu q̃p − ∆p − tN oN )
κu


(2.55)

∗ that satisfies (2.55) is an optimum answer since when (q ∗ , q ∗
Note that every qN
N N oN ) ∈
∗ is of no importance. Also, note that q
F L , nN = 0 and qN
N ≥ 0. Thus, (2.55) is true
∗ if ∆p ≤ κ q̃ − t
for at least one qN
u f
N oN (respectively, ∆p ≤ κu q̃p − tN oN ). The result

follows.
The following lemma characterizes all the candidate answers when xN ≥ 1, and characterize the necessary condition on parameters for this solutions to be feasible.
U
∗
∗ , q∗
Lemma 16. If (qN
N oN ) ∈ F , i.e. optimum strategies are such that xN ≥ 1. Then
∗ = q̃ . Moreover, for all x ∈ [0, 1 (κ q̃ − t + ∆p)] and ∆p ≥ t − κ q̃ , (q ∗ , x)
qN
u f
u f
N
N
f
N
κu

constitutes an optimum solution in F U .
Proof. Proof: From (2.5), xN ≥ 1 is equivalent to:
∆p ≥ tN + κu (qN oN − qN )

(2.56)

Now, we prove the first result of the lemma. Note that from (2.5), if xN ≥ 1 then
nN = 1 and nN oN = 0. In this case, the payoff of the CP is,
πG = κad qN

(2.57)

Note that the value of the payoff is independent of qN oN as long as nN = 1, and from
(2.5), nN is a function of qN and qN oN . In addition, note that if there exist a qN that
0 ≥ q also satisfies this constraint. Therefore,
satisfies ∆p ≥ tN + κu (qN oN − qN ), then qN
N
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0 ≥ q , n = 1 and (2.57) is true. Note that (2.57) is an increasing function of q .
for qN
N
N
N
∗ = q̃ (using the feasible sets in Table 2.1 and their definitions).
Thus, qN
f
∗ , q∗
U if and only if:
Using (2.56), (qN
N oN ) ∈ F

∗
qN
oN ≤

1
(κu q̃f − tN + ∆p)
κu

(2.58)

∗
∗
∗
Note that every qN
oN that satisfies (2.58) is an optimum answer since when (qN , qN oN ) ∈
∗
F U , n∗N oN = 0 and qN
oN is of no importance. Also, note that qN oN ≥ 0. Thus, the
∗
condition (2.58) is true for at least one qN
oN if κu q̃f −tN +∆p ≥ 0. The result follows.

eq eq
eq eq
eq eq
, qN oN ) ∈ F1L , then
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃f ). If (qN
, qN oN ) ∈ F0L , then (qN
Corollary 7. If (qN
eq eq
eq eq
eq eq
, qN oN ) = (q̃f , 0).
, qN oN ) ∈ F U , then (qN
(qN
, qN oN ) = (0, q̃p ). If (qN

∗ , q∗
L (, respectively (q ∗ , q ∗
U
Proof. Proof: Note that when (qN
N oN ) ∈ F
N N oN ) ∈ F ), then
∗ and q ∗
the payoff of the CP is independent of qN
N oN . Thus, result of the corollary follows

from Tie-Breaking Assumption 1.
Theorem 12. All possible equilibrium strategies are:
(0, q̃f ) ∈ F0I ∪ F0L , (q̃f , 0) ∈ F0I ∪ F0U , (q̃f , q̃f ) ∈ F0I ,
(0, q̃p ) ∈

F1I

∪

F1L

, (q̃f , q̃p ) ∈

(2.59)

F1I

Results follow directly from Corollaries 6 and 7.
Note that (2.59) and (2.11) are exactly similar. This implies that the strategies chosen
by the CP when she chooses from continuous sets is exactly similar to the strategies when
she chooses from the discrete set characterized in our model. This completes our proof.
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Chapter 3

Non-Neutrality Framework I Uncertain Price Competition in
1

an Internet Market
In Chapter 2, we assessed the benefits of migrating to non-neutrality for different entities of the market. Given the incentives of different entities of the market to migrate
to a non-neutral regime under appropriate conditions, in this chapter, we formulate and
analyze the strategic choices of decision makers in a non-neutral Internet market. More
specifically, we analyze the interactions, pricings, and the consequences of different nonneutral frameworks. In this chapter, we study the price competition in a duopoly with
an arbitrary number of buyers. In this case, ISPs can be considered to be sellers selling/leasing a number of their resources to buyers, i.e. CPs. Each seller can offer multiple
1

Presented in Allerton 2012 [36] and published in IEEE Transaction on Automatic Control [37].
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units of resources depending on the availability of the resources which is random and may
be different for different sellers. Sellers seek to select a price that will be attractive to
the buyers and also fetch adequate profits. The selection will in general depend on the
number of units available with the seller and also that of its competitor - the seller may
only know the statistics of the latter. We analyze this price competition as a game, and
identify a set of necessary and sufficient properties for the Nash Equilibrium (NE). The
properties reveal that sellers randomize their price using probability distributions whose
support sets are mutually disjoint and in decreasing order of the number of availability.
We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric NE in a symmetric market, and
explicitly compute the price distribution in the symmetric NE. In addition, we propose a
heuristic pricing strategy for sellers in a symmetric oligopoly market which satisfies the
necessary and sufficient properties identified for a NE in a symmetric duopoly. Numerical
evaluations reveal that our proposed strategy constitutes a good approximation for the
NE of the symmetric oligopoly market.
The chapter is organized as follows: We model the price selection problem as a oneshot non-cooperative game in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, we identify key properties that
every NE pricing strategy should satisfy when demand is greater than the maximum
possible availability level. In Section 3.3, we prove that any strategy profile that satisfies
the properties listed in Section 3.2 constitutes an NE regardless of the relation between
the demand and the number of available units. This sufficiency result naturally leads to an
algorithm for computing the strategies that satisfy the properties in Section 3.2 (presented
in Appendix, Section 3.9.3). In Section 3.4, we present the results for a symmetric market.
Results are generalized to the case of random demand in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6,
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numerical evaluations are presented. In Section 3.7, we outline the connection between
the decision problem we considered and two other different emerging application domains:
primary/secondary and microgrid markets. In addition, we discuss about some aspects of
the model in connection to the applications considered. Finally, in Section 3.8 we conclude
the chapter. Additional details and some of the proofs are presented in the Appendix of
the chapter (Section 3.9).

3.1
3.1.1

Market Model and Problem Formulation
Market Model

First, we define some preliminary notations. Then sellers’ decision and information are
described.

Preliminary notations
We consider a market with two sellers in which each seller owns multiple number of the
same commodity and quotes a price per unit. The total demand of the market is d units.
For simplicity, the demand is assumed to be deterministic. The generalization to random
d is straightforward, and is presented in Section 3.5.
Buyers prefer the seller who quotes a lower price per unit, and they are equally likely
to buy a unit from sellers who select equal prices. Thus, if sellers have a, b units to
sell respectively and quote prices of x, y per unit, where x < y, then they respectively
sell min{a, d}, min{b, (d − a)+ } units, where z + denotes max{z, 0}. The cost of each
transaction is c. Therefore, a seller earns a profit of i(x − c) when she sells i units with
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price x per unit. Because of regulatory restrictions or because of valuations that buyers
associate with purchase of each unit, the price selected by each seller should be bounded
by some constant v > c, i.e. x ≤ v. The availability of each seller is random:
Terminology 1. We denote mk as the maximum possible number of available units of
seller k. Let qkj ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that seller k has j ∈ {0, . . . , mk } units available,
and ~qk = (qk0 , . . . , qkmk ).
The availability of sellers may for example follow binomial distributions B(m1 , p1 ) and
B(m2 , p2 ). Specifically, if p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.3, m1 = 3, and m2 = 2, then ~q1 = ( 18 , 38 , 38 , 18 )
9
49 42
, 100 , 100
).
and ~q2 = ( 100

We assume that sellers have zero unit available for sale with positive probability, i.e.,
qk0 > 0 for k ∈ {1, 2}, and the competition is uncertain, i.e., qk̄i < 1 for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , mk }
for at least one seller k 2 . Note that if competition is deterministic for both sellers, then
the problem is trivial.
Terminology 2. For each seller k, let k̄ denote the other seller, i.e., if k = 1 (respectively,
k = 2), then k̄ = 2 (respectively k̄ = 1).

Sellers’ decisions and information
Sellers select their price based on the number of units they offer in the market. Before
choosing her price, a seller does not know the number of units of the commodity that
her competitor has available for sale and the price per unit her competitor selects. She
2

Note that if these exists i, j ∈ {0, . . . , mk } such that q1i = 1 and q2j = 1, then both sellers know the

exact number of available units with the other seller. Thus the competition is deterministic.
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is however aware of the demand and the distributions for the above quantities. A seller
may select her price randomly.
Terminology 3. Let Φkj (.) be the probability distribution that the seller k ∈ {1, 2} uses
for selecting price per unit when she offers j units. Let p̃kj and ṽkj be the infimum and
the supremum of the support set3 of Φkj (.). The strategy profile of seller k is Θk (.) =
(Φk1 (.), . . . , Φkmk (.)).
An example of probability distributions, support sets, and their infimums and supremums is presented in Figure 3.1. In this figure, the infimums (p̃kj ’s) are illustrated
explicitly, and ṽkj = p̃k,j−1 (For instance, ṽ13 = p̃12 ). Note that, Figure 3.1 presents
the distributions which are strictly increasing between the infimum and the supremum
of their support sets. However, the probability distributions in general may consist of
strictly increasing and flat parts. For example, a probability distribution that is strictly
increasing over intervals [a, b] and [c, d], and flat over interval [b, c]. Unlike the previous
example, the support set of this probability distribution ([a, d] ∪ [c, d]) is not connected.

3.1.2

Problem Formulation

Clearly, the number of units a seller sells and her profit are random.
Terminology 4. Let uk (Θk (.), Θk̄ (.)) denotes the expected profit of seller k when she
adopts strategy profile Θk (.) and her competitor adopts Θk̄ (.).
3

The support set of a probability distribution is the smallest closed set such that its complement has

probability zero under the distribution function. In other words, if there is another set such that its
complement has probability zero, it should be a super set of the support set.
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Definition 5. A Nash equilibrium (NE)4 is a strategy profile such that no seller can improve her expected profit by unilaterally deviating from her strategy. Therefore, (Θ?1 (.), Θ?2 (.))
is a NE if for each seller k:
uk (Θ∗k (·), Θ∗k̄ (·)) ≥ uk (Θ̃k (·), Θ∗k̄ (·)),

∀

Θ̃k (·).

Terminology 5. With slight abuse of notation, we denote ukl (x) as the expected profit
that seller k earns, and Bkl (x) as the expected number of units that seller k sells, when she
offers l units for sale with price x per unit, respectively (the dependence on the competitor’s
strategy is implicit in this simplified notation).

Clearly, ukl (x) = Bkl (x)(x − c).
Note that
1
j ukj (x)

ukl
l

(3.1)

is the expected utility per unit of availability. Thus, Ak,l,j (x) = 1l ukl (x)−

is the difference between the utility per availability for availability levels l and

j. We will see that Ak,l,j (x) plays an important role throughout in the proofs, which
motivates the following terminology:
Terminology 6. Let Ak,l,j (x) = 1l ukl (x) − 1j ukj (x) = (x − c)Bk,l,j (x), where Bk,l,j (x) =
1
l Bkl (x)

− 1j Bkj (x).

Terminology 7. Let ek = (d − mk̄ )+ .
Note that for all x ≤ v,
Bkl (x) = l
4

l = 1, . . . , ek

(3.2)

Clearly, our game is a Bayesian game with the number of available units for sale being the type of

a player. For the sake of notational convenience, we use Nash equilibrium as an alternative for Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
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as k will sell all she offers in this case given that the total offering is less than the
demand. We would later obtain the expression for Bkl (x) under the NE strategy profiles
when l > ek .
Definition 6. A price x is said to be the best-response price for seller k when she offers
j units if ukj (x) ≥ ukj (a) for all a ∈ [0, v].
Note that a NE-strategy profile selects with positive probability only amongst the
best-response prices. Thus, all the elements of support sets are best responses except
potentially those on the boundaries (elements of boundaries may not be best responses)
if there is a discontinuity in the utility at those points.
We seek to determine the Nash equilibrium strategy profile of sellers. If m1 + m2 ≤
d, since there is no competition between sellers, both sellers offer their units with the
monopoly price, v at the NE. We therefore assume that m1 + m2 > d.

3.2

Properties of a NE when d > max{m1 , m2 }

We investigate the necessary conditions for a strategy to be an NE when d > max{m1 , m2 }
(Theorem 13). We will explicitly point out whenever we use the assumption that d >
max{m1 , m2 }.
Theorem 13. A NE must satisfy the following properties when d > max{m1 , m2 },
1. For each k, there exists a threshold such that seller k offers price v with probability
one if she has the availability level less than or equal to this threshold. This threshold,
denoted as lk henceforth, is such that:
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(a) lk ∈ {ek , . . . , mk − 1}
(b) l1 + l2 = d − 1 or l1 + l2 = d
2. When seller k has lk + 1

5

units, she uses distribution Φk,lk +1 (.)

(a) whose support set is [p̃k,lk +1 , v],
(b) which is continuous throughout except possibly at v, and
(c) has a jump at v for at most one value of k ∈ {1, 2}, and size of such a jump is
less than 1
3. When the availability level is i ∈ {lk + 2, . . . , mk }6 , seller k uses distribution Φki (.)
(a) whose support set is [p̃k,i , p̃k,i−1 ],
(b) which is continuous throughout
(c) p̃1,mk = p̃2,mk
4. The utility of seller k when she offers i units is equal for all prices in the support
set of Φki (.), except possibly at price v (if v belongs to her support set).
In Appendix 3.9.3, we will present an algorithm to explicitly compute the NE strategies
satisfying properties in Theorem 13. Using this algorithm, in Figure 3.1, we plot an NE
probability distribution of price when the vector of availability distributions are q~1 =
[0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3] and q~2 = [0.4, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2], the demand , i.e. d, is 3, v = 10, and c = 6.
Note that in this case l1 = l2 = 1, and l1 + l2 = d − 1 (part 1 at Theorem 13). This means
that both sellers offer price v with probability one if they have one unit of commodity
5

The same lk as the one in part 1.

6

The same lk as the one in part 1
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Figure 3.1: An example of an NE pricing strategy, Supp = Support Set. Note that Φ11
and Φ21 have a jump of magnitude one, and Φ22 has a jump of size 0.6 at v.

available. When sellers have availability l1 + 1 = 2 and l2 + 1 = 2 units available for
sale, they use probability distributions Φ12 (.) and Φ22 (.), respectively, whose support
sets are [p̃12 , v] and [p̃22 , v], respectively (part 2a of the Theorem). In addition, these
distributions are continuous throughout except possibly at v (part 2b). Furthermore, only
the probability distribution Φ22 (.) has a jump at price v and the size of this jump is less
than one (part 2c of Theorem 13). When sellers have availability level l1 + 2 = l2 + 2 = 3,
they use probability distributions Φ13 (.) and Φ23 (.), respectively, whose support sets are
[p̃13 , p̃12 ] and [p̃23 , p̃22 ], respectively (part 3a of Theorem 13). In addition, these probability
distributions are continuous throughout (part 3b). Note that p̃13 = p̃23 = p̃ (part 3c of
the Theorem). More numerical examples are presented in Appendix 3.9.3.
We prove Theorem 13 using the following results which we first state and prove later.
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1. The probability distribution of price, Φki (x) for i ∈ {1, . . . , mk }, is continuous for
x < v (Section 3.2.2, Property 3).
2. The lower bound of prices are equal for both sellers (Section 3.2.3, Property 4).
3. There is no gap between support sets (Section 3.2.4, Property 5).
4. Support sets are disjoint barring common boundary points, and are in decreasing
order of the number of available units for sale (Section 3.2.4, Property 6).
5. The structure of NE at price v: A seller selects v with probability one, if and
only if the number of available units with her is less than or equal to a threshold
lk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , mk −1}, where l1 +l2 = d or l1 +l2 = d−1 (Section 3.2.6, Property 7).

Note that in Figure 3.1, the distributions are continuous and the lower bound of prices
are equal. In addition, every element of the set [p̃, v] belongs to a support set, i.e. there
is no gap between support sets. The support sets of seller one when she offers 3, 2, and
1 unit are [p̃, p̃12 ], [p̃12 , v], and {v}, respectively. This illustrates the result 4. The result
5 is the same as part 1 in Theorem 13, and is previously connected to Figure 3.1.
Henceforth in this section, we focus on proving the necessary results and properties
needed to prove Theorem 13.

3.2.1

Results that we use throughout

Property 1. For each i and k, Φki (c) = 0.
This result follows directly since prices less than cost c are not chosen by sellers.
Property 1 therefore rules out jumps at prices x ≤ c.
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Proof. Note that for each i, uki (x) ≤ 0 for x ≤ c. But, since Bki (x) ≥ iqk̄0 > 0 for all
x ∈ [0, v], uki (x) > 0 for all x ∈ (c, v]. Thus, no price in [0, c] is a best response for a
seller.
Lemma 17 rules out jumps at prices higher than c:
Lemma 17. Let the strategy profile of player k be Θk (.) = (Φk1 (.), . . . , Φkmk (.)), and
Φki (.) have a jump at x > c. Then for l such that l + i > d, uk̄l (x − 0 ) > uk̄l (a),
∀a ∈ [x, min{x + , v}], and for all sufficiently small but positive  and 0 .
We provide the intuition behind the result and defer the proof to Appendix 3.9.1. Note
that offering a lower price increases the expected number of units sold by a seller, but
decreases the revenue per unit sold. Suppose that a seller k offers i units with price x with
a positive probability. Let her competitor k̄ have l units available where l + i > d; k̄ can
sell a strictly larger number of units in an expected sense by choosing a price in the left
neighborhood of x (eg, x − ) rather than x or in its right neighborhood. In addition the
difference is bounded away from zero even as the size of the left neighborhood approaches
zero. On the other hand, the difference in the revenue per unit approaches zero as the
size of the left neighborhood approaches zero. Therefore, prices in the left neighborhood
of x constitute better responses for the seller than x or those in its right neighborhood.
The following property fully characterizes the NE when seller k offers i ∈ {1, . . . , ek }
units.
Property 2. Φki (x) selects v with probability 1 and any other prices with probability 0
when i = 1, . . . , ek for each k.
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The proof relies on the fact that if a seller offers less than or equal to ek units of
commodity, she can sell all units regardless of the price she quotes. Therefore v strictly
dominates all other prices.
Proof. This statement holds by vacuity if max{m1 , m2 } ≥ d. Now consider d > max{m1 , m2 }.
If the seller k offers i ≤ ek units, the total offerings from both sellers are at most d, since the
other seller offers at most mk̄ units. Thus, the seller k can sell everything it offers with any
price x in interval [0, v]. Therefore for all x ∈ [0, v), uki (x) = i(x − c) < i(v − c) = uki (v).
Thus, no price in [0, v) is a best response. The result follows.

3.2.2

Continuity of Price Distribution for Price x < v

Utilizing Lemma 17, we can prove that the distribution of price is continuous for prices
less than v,
Property 3. Φki (x) is continuous for x < v.
Note that in Fig 3.1, there is no jump in the distributions for prices less than v.
Proof. If i ≤ ek , the property follows from Property 2. Now let i > ek . If x ≤ c,
the property follows from Property 1. Now consider x ∈ (c, v). We use contradiction
argument. Suppose Φki (.) has a jump at price x < v. Since i > ek , there exists l ≤ mk̄
such that l + i > d. Using lemma 17, we can say that if Φki (.) has a jump at x, for each l
such that l +i > d, uk̄l (x−0 ) > uk̄l (a), where a ∈ [x, min{x+, v}], and for all sufficiently
small but positive  and 0 . Therefore no price in this interval is a best response for the
seller k̄ when she offers l units. Therefore Φk̄l (x + ) = Φk̄l (x) for all sufficiently small but
positive  and all l such that l > d − i, i.e. the other seller does not choose any price in
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[x, x + ) whenever she offers l units. Knowing this we can say that Bki (a) = Bki (x) for
all a ∈ [x, x + ) for some  > 0 such that x +  ≤ v. Therefore,

uki (x) = (x − c)Bki (x) < (x +




− c)Bki (x + ) = uki (x + )
2
2
2

(3.3)

Thus, x is not a best response for a seller who offers i units. Hence x is chosen with
probability zero, which rules out a jump at x for Φki (.). The property follows.
Based on this property, the distribution of price is continuous for x < v. We will later
show that the price distribution has a jump at v for some availabilities.
Based on the above continuity result, the expression for the expected number of units
sold for all x ∈ [0, v) and l = ek + 1, . . . , mk is,

Bkl (x) = l

d−l
X
i=0

qk̄i + l

mk̄
X


1 − Φk̄i (x) qk̄i +

mk̄
X

Φk̄i (x)qk̄i (d − i)

(3.4)

i=d−l+1

i=d−l+1

Note that we assumed d ≥ max{m1 , m2 } in (3.4). The first term in the left hand side
corresponds to the situation in which the other seller offers at most d − l units. In this
case, seller k will sell all l units she offered in the market. The second and the third terms
are corresponding to the situation in which the other seller offers more than d − l units
with a price higher than and less than x, respectively. If the other seller offers with price
higher than x, seller k is able to sell the entire l units. On the other hand, if k̄ offers with
a price less than x, k will sell d − l units of commodity.
We can now obtain an expression for ukl (x) for x < v from (3.1), (3.2), and (3.4).
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3.2.3

Sellers Have Equal Lowerbound of Prices

Note that the example NE distributions presented in Figure 3.1 have equal lower bounds
(p̃ = p̃13 = p̃23 ). We now prove that all NE distributions must satisfy this property:
Property 4. The minimum of lower end points of support sets are equal for both sellers.
Mathematically,
p̃1 = p̃2
where, p̃k = min{p̃ki : i = 1, . . . , mk }. Furthermore, p̃1 = p̃2 < v if d < m1 + m2 .
If the lower bound of prices for seller k, i.e. p̃k , is lower than that for the other seller,
p̃k̄ , then k sells equal number of units in an expected sense by choosing p̃k as any other
price in (p̃k , p̃k̄ ). Using continuity of distributions for prices less than v, we can say that
p̃k̄ is a better response than p̃k for k, which is a contradiction. The formal proof follows:
Proof. Suppose not. Without loss of generality suppose p̃1 < p̃2 ≤ v. Therefore there
exists j such that p̃1 belongs to the support set of Φ1j (.). Since player 2 does not offer
−
7
with any price in the interval [p̃1 , p̃2 ), B1j (p̃1 ) = B1j (p̃−
2 ) . Thus u1j (p̃1 ) < u1j (p̃2 ) which

contradicts the assumption that p̃1 is a best response for the first player when she offers
i units of commodity. Therefore, the first part of the property follows.
Suppose p̃1 = p̃2 = v. Thus, both sellers choose the price v with probability 1
regardless of the number of units they have available. Consider seller k. Let l = mk̄ .
Since m1 + m2 > d, Lemma 17 implies that uk̄mk̄ (v − ) > uk̄mk̄ (v). This contradicts the
assumption that v is the best response for seller k. The result follows.
7

f (x− ) = limy↑x f (y)
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Terminology 8. Let p̃ denote the minimum of lower end points of prices in the NE, i.e.
p̃1 = p̃2 = p̃.

3.2.4

The union of support sets cover [p̃, v]

We show that there does not exist an interval of prices in [p̃, v] which is eschewed with
probability 1 by both sellers. If such an interval existed, the cumulative distribution
functions of both sellers would be flat in it, which we rule out below. Note that in Fig 3.1,
the NE distributions are strictly increasing throughout their support sets, and there is no
flat region.
Property 5. There does not exist a, b such that p̃ ≤ a < b ≤ v and Φki (b) = Φki (a) for
all i ∈ {ek + 1, . . . , mk } and k = 1, 2.
If such a and b exist for seller k, this means that regardless of the number of available
units, k does not select any price in the interval (y, z) where y ≤ a, z ≥ b, and y is a
best response when k has an availability level l. This implies that for the competitor,
k̄, the expected utility is strictly increasing in interval [y, b]. Thus k̄ does not select any
price in the interval [y, b). This again implies that for seller k, when she offers l units,
price b yields a strictly higher payoff than y, which is in contradiction with y being a best
response for k when offering l units. The formal proof is as follows:
Proof. Let there be a, b, and k such that p̃ ≤ a < b ≤ v and Φki (b) = Φki (a) for all i.
Thus for ζ such that a < b − ζ < b ≤ v, Φki (b − ζ) = Φki (a). Consider y such that,
y = sup{x|x < a, x ∈ support set of Φkl (.) for an l}
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Since support sets are closed, y belongs in the support set of Φkl (·) for some l. Thus, y is
a best response when the availability of player k is l (note that y < v).
In addition, note that Φki (y) = Φki (b − ζ) for all i. Since a < b − ζ < v, from
Property 3 and equation (3.4), the expected number of units sold for the second seller
remains constant for prices in [y, b − ζ], regardless of the number of units she offers, i.e.
Bk̄,. (y) = Bk̄,. (b − ζ). Thus, uk̄,. (b − ζ) > uk̄,. (y), and player k̄ does not offer any price in
the interval [y, b−ζ). Therefore Φk̄,. (y) = Φk̄,. (b−ζ). Since a < b−ζ < v, from Property 3
and equation (3.4), Bkl (y) = Bkl (b−ζ). Thus, ukl (b−ζ) > ukl (y). This is in contradiction
with y being a best response when the availability of player k is l. Therefore, there does
not exist a, b such that p̃ ≤ a < b ≤ v and Φki (b) = Φki (a) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , mk } and
k = 1, 2. Also, note that for i ∈ {1, . . . , ek }, Φki (b) = Φki (a) for p̃ ≤ a < b ≤ v, since
support sets for these distributions only contain v. The result follows.
Remark: In all the previous results, we considered d ≥ max{m1 , m2 }. In the next
section, we need to consider that d > max{m1 , m2 }.

3.2.5

Support Sets Are Mutually Disjoint and in Decreasing Order of
the Number of Availabilities

We start with proving a result, Lemma 18, on Ak,l,j (x) (defined in Section 3.1, Terminology 6). Note that we use Lemma 18 in subsequent sections as well. We next prove
Property 6 using this result, which leads to the main results of this section: Corollaries 8
and 9.
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First, using (3.2) and (3.4),
Bk,l,j (x) = −

1
l

d−j
X

Φk̄i (x)qk̄i (i − d + l) +

mk̄
X
i=d−j+1

i=d−l+1

1
l
Φk̄i (x)qk̄i (d − i)( − )
l
j

(3.5)

Thus, Bk,l,j (·) is non increasing and non positive with respect to the price x when
l > j. Therefore if l > j then Ak,l,j (x) is non increasing and non positive with respect
to x. Based on the following lemma, Ak,l,j (x) is (strictly) decreasing for v > x ≥ p̃ and
l > j if d > max{m1 , m2 }.
Lemma 18. For each seller k ∈ {1, 2} and every l and j, j < l ≤ mk , Ak,l,j (x) is
(strictly) decreasing for p̃ ≤ x < v when d > max{m1 , m2 }.
Since Ak,l,j (.) = (x − c)Bk,l,j (x), knowing that Bk,l,j (x) is non-increasing, lemma
follows if we prove that Bk,l,j (·) is negative. We will prove that Φkmk (x), which is included
in the summation of Bk,l,j (·), is positive for x > p̃ and k ∈ {1, 2}. In addition, the
coefficient of Φkmk (x) is negative since d > max{m1 , m2 }. Thus, the result follows.
Proof. It is enough to prove that Bk,l,j (x) is non-increasing for x ≥ p̃ and negative for
x > p̃. This yields that Ak,l,j (x) = (x − c)Bk,l,j (x) is strictly decreasing with respect to x.
Note that in (3.5), Φkj (.)’s are non-negative and non-increasing since they are probability distributions. In addition, they have negative weights: −(i − d − l) ≤ −1 < 0,
1
l

− 1j < 0, and since d > max{m1 , m2 }, d − i ≥ d − mk̄ > 0. Thus Bk,l,j (x) is non increas-

ing and non positive with respect to the price x when l ≥ j. To prove that Bk,l,j (x) is
negative for x > p̃, since the distributions in (3.5) have (strictly) negative weights , it is
enough to prove that at least one of the Φkj (.)’s is included in the summation of Bk,l,j (.)
is positive, i.e. not all of them are zero. We will prove that Φkmk (x) > 0 for x > p̃ and
k ∈ {1, 2}.
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Suppose not and there exists x > p̃ such that x ≤ p̃kmk . By Property 5, there exists
an  > 0 and an availability level j 6= {1, . . . , ek , mk } such that [p̃kmk − , p̃kmk ] belongs to
the support set of Φkj (.) and p̃kj < p̃kmk . Thus ukj (p̃kmk ) = ukj (p̃kmk − ). In addition,
Bk,mk ,j (x) is the weighted summation of Φk̄i (.) for i ∈ {ek̄ +1, . . . , mk̄ }. Property 5 implies
that p̃kj belongs to at least one of the support sets of Φk̄i (.) for i ∈ {ek̄ + 1, . . . , mk̄ }.
The distribution Φk̄i (.) is included in the summation of Bk,mk ,j (x), and its coefficient is
negative. Thus, Ak,mk ,j (x) is strictly decreasing with respect to x for x > p̃kj . Thus
Ak,mk ,j (p̃kmk − ) > Ak,mk ,j (p̃kmk ). Using ukj (p̃kmk ) = ukj (p̃kmk − ), we can conclude
that ukmk (p̃kmk ) = ukmk .max < ukmk (p̃kmk − ). This contradicts with p̃k,mk belonging to
the support set of Φkmk (.). The result follows.
Note that in the previous lemma, we used d > max{m1 , m2 } to prove that Ak,l,j (x)
is decreasing for p̃ ≤ x < v. The following properties characterize the NE for price less
than v.
Property 6. For k ∈ {1, 2}, the support set of Φkl (.) is a subset of [p̃, p̃kj ] ∪ [v] for all
integers j ∈ [1, l).
For example, in Figure 3.1, the support set for seller 1 and availability 3 is [p̃, p̃12 ],
which is a subset of the mentioned set.
Proof. First note that for j ∈ {1, . . . , ek } property follows, since p̃kj = v by Property 2.
Now consider j > ek . Consider support sets of Φkj (·), Φkl (·), and j < l. We will show
that ukl (a) < ukl (p̃kj ) for all a ∈ (p̃kj , v). Thus, no a ∈ (p̃kj , v) is a best response for
the seller k with availability of l units. Therefore, the support set of Φkl (·) is a subset of
[c, p̃kj ] ∪ [v].
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We now complete the proof, by showing that ukl (a) < ukl (p̃kj ) for all a ∈ (p̃kj , v):
1
1
ukl (a) − ukj (a) = Ak,l,j (a)
l
j
Since l > j and p̃ ≤ p̃kj < a < v, by Lemma 18, Ak,l,j (a) is decreasing function of a
for a ∈ [p̃kj , v). Thus, Ak,j (a) < Ak,j (p̃kj ) for a ∈ (p̃kj , v). On the other hand ukj (a) ≤
ukj (p˜kj ) for all a > p̃kj , since p̃kj is a best response of a seller with availability j, therefore
ukl (p̃kj ) > ukl (a).
Note that, in this stage, since Φkl (.) can have a jump at v, we cannot rule out v as a
member of the support set of Φkl (.).
Corollary 8. The support sets of Φkl (.) and Φkj (.) overlap at most at one point in [p̃, v).
For instance, note that in Figure 3.1, the support sets of Φ13 and Φ12 overlap only at
p̃12 , the support sets of Φ12 and Φ11 overlap only at v, and there is no overlap between
support sets of Φ13 and Φ11 .
Proof. Suppose two points x1 and x2 , where x1 < x2 < v, and both points belong to the
intersection of the support sets of Φkj (·) and Φkl (·). Without loss of generality, consider
j < l. The price x2 > p̃j belongs to the support set of Φkl (.), which is a contradiction
with Property 6.
Corollary 9. For prices less than v support sets are contiguous (Property 5), disjoint (except possibly at one point) (Corollary 8), and in decreasing order of the number of available
units for sale (Property 6). Thus, there exists an increasing sequence akmk , ak,mk −1 , . . .
of positive real numbers in (c, v] such that the seller k will randomize her price in the
interval [aki , ak,i+1 ] and possibly {v} when she has i units of commodity available for sale.
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For instance, note that in Figure 3.1, the support sets of seller one are in decreasing
order of the number of available units for sale, and the aforementioned increasing sequence
is p̃, p̃12 , and v.

3.2.6

The Structure of Nash Equilibrium at Price v

We will investigate the possibility of having a jump at v. First, we prove Lemma 19
which complements previous results by identifying the nature of overlap between Φkj (.)
and Φk̄l (.) for j ∈ {1, . . . , mk } and l ∈ {1, . . . , mk̄ } for prices less than v. Using this
lemma, we prove Property 7 which is the main result of this section.
Lemma 19. For every price p̃ ≤ x < v, x should belong to the support sets Φkl (.) and
Φk̄j (.) such that l + j > d.
A contradiction argument is used to prove the lemma. Assume that there exist x, l,
and j such that x belongs to say Φkl (.) and Φk̄j (.), and l + j ≤ d. We show that in this
case, the expected number of units sold at x and x +  are equal for seller k when offering
l units, i.e. Bkl (x) = Bkl (x + ), and subsequently that ukl (x + ) > ukl (x). Thus x is not
a best response for seller k who offers l units, which is a contradiction.
Proof. Suppose not. There exist x, l, and j such that x belongs to say Φkl (.) and Φk̄j (.),
and l + j ≤ d. We show that there exist j̃,  > 0 such that x +  belongs in the support
set of Φk̄j̃ (.), and subsequently that ukl (x + ) > ukl (x). Thus x is not a best response
for seller k who offers l units which is a contradiction. Consider two cases:
• x = ṽk̄j . Using Corollary 9, x and x +  belongs to the support set of Φk̄,j−1 (.) when
 is small enough. Take j̃ = j − 1.
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• x < ṽk̄j . If  is small enough, x and x +  belongs to the support set of Φk̄j (.). Take
j̃ = j.
Note that since l + j ≤ d, l + j̃ ≤ d. We are going to argue that the expected number
of units sold at x and x+ are equal for seller k, i.e. Bkl (x) = Bkl (x+). To show this, we
condition on the number of available units with the seller k̄. If k̄ has more than j̃ number
of available units, say f , then she will offer with price less than x with probability one.
Thus B̃kl (x|f ) = B̃kl (x + |f ) = d − f in which B̃. (.|.) is the conditional expected number
of units sold. If k̄ offers less than j̃ number of units, she will offer with price higher than
x +  with probability one. Thus B̃kl (x|f ) = B̃kl (x + |f ) = l. If k̄ offers j̃ units, since
l + j̃ ≤ d, B̃kl (x|j̃) = B̃kl (x + |j̃) = l. Therefore the expected number of units sold at x
and x +  are equal for seller k, and ukl (x + ) > ukl (x). The proof is complete.

Finally, the following property characterizes the behavior of NE at v.
Property 7. For each k, there exists a threshold such that seller k offers price v with
probability one if she has the availability level less than or equal to this threshold. We
denote this threshold with lk . This threshold is such that:
• lk ∈ {ek , . . . , mk − 1}
• l1 + l2 = d − 1 or l1 + l2 = d
The price distribution Φkj (.) does not have a jump at v if j > lk + 1, at most one of the
distributions Φ1,l1 +1 (.) and Φ2,l2 +1 (.) can have a jump at v, and size of such a jump is
less than 1.
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Note that in Fig 3.1, l1 = l2 = 1, and l1 + l2 = d − 1. In addition, both sellers have a
jump of magnitude one at price v when they have one unit available, only seller two has a
jump at price v when the availability level is two, and there is no jump in the distribution
functions when sellers have three units available.
Proof. Take zk such that k offers price v with probability one if she has i ∈ {1, . . . , zk }
units. Property 2 shows that zk ≥ ek . We will prove that the zk should be less than mk .
Note that if seller k has mk units of availability and she offers her units with a single
price v, then p̃k = v. By Properties 4 and 6, the other seller, k̄, offers her units with a
single price v regardless of the number of available units. This is a contradiction. The
reason is because of Lemma 17. Since m1 + m2 > d, if Φ1,m1 (.) has a jump at v, then
u2m2 (v − ) > u2m2 l (v), for all sufficiently small but positive . Thus v is not a best
response for the second player when she offers m2 units, which is a contradiction. Thus
zk < mk . Therefore zk ∈ {ek , . . . , mk − 1}.
First, suppose z1 + z2 ≥ d + 1. By lemma 17, v is not a best response for the player
k when she offers zk units, which is a contradiction. Therefore z1 + z2 ≤ d. Next, we will
prove that either z1 + z2 = d − 1 or z1 + z2 = d. Note that by the definition of zk , seller
k with availability zk + 1 cannot choose the price v with probability 1. Thus using this
fact and Corollary 9, the price x = v −  for  > 0 small enough is in the support sets of
Φ1,z1 +1 (·) and Φ2,z2 +1 (·). Thus, by Lemma 19, z1 + z2 ≥ d − 1. Knowing that z1 + z2 ≤ d.
Take lk = zk , and the first part of the property follows.
Now we should consider the possibility of having a jump at v for Φkj (.) for j ≥ lk + 1.
We will prove that the price distribution does not have a jump at v when seller k offers
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more than lk + 1 units. Suppose Φkj (.) has a jump for j > lk + 1. Note that j + lk̄ >
lk + lk̄ + 1 ≥ d. By Lemma 17, v is not a best response for the seller k̄ under availability
lk̄ which contradicts the definition of lk̄ .
Now consider lk + 1. By definition of lk such a jump must have a size less than 1,
should it exist. We will prove that at most one of the distributions Φ1,l1 +1 (.) and Φk,l2 +1 (.)
can have a jump at v. Suppose not and both have a jump at v. By Lemma 17, since
(l1 + 1) + (l2 + 1) > d, v is not a best response for the player k when she offers lk + 1
units. This is a contradiction. The result follows.

Revisiting Equation (3.4) implies that utility, uki (.), is continuous not only in interval
[c, v), but also at price v, if i ≤ d − lk̄ − 1. The reason is that for i ≤ d − lk̄ − 1, equation
(3.4) depends only on Φk̄j (.) where j ≥ lk̄ + 2, which is continuous at price v based on
Property 7. If Φk̄lk̄ +1 (.) is continuous at v then uki (.) is continuous in [c, v] for i ≤ d − lk̄ .

3.2.7

Proof of Theorem 13

Proof. Part 1 of Theorem 13 follows from Property 7. We now prove part 2. The support
set of Φk,lk +1 (.) includes at least one x < v from Property 7. Thus, Properties 6 and 5
imply part 2a of this part. Parts 2b and 2c follow from Properties 3 and 7, respectively.
We now prove part 3. We start with 3a. Consider i > lk+1 . From Property 7, Φk,i (·)
does not have a jump at v. From part 2a and Property 6, v is not in the supports set of
Φk,i (.) and ṽk,i ≤ p̃k,i−1 . The result can now be proved by induction starting with i = lk+2
using the fact that there is no gap between the support sets (Property 5). Since v is not
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in the support set of Φk,i (.), part 3b follows from Property 3. Part 3c follows from part 3a
and Property 4.
Part 4 follows from the fact that every price in the support set of a NE, except those
on the boundaries, should be a best response for a seller. Thus they yield the same utility
value. The result follows for the boundary points of the support sets other than v from
Property 3.

3.3

Arbitrary Demand

In this section, first we present the sufficiency theorem for d ≥ max{m1 , m2 } (Theorem 14). Theorem 14 establishes that a strategy profile which satisfies the mentioned
properties in Theorem 13 constitutes an NE when d ≥ max{m1 , m2 }. Note that unlike Theorem 13, the sufficiency theorem holds even when d = max{m1 , m2 }. Thus, the
properties in Theorem 13 are both necessary and sufficient conditions for an NE when
d > max{m1 , m2 }, and only sufficient conditions when d = max{m1 , m2 }. The sufficiency
theorem naturally leads to an algorithm for computing NE strategy profiles that satisfy
the properties in Theorem 13 (Appendix 3.9.3). Any strategy profile obtained by the
algorithm constitutes an NE by Theorem 14. In Section 3.3.2, we argue that the computation of the NE strategies for d < max{m1 , m2 } can be reduced to d = max{m1 , m2 }.
This completes the entire framework.

3.3.1

The Sufficiency Theorem when d ≥ max{m1 , m2 }

Theorem 14. Consider a strategy profile that satisfies the properties enumerated in Theorem 13. This strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium when d ≥ max{m1 , m2 }.
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The proof is presented in Appendix 3.9.2. In the proof, we use the fact that Ak,l,j (.)
is non increasing and non positive when d ≥ max{m1 , m2 }.

3.3.2

Allowing d ≤ max{m1 , m2 }

Note that all results before equation (3.4) also hold when d ≤ max{m1 , m2 }. Thus (3.4)
can be restated by replacing ek = d − mk̄ with ek = (d − mk̄ )+ :

(d−j)+

Bkj (x) = j

X

qk̄i + min{j, d}

mk̄
X


1 − Φk̄i (x) qk̄i +

i=(d−j)+ +1

i=0

mk̄
X

Φk̄i (x)qk̄i (d − i)+

i=(d−j)+ +1

(3.6)
Note that if mk > d, the utilities of all number of availability levels j ≥ d for player k
are equal:

ukd = uk,d+1 = · · · = ukmk = d

mk̄
X


1 − Φk̄i (x) qk̄i

(3.7)

i=1

Let q̃k̄d =

Pmk̄

i=d qk̄i

and Φ̃k̄d (x) =

Pmk̄

qk̄i
i=d q̃k̄d Φk̄i (x).

Thus, q̃k̄d is the probability that

the availability level of seller k̄ is greater than or equal to d and Φ̃k̄d (x) is the average
probability distribution associated with selecting the price if seller k̄ availability is d or
higher. Now, the term

Pmk̄

i=d


1 − Φk̄i (x) qk̄i in the expression for uki (.) in (3.6) can

be replaced by q̃k̄d (1 − Φ̃k̄d (x)). Thus the problem is reduced to finding the structure
when d = max{m1 , m2 }. It was proved previously that a strategy profile that satisfies
properties in Theorem 13 is a NE when d = max{m1 , m2 }. Thus, a set of equilibria of the
game when d < max{m1 , m2 } can be found by defining Φ̃kd (.) and using the properties in
Theorem 13. The distribution of each individual Φkj (.) for j ≥ d cannot be determined
uniquely and is not of significant interest.
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3.4

The Symmetric Setting

We now consider the symmetric setting in which q~1 = q~2 = ~q (clearly m1 = m2 = m). In
this case, it is natural to consider a symmetric NE, defined as follows,
Definition 7. An NE (Θ1 (·), Θ2 (·)) is said to be symmetric if Θ1 (·) = Θ2 (·).
Thus, when considering symmetric NE, in terminologies like Φ. (·), Θ. (·), u. (·), p̃· , we
drop the index that represents the seller and only retain the index that represents the
number of units available for sale. As a special case of the general setting (Sections 3.2 and
3.3), every symmetric NE should satisfy the properties in Theorem 13 when d > m , and
every strategy profile that satisfies these properties is a NE when d ≥ m (Theorem 14).
In Section 3.4.1, we extend Theorem 13 to the case of d = m. In Section 3.4.2, we will
present an algorithm to find symmetric Nash equilibria of the game when d ≥ m. Using
the results in Section 3.3.2, the algorithm can be extended to d < m.
Note that the algorithm reveals that there is only one symmetric strategy profile that
satisfies the properties. It follows from Theorems 13 and 14 that a symmetric NE strategy
profile exists uniquely when d ≥ m. In contrast, in Appendix 3.9.3, we show that there
may exist multiple Nash equilibria for an asymmetric market.

3.4.1

Properties of a Symmetric Nash Equilibrium

Theorem 15. Let d = m. A symmetric NE in a symmetric market satisfies the properties
in Theorem 13.
The proof is technical and is relegated to the Appendix. It implies that properties in
Theorem 13 are necessary and sufficient conditions for a symmetric NE when d ≥ m.
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Since NE is symmetric, l∗ = l1 = l2 . Thus, l∗ =

d−1
2

or l∗ =

d
2,

whichever is an

integer. Since at most one seller can have a jump at v at l∗ + 1, in a symmetric NE,
none of them do. Thus, the properties in Theorem 13 transform to the following in the
symmetric context.
1. Sellers offer price v with probability 1, if they have i ∈ {1, . . . , l∗ } available units.
2. There exists an increasing sequence am , am−1 , . . . , al∗ +1 , al∗ of positive real numbers
in (c, v] with al∗ = v such that each seller randomizes her price in the interval
[ai , ai−1 ] when she has i units of commodity available for sale for i ∈ {l∗ + 1, . . . , m}.
Thus,
(a) Support sets are contiguous.
(b) Support sets are disjoint (except possibly at one point).
(c) Support sets are in decreasing order of the number of available units for sale.
3. Price distribution is continuous for i ≥ l∗ .
4. The utility of a seller when she offers i units is equal for all prices in the support
set of Φi (.), except possibly at price v (if it belongs to her support set).

3.4.2

Algorithm for computing a symmetric NE for the symmetric setting

We will now identify an algorithm to compute strategies that exhibit the properties in
the previous subsection. The algorithm reveals that there is only one symmetric strategy
profile that satisfies the same. It follows from Theorem 13 and 14 that a symmetric NE
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strategy profile exists uniquely when d ≥ m. Note that the algorithm is developed for
d ≥ m. However, with the method presented in Section 3.3.2, the algorithm can be used
to find the equilibrium for d ≤ m.
Since Φj (·) is completely characterized for j <
d+1
2 ,

j≥

d+1
2 ,

we should characterize Φj (·) for

and outline a framework for computing the same. We proceed in an increasing

d+1
order of j starting with j = d d+1
2 e. Then moving to j = d 2 e + 1, etc.
d+1
Now, let d d+1
2 e. Note that ṽd d+1 e = v and p̃k = v for k < d 2 e, and ṽk ≤ p̃d d+1 e
2

2

for k > d d+1
2 e (Properties 1 and 2c). Since support sets are ordered (Property 2c) and
disjoint (Property 2b), the expression for ud d+1 e (x) for x ∈ [p̃d d+1 e , v) only depends on
2

2

Φd d+1 e (x)(Equation (3.4)). In particular, ud d+1 e (v − ) can be obtained using the fact that
2

2

Φd d+1 e (v − ) = 1 which follows from the continuity of Φd d+1 e (.) (Properties 3). Next,
2

2

ud d+1 e (x) = ud d+1 e (v − ) for every x ∈ [p̃d d+1 e , v). Thus having ud d+1 e (v − ), and using
2

2

2

2

continuity, we can find a unique expression for Φd d+1 e (x). Using Φd d+1 e (p̃d d+1 e ) = 0,
2

2

2

p̃d d+1 e can be found uniquely.
2

We now compute the structure of Φi (·), ∀i > d d+1
2 e using Φi−1 (.), Φi−2 (.), · · · , Φd d+1 e (.)
2

that are computed before Φi (·). We utilize the facts that,
1. Φj (x) = 1 for j > i, x ∈ [p̃i , ṽi ]
2. Φj (x) = 0 for j < i, x ∈ [p̃i , ṽi ]
3. ṽi < v
Thus, from (3.4),

 X
i−1
m
X
ui (ṽi ) = (ṽi − c) i
qg +
qg (d − g)
g=0
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i

(3.8)

Since ṽi = p̃i−1 , and p̃i−1 is computed during the computation of Φi−1 (·), which precedes
that of Φi (·), (3.8) fully specifies ui (ṽi ). Furthermore, for x ∈ [p̃i , ṽi ] the only unknown
variable in the expression of ui (x) is Φi (x). Since ui (x) = ui (vi ) for x ∈ [p̃i , ṽi ],
Φi (x) =

i

Pi−1

g=0 qg

+ iqi +

Pm

g=i+1 qg (d

− g) −

ui (ṽi )
x−c

qi (2i − d)

(3.9)

From (3.9), Φi (ṽi ) = 1. Thus, for x ≥ ṽi , Φi (x) = 1. Now, p̃i can be uniquely identified
using the fact that Φi (p̃i ) = 0,


Pi−1
Pm
(ṽi − c) i g=0 qg + i qg (d − g)
p̃i = c + Pi−1
P
i g=0 qg + iqi + m
g=i+1 qg (d − g)

(3.10)

Therefore Φi (x) = 0 for x ≤ p̃i . Clearly, Φi (·) has been characterized uniquely. Note that
the denominator of (3.10) is positive since d ≥ m and qm < 1 (uncertainty assumption in
Section 3.1). In addition, p̃i > c. This is because of the fact that the second term of RHS
of (3.10) is positive.
We now prove that Φi (·) is a valid probability distribution. Clearly, Φi (·) is continuous.
Note that in (3.9) for x ∈ [p̃i , ṽi ), by increasing x, the term

ui (vi )
x−c

will strictly decrease

(since ui (ṽi ) > 0), and we can say that Φi (x) is strictly increasing. Also, Φi (p̃i ) = 0 and
Φi (ṽi ) = 1. Thus, 0 ≤ Φi (x) ≤ 1 for x ∈ [p̃i , ṽi ). Therefore, Φi (·) is non-decreasing and
assumes values in [0, 1] for all x. The claim follows. Thus we have uniquely identified a
symmetric strategy that satisfies the properties required by a Nash equilibrium.

3.5

Random Demand

We have so far assumed that the demand d is deterministic. In this section, we will
generalize the results to a random demand, D. Let rd denote the probability that the
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demand is d, Bkld (x) be the expected number of units that seller k sells if she offers l
units for sale and quotes x as the price per unit when the total demand is d, and ukld (x)
be the expected utility in this case. Clearly,
ukl (x) =

X

rd ukld (x) =

d

X

rd Bkld (x)(x − c)

d

We introduce d = min{d : d > 0 and rd > 0}. Utilizing similar proofs, we can show that
all the previous results about the structure of NE are valid for the random demand, once
d is replaced with d. This is but expected as each seller now chooses her price knowing
that she is assured of an overall demand of at least d (instead of d in the deterministic
demand case). Algorithms similar to those in the deterministic case can be developed for
computation of the NE in both symmetric and general cases.

3.6

Numerical Evaluations

In this section, we present numerical results for a symmetric market. In Section 3.6.1,
using the results we proved for a duopoly market, we propose a heuristic pricing strategy
for sellers in an oligopoly market, i.e. a market with multiple number of sellers. Numerical
results reveal that our proposed strategy constitutes a good approximation for the NE
of the oligopoly market. In Section 3.6.2, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of the
symmetric NE of a symmetric duopoly market when the number of available units with
a seller increases to infinity.
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3.6.1

Oligopoly Market

Suppose that the setting is symmetric and there exist n sellers in the market. We consider
a strategy that satisfies the properties identified for a symmetric NE in Section 3.4 with
the threshold l∗ = b nd c. Note that the algorithm for finding such a strategy is similar to
what is presented in Section 3.4.2. We now investigate how well this strategy approximates
an NE strategy in an oligopoly market.
We numerically compute the maximum expected utility for a particular seller, when
all other sellers choose the proposed strategy (best response utility, UBest Response ). We
observe that over a large set of parameters for all possible availability levels, the best response utility is either the same as the expected utility obtained by following the proposed
strategy (UProposed Strategy ), or is fairly close to this value 8 .
For instance, consider a market in which the availability of each seller follows a binomial distribution, B(m, p), with binomial probability p = 0.4 and m = 3 (m is the
maximum possible available units with each seller). In addition, in this market the demand is d = max{n, m}, v = 10, and c = 1. We plot the relative difference, described as
follows, between the best response utility and the expected utility of the proposed strategy
versus different number of sellers, i.e. n, for different availability levels in Figure 3.2:
Relative Difference =

UBest Response − UProposed Strategy
UProposed Strategy

Note that the relative difference is zero for all availability levels when there exist 2, 3,
and 6 sellers in the market. Thus, the proposed strategy is a NE of the market in these
8

For large sets of parameters, the difference is at most 5 percent of the value of the expected utility

resulted by the proposed strategy.
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Figure 3.2: The relative difference of the best response expected utility and the expected
utility of the proposed strategy versus different number of sellers

cases. Although, in the case of 4 and 5 sellers the proposed strategy is not an NE when
a seller has 1 and 2 units of commodity available, respectively, the relative difference in
these cases is less than 3 percent. Thus, overall, we can say that the proposed strategy is
a good approximation for the oligopoly market in this scenario.

3.6.2

The Asymptotic Behavior

The focus of this section is on the asymptotic behavior of the symmetric NE of a symmetric
duopoly market when the number of available units with a seller increases to infinity. In
asymptotic scenario, many of availability probability distributions that arise naturally
concentrate around the mean. Thus, qk → 0, when k is far from the mean. First, we show
that the length of the support set for availability of k units approaches zero as qk → 0:
From equation (3.10),
Pm
Pi−1
(p̃i−1 − c)(i g=0 qg + g=i qg (d − g))
qi (d − 2i)
= p̃i−1 + (p̃i−1 − c) Pi
p̃i = c +
Pi
Pm
Pm
i g=0 qg + g=i+1 qg (d − g)
i g=0 qg + g=i+1 qg (d − g)
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Figure 3.3: p̃ versus m for when availability level is binomial with probability p and
demand is m
It is immediate that if qi → 0, then p̃i → p̃i−1 9 . This implies that the length of the
support set for the availability level i units approaches zero.
We investigate the asymptotic behavior using numerical simulations when the availability of each seller follows a binomial distribution (m, r < 1). With this distribution,
as m → ∞, the binomial distribution can be approximated by a normal distribution with
mean mr and variance mr(1 − r). Thus m → ∞ yields that p̃i → p̃i−1 when |i − mr|
is large enough. In other words, the length of the support set for the availability level i
units approaches zero if i is far from the mean. Other parameters are considered to be
v = 10, c = 1, and d = m.
In Figure 3.3, the value of p̃, i.e. the lowest lower-bound is plotted versus m, i.e. the
highest possible level of availability. As you can see, the larger the probability r, the
smaller p̃. Note that when r is large, the seller is more likely to offer with higher levels of
9

Note that the denominator is positive since d ≥ m, and we assume uncertainty in competition, i.e.

qm < 1.
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availability. Therefore the competition is more intense. In addition, when m is increased,
the distribution ~q of the availability levels concentrates around the mean, mr. If r > 12 ,
when a seller offers k = mr, knowing that the other seller offers mr >

m
2

with positive

probability, she will offer price less than v (note that d = m). Furthermore, the higher m,
the more intense the competition, and consequently p̃ is decreasing. On the other hand,
when r ≤

1
2,

if a seller offers around mr units, there is no competition between sellers

knowing that 2mr ≤ d = m. Furthermore, the availability probability qk , when k is far
from mr, tends to zero when m is large. Thus the associated support sets shrink to zero.
This explains the increasing behavior of p̃. We notice oscillation in the figure, since m
alternates between odd and even.

3.7

Applications and Discussion

The framework we described in this chapter can also be used to model two other applications in which uncertainty in competition naturally emerges: secondary spectrum access
and micro grid networks.
Pricing in secondary spectrum access networks [1] is one of the applications of our
model. Recent developments in wireless devices have resulted in a significant growth
in demand for the radio spectrum. This leads to spectrum congestion. On the other
hand, the available radio spectrum is greatly under-utilized [57]. Spectrum congestion
and under-utilization have directed researchers to adopt new techniques in order to use
the available spectrum more efficiently and to decrease congestion. Secondary spectrum
access is an example of these techniques. In these networks, there are two types of users:
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(i) Primary/licensed users, who lease a number of frequency bands (channels) directly
from the regulator, and (ii) Secondary/unlicensed users, who lease frequency bands from
primary users for a certain amount of time in exchange for money or other types of credit.
Note that primary and secondary users correspond to sellers and buyers in our model,
respectively. Each primary user may have multiple vacant frequency bands available for
sale, and a secondary user can lease a channel only if it is not in use by the primary
user who owns it. The usage of subscribers of primary users is random and different for
different primaries. Thus primaries are uncertain about the competition, and they need
to select prices for the frequency bands they offer for sale, without knowing the number
of frequency bands available for sale with their competitors.
The next example scenario pertains to pricing in micro grids[14]. A micro grid network
is a network of distributed power generating systems connected to local subscribers, and
also to the central macro power grid. The distributed generation of power at small onsite stations is a promising alternative to the traditional generation at large stations.
Decreasing the loss of transmission by reducing the distance to consumption units10 ,
utilizing renewable energy sources, decreasing the risk of blackout, and increasing security
are some of the advantages of distributed power generating scheme [33]. In these networks,
a microgrid equipped with a distributed power generating system can sell its excess power
to other microgrids as well as the macro grid. Since micro grids are emerging technologies
11 ,

their market structure has not been finalized yet. Thus, different market structures

needs to be investigated. One possible scenario is a centralized market in which micro
10

In microgrid networks, the power can be sold to or bought from other local micro grids. This reduces

the distance the power should be transmitted via the macro grid from a generation to a consumption site.
11

Microgrids are emerging in different countries such as United States [63] and India[46].

164

grids sell their excess power to the macro grid or a local utility at a feed-in tariff12 [56].
Another scenario, which is investigated in this chapter, is a distributed market in which
micro grids trade the power among themselves as also with macro grid at a price quoted
by them in a competitive market. Our model captures the second scenario in which each
micro grid with excess power (seller) sells its excess power to micro grids with deficient
power or the macro grid (buyers)13 . The amount of power generated by a power generating
system is not apriori known and is different for different sellers. Thus, the sellers need
to select prices for the excess power they offer for sale, without knowing the number of
power units available for sale with their competitors (uncertainty in competition).
We now discuss about some details of the applications that arise in practice. Note
that one unit of commodity might be valued differently by different buyers in the above
mentioned applications. For instance, different secondary users receive different rates for
the same frequency band, depending on their location. Similarly, different microgrids
receive different amounts of power owing to differences in power loss. Hence, different
buyers have different utilities even when they buy the same amount of commodity. However, in our formulations, we assumed that the pricing structure is the same for all buyers,
regardless of the differences in the utilities. We justify this assumption as follow.
First note that in microgrid networks, the transmission loss is typically negligible, due
to the proximity of generators and consumers. Thus, all consumers receive approximately
12

A feed-in tariff is an offer by the macro grid to purchase some or all of the output of a micro grid at

a fixed or formula rate.
13

Note that each microgrid can be a seller or a buyer depending on the number of power units generated

and the demand of its subscribers. However, at a fixed time, the identity of a micro grid as a seller or a
buyer is fixed.
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the same utility for a unit of power they purchase. For Primary/Secondary markets and a
Non-Neutral Internet market, the utility of secondary users and CPs (as buyers) depends
on the utility of their end-users, and subsequently is different for different secondaries
and CPs, depending on the characteristics of their end-users. Sellers would not in general
know the characteristics and identities of the subscribers of potential buyers. Hence,
prices quoted by the sellers cannot depend on the utility of buyers. In addition, note that
introducing a differential pricing for customers complicates the pricing structure for them,
and prevents an easy cost prediction and management. For instance, in wireless settings,
the channel quality of end-users and the rate perceived by them are time and location
dependent[34]. Thus, in a differential pricing scheme, customers know the current pricing
only when they use the service. But, customers are usually reluctant to adopt differential
pricing schemes, owing to the rapid variability of prices which is not usually well-received
by them [58]. In addition, sellers are also reluctant using a differential pricing scheme
for their end-users, as they are usually computationally complex. Therefore, we did not
consider different valuations for different customers in determining the pricing strategy
of sellers. However, differential pricing for users with different valuation might arise for
other applications; this constitutes a topic of future research.

3.8

Conclusion

We investigated price competition in a duopoly market with uncertain competition when
different sellers may have different number of units available for sale. We modelled the
interactions among sellers as a non-cooperative game and listed a set of properties that are
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sufficient conditions for a strategy profile to be an NE. We proved that these properties are
also necessary conditions for an NE in a symmetric market, or for some values of demand
values in an asymmetric market. We showed that there exists a unique symmetric NE and
presented an algorithm for computing the same. Using the results proved for a duopoly,
we proposed a heuristic pricing strategy for sellers in a symmetric oligopoly market which
approximate the NE. Directions for future work is to consider different pricing for different
types of demand.

3.9
3.9.1

Appendix
Proof of Lemma 17

Proof. First consider the tuple < l, y > associated with the seller k̄ in which the first
element is the number of units she offers and the second one is the price she chooses. We
(1)

introduce Dkl (y, i, x) as the expected number of units sold by the seller k who wants to
(2)

offer l units with price y when her competitor’s tuple < g, z >6=< i, x >, and Dkl (y, i, x)
as the expected number of units sold by the seller who wants to offer l units with price y
when her competitor’s tuple < g, z >=< i, x >. The expected number of units sold by a
seller can be written as,
(1)

(2)

Bkl (y) = Dkl (y, i, x)P r{< g, z >6=< i, x >} + Dkl (y, i, x)P r{< g, z >=< i, x >}
(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

Note that Dkl (a, i, x) ≤ Dkl (x, i, x) and Dkl (a, i, x) ≤ Dkl (x, i, x) for a ≥ x because
the number of units a seller sells is a non-increasing function of her price for any given
amounts offered by both sellers and any given price chosen by the competitor. Thus
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Bkl (a) ≤ Bkl (x). In addition,
(1)

(1)

Bkl (x − 0 ) − Bkl (x) = (Dkl (x − 0 , i, x) − Dkl (x, i, x))P r{< g, z >6=< i, x >}
(2)

(2)

+ (Dkl (x − 0 , i, x) − Dkl (x, i, x))P r{< g, z >=< i, x >}
(3.11)
(1)

(1)

(2)

As we discussed Dkl (x, i, x) ≤ Dkl (x − 0 , i, x). For Dkl (x, i, x), we should consider
ties. Since each buyer is equally likely to buy a unit from both sellers if both select equal
(2)

(2)

d
prices, we can say that Dkl (x, i, x) = l i+l
< l (since i + l > d) and Dkl (x − , i, x) = l.

Note that P r{other seller’s tuple < g, z >=< i, x >} = qi × Jump Size of Φki (.) at x.
Thus, for all positive 0 , RHS of (3.11) is greater than or equal to θ(x), where θ(x) is a
positive number that does not depend on . Therefore since Bkl (a) ≤ Bkl (x), ∀a ≥ x,
Bkl (x − 0 ) ≥ Bkl (a) + θ(x), for all a ≥ x. Thus,
ukl (x − 0 ) − ukl (a) ≥ (x − 0 − a)Bkl (a) + θ(x)(x − 0 − c)
Since x > c, for all sufficiently small 0 , x − 0 − c > 0. In addition, since a ≤ x + 
by the statement of the lemma, the lowest value for x − 0 − a is − − 0 , and Bkl (a) ≤ l.
Therefore (x − 0 − a)Bkl (a) + θ(x)(x − 0 − c) ≥ (− − 0 )l + θ(x). Therefore, for all
sufficiently small but positive  and 0 ,
ukl (x − 0 ) > ukl (a)

3.9.2

a ∈ [x, min{x + , v}]

Proof of Theorem 14

Proof. The goal is to show that for each i and k all x ∈ [p̃ki , ṽki ) constitutes a best
response for the seller k who offers i units. That is, for each x ∈ [p̃ki , ṽki ) and for all
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y, uki (x) ≥ uki (y). In addition, if Φki (·) associates positive probability with ṽki , then
uki (ṽki ) ≥ uki (y) for all y, i.e., vki is a best response when the seller k offers i units. Note
that the distributions, Φki (·)’s, should satisfy Property 3. Thus, equations (3.4) and (3.5)
holds for x < v, and Ak,l,j (x) is non increasing and non positive with respect to x for
l > j > ek̄ .
We consider the case j ≤ ek̄ here. Thus, Bk,j (x) = j and Bk,l,j (x) = 1l Bk,l (x) − 1.
Note that the expected number of units Bk,l (x) sold at price x when l units are offered is
a non-increasing function of x and Bk,l (x) ≤ l. Thus, Bk,l,j (x) and therefore Ak,l,j (x) is
non increasing and non positive with respect to x for l > j regardless of how j compares
with ek̄ .
Consider x < p̃. uki (x) ≤ i(x − c) < i(p̃ − c) = uki (p̃). The last equality follows from
(3.4), since Φkj (p̃) = 0 for all j. Therefore we consider x ≥ p̃ throughout the proof.
Suppose lk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , mk − 1} in Property 7 is fixed. We first start with i ≥ lk +
1. From the assumption in Theorem 14, we know that uki (x) = uki (y) for any x, y in
the interior of the support set of Φki (·), the support set of Φki (·) is [p̃ki , ṽki ], Φki (·) is
continuous at all x < v, ṽki < v for i > lk + 1, and ṽki = v for i = lk + 1. Thus, if
i > lk + 1 uki (x) = uki (y) for all x, y ∈ [p̃ki , ṽki ], and for i = lk + 1, uki (x) = uki (y) for
all x, y ∈ [p̃ki , ṽki ). We consider the last case in detail. Here, ṽki = v. If k̄ has a jump at
v when she offers lk̄ + 1 units, by Lemma 17, uki (v) < uki (v − ) for arbitrary small but
positive .

14

If not, using equation (3.4) and continuity of the price distributions included

in that equation, it follows that uki (v) = uki (p̃ki ). Thus, we only need to prove that for
all x, uki (p̃ki ) ≥ uki (x). We do so by separately considering three cases: 1. i ≥ lk + 1 and
14

Note that Lemma 17 holds for any arbitrary price distributions and not only those that are NE.
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x ∈ [p̃, p̃ki ) 2. i ≥ lk + 1 and x ∈ (ṽki , v] 3. i ≤ lk .
1) i ≥ lk + 1 and x ∈ [p̃, p̃ki ): The claim follows by vacuity for i = mk . We therefore
consider i < mk . Since ṽkj = p̃k,j−1 for j ≥ lk + 1, any such x is in [p̃kg , p̃k,g−1 ) for some
g > i. We prove this claim by induction on g, starting with the base case of g = i + 1.
For x ∈ [p̃k,i+1 , p̃ki ),
1
1
uk,i+1 (x) − uki (x) = Ak,i+1,i (x)
i+1
i
1
1
uk,i+1 (p̃ki ) − uki (p̃ki ) = Ak,i+1,i (p̃ki )
i+1
i
uk,i+1 (x) = uk,i+1 (p̃ki )
Note that p̃ki = ṽk,i+1 . Subtracting the first and the second equation, we get,

1
(uki (x) − uki (p̃ki )) = Ak,i+1,i (p̃ki ) − Ak,i+1,i (x) ≤ 0
i

Since Ak,l,j (x) is non increasing and non positive with respect to x for l > j. Therefore
uki (x) ≤ uki (p̃ki ) for x ∈ [p̃k,i+1 , p̃ki ). We want to prove that uki (x) ≤ uki (p̃ki ) for
x ∈ [p̃k,g+1 , p̃kg ), knowing that uki (x) ≤ uki (p̃ki ) for x ∈ [p̃kg , p̃k,g−1 ) and mk −1 ≥ g ≥ i+1
(at the base we had g = i + 1).
1
1
uk,g+1 (x) − uki (x) = Ak,g+1,i (x)
g+1
i
1
1
uk,g+1 (p̃kg ) − uki (p̃kg ) = Ak,g+1,i (p̃kg )
g+1
i
uk,g+1 (x) = uk,g+1 (p̃kg )
Note that p̃kg = ṽk,g+1 . Subtracting the first and the second equation, we get,

1
(uki (x) − uki (p̃kg )) = Ak,g+1,i (p̃kg ) − Ak,g+1,i (x) ≤ 0
i

Thus, uki (x) ≤ uki (p̃kg ) for x ∈ [p̃k,g+1 , p̃kg ). The induction hypothesis yields uki (x) ≤
uki (p̃ki ) for x ∈ [p̃k,g+1 , p̃kg ).
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2) i ≥ lk + 1 and x ∈ (ṽki , v]: We have just shown that uki (x) ≤ uki (p̃ki ) for all
x ∈ [p̃, p̃ki ). We now show the same for all x ∈ (ṽki , v]. The claim follows by vacuity
for i = lk + 1, since ṽki = v. We therefore consider i > lk + 1. Since ṽkj = p̃k,j−1 for
lk + 1 ≤ j ≤ mk , and ṽk,lk +1 = v, any such x is in (p̃kg , p̃k,g−1 ] for some lk + 1 < g < i. We
prove this claim by induction on g, starting with the base case of g = i − 1. Let x < v.
1
1
uki (x) −
uk,i−1 (x) = Ak,i,i−1 (x)
i
i−1
1
1
uki (p̃k,i−1 ) −
uk,i−1 (p̃k,i−1 ) = Ak,i,i−1 (p̃k,i−1 )
i
i−1
uk,i−1 (x) = uk,i−1 (p̃k,i−1 )
Subtracting the first and the second equation, we get,
1
(uki (x) − uki (p̃k,i−1 )) = Ak,i,i−1 (x) − Ak,i,i−1 (p̃k,i−1 ) ≤ 0
i

Therefore uki (x) ≤ uki (p̃k,i−1 ) for x ∈ (p̃k,i−1 , p̃k,i−2 ] \ v. The claim is established
in the base case if p̃k,i−2 < v. Else, if p̃k,i−2 = v, the claim has been shown only for
x ∈ (p̃k,i−1 , v) and we still need to show that uki (v) ≤ uki (p̃k,i−1 ), which we proceed to
do. Now, let x = v. if the seller k̄ has a jump when it offers lk̄ + 1 units, since i > lk + 1,
for all sufficiently small but positive , uki (v) < uki (v − ), and for sufficiently small but
positive , v −  ∈ (p̃k,i−1 , v). Since uki (v − ) ≤ uki (p̃k,i−1 ), the base case follows. If not,
that is seller k̄ does not have a jump when it offers lk̄ + 1 units, using equation (3.4) and
continuity, we can deduce that uki (v) ≤ uki (p̃k,i−1 ). The base case follows.
Now we want to prove that uki (x) ≤ uki (p̃k,i−1 ) for x ∈ (p̃k,g−1 , p̃k,g−2 ], knowing that
uki (x) ≤ uki (p̃k,i−1 ) for x ∈ (p̃kg , p̃k,g−1 ] and g ≤ i − 1 and g − 1 ≥ lk + 1. First, let x < v.
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1
1
uki (x) −
uk,g−1 (x) = Ak,i,g−1 (x)
i
g−1
1
1
uki (p̃k,g−1 ) −
uk,g−1 (p̃k,g−1 ) = Ak,i,g−1 (p̃k,g−1 )
i
g−1
uk,g−1 (x) = uk,g−1 (p̃k,g−1 )

Subtracting the first and the second equation, we get,
1
(uki (x) − uki (p̃k,g−1 )) = Ak,i,g−1 (x) − Ak,i,g−1 (p̃k,g−1 ) ≤ 0
i

The inequality is because of the fact that Ak,l,j (x) is non increasing and non positive
with respect to x if l > j. Therefore uki (x) ≤ uki (p̃k,g−1 ). Furthermore we know from
the assumption of induction that uki (p̃k,g−1 ) ≤ uki (p̃k,i−1 ), thus uki (x) ≤ uki (p̃k,i−1 ) for
x ∈ (p̃k,g−1 , p̃k,g−2 ]\v. We can show that uki (v) ≤ uki (p̃k,i−1 ) if v ∈ (p̃k,g−1 , p̃k,g−2 ] exactly
as in the base case. The proof that for each i ≥ lk + 1 each x ∈ [p̃ki , ṽki ) is a best response
when a seller offers i units is therefore complete.
3) i ≤ lk : Now let i ≤ lk . Thus, lk > 0. Consider two cases:
• lk + lk̄ = d − 1. Therefore i ≤ lk = d − lk̄ − 1. As we previously mentioned, utility
uki (.), is continuous not only in interval [c, v), but also at price v, if i ≤ d − lk̄ − 1.
Using (3.5), and the fact that Ak,l,j (x) is non increasing and non positive with
respect to x, for l > j and a similar argument to case 1, we can get uki (x) ≤ uki (v)
for all x ∈ [p̃, v). The result follows.
• lk + lk̄ = d. Therefore i ≤ lk = d − lk̄ . Since lk + lk̄ + 1 > d, neither Φklk +1 (.) nor
Φk̄lk̄ +1 (.) have a jump at v, and uki (.) is continuous in [c, v]. The result follows by
a similar argument to that of in the previous case.
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3.9.3

Computation of NE Strategies in an Asymmetric Setting

In this section, we consider the general case in which the setting may not be symmetric.
First we develop a framework to obtain the strategy profiles that satisfy the properties
listed in Theorem 13. Then, we compute these strategies for a simple case of an asymmetric market in which m1 = m2 = d = 3. We then show that the system may have
multiple Nash equilibria.

Framework for computation
In Theorem 14, it has been proved that the properties listed in Theorem 13 are sufficient
properties for a NE whether d > {m1 , m1 } or d = max{m1 , m2 }. In this section, we use
Theorem 13 to obtain a framework to identify a set of Nash equilibria for the game.
First, fix l1 and l2 (refer to Property 7). In addition, note that Theorem 13 specifies
the ordering of support sets for a seller and not the relative ordering of support sets of
the two sellers. Thus, we fix an ordering of p̃ki ’s and p̃k̄j ’s for i ∈ {lk + 1, . . . , mk } and
j ∈ {lk̄ + 1, . . . , mk̄ } such that for seller k and k̄ the lower bounds are ordered with a
decreasing relation with i and j respectively, and p̃kmk = p̃k̄mk̄ = p̃. The unknowns that
we should determine for a NE are p̃, mk − lk − 1 and mk̄ − lk̄ − 1 number of lower bounds
other than p̃ for seller k and k̄ respectively, and the distribution of price over each support
set.
For these particular l1 , l2 , and relative ordering of support sets, the NE is the solution
of:
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uki (p̃ki ) = uki (p̃−
k,i−1 )

i∈A

uk̄j (p̃k̄j ) = uk̄j (p̃−
)
k̄,j−1

j∈A

uki (p̃ki ) = uki (p̃−
)
k̄j

i ∈ A, j : p̃k̄j ∈ (p̃ki , p̃k,i−1 )

uk̄j (p̃k̄j ) = uk̄j (p̃−
ki )

j ∈ A, i : p̃ki ∈ (p̃k̄j , p̃k̄,j−1 )

(3.12)

f1 f2 = 0

where A = {lk + 1, . . . , mk }. In addition, f1 and f2 are the magnitude of jump at v for
the first and second seller when they offer lk + 1 and lk̄ + 1 units, respectively. Note that
the first four sets of equations are derived using the fact that the utility of a seller should
be equal over the entire support set. The fifth equation ensures that only one seller can
have a positive jump at v.
In equation (3.12), the unknowns are p̃, m1 + m2 − l1 − l2 − 2 number of lower-bounds
other than p̃, p1 , p2 , and m1 + m2 − l1 − l2 − 2 number of probability distributions at some
specific points. That is Φki (p̃k̄j ) for i ∈ {lk +1, . . . , mk } and j such that p̃k̄j ∈ (p̃ki , p̃k,i−1 ).
By solving the system of equations (3.12), we can get a candidate NE.
Using the solution, Φki (.) for k ∈ {1, 2} and i ∈ {1, . . . , mk } can be found. To find the
distributions of price for prices less than v, first note that each price x ∈ [p̃, v) which is not
a lower bound for the support set belongs to exactly one of the support sets of each seller.
Therefore, by (3.4), the expression of utility of player k when it offers i units depends only
on x and Φkj (x), i.e. uki (x) = (x−c)G(Φkj (x)), where G(Φ. (.)) is a decreasing function of
Φ. (.), and therefore its inverse exists. On the other hand, the utilities at the lower bounds
are obtained from (3.12) for both sellers. Using Property 4, Φk̄j (x) = G−1 (

uki (p̃kj )
x−c ).

If

the resulting Φk̄j (·) are valid probability distribution functions, using Theorem 14 we can
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conclude that they constitute a NE for the given l1 , l2 , and the fixed ordering of lower
bounds.
We have shown how to obtain a Nash equilibrium given one exists for a particular
choice of l1 , l2 , and a relative ordering between the support sets of the two sellers. Note
that by changing the choices of the above we can possibly obtain multiple Nash equilibria.
In the next sections, we present an example in which there exist at least two equilibria.
It is not clear that there always exists an NE; our extensive numerical evaluations have
not however lead to an instance where there does not exist one.

Example illustration of computation of Nash Equilibria
Consider the case in which each seller offers up to three units and the total demand is
exactly three units, i.e. d = 3. Without loss of generality we assume that l1 ≥ l2 ; the
strategy profiles in the other case l1 < l2 can be obtained by swapping the indices of the
sellers.
1) First we focus on the case in which l1 + l2 = d − 1 = 2. In this case, l1 = l2 = 1 or
l1 = 2, l2 = 0. If l1 = l2 = 1, then sellers choose v with probability 1, if they offer 1 unit
of commodity. In order to specify the NE, we should find the lower bounds p̃13 = p̃23 = p̃,
p̃12 , p̃22 , jumps at price v (f1 and f2 ), and each distribution Φkj (.) for all k = 1, 2, and
j = 2, 3.
First consider the ordering of lower bounds in which p̃22 ≥ p̃12 (Figure 3.4). The
system of equations is:
u13 (p̃) = u13 (p̃12 ) ⇒ 3(p̃ − c) = (3 − 3q23 Φ23 (p̃12 ))(p̃12 − c)
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(3.13)

u23 (p̃) = u23 (p̃12 ) ⇒ 3(p̃ − c) = (3 − 3q13 )(p̃12 − c)

(3.14)

u23 (p̃) = u23 (p̃22 ) ⇒ 3(p̃ − c) = (3 − 3q13 − 2q12 Φ12 (p̃22 ))(p̃22 − c)

(3.15)

u12 (v − ) = u12 (p̃22 ) ⇒ (v − c)(2q20 + 2q21 + 2q22 f2 + q22 (1 − f2 )) = (p̃22 − c)(2 − 2q23 )

(3.16)

u12 (v − ) = u12 (p̃12 ) ⇒ (v−c)(2q20 +2q21 +2q22 f2 +q22 (1−f2 )) = (p̃12 −c)(2−2q23 Φ23 (p̃12 )) (3.17)

u22 (v − ) = u22 (p̃22 ) ⇒ (v − c)(2q10 + 2q11 + 2q12 f1 + q12 (1 − f1 )) = (p̃22 − c)(2 − 2q13 − q12 Φ12 (p̃22 ))
(3.18)

f1 f2 = 0

(At most one seller can have a jump at v )

(3.19)

Using equations (3.13), (3.15), (3.17), and (3.18), we can find p̃22 as,
(v − c)A
+c
1
1
2 − 2 q13


3
3
3
A = 2q10 + 2q11 + q12 (1 + f1 ) − q20 − q21 − q22 (1 + f2 )
2
2
4

p̃22 =

(3.20)

On the other hand, from (3.16),
p̃22 =

(v − c)(2q20 + 2q21 + q22 (1 + f2 ))
+c
2 − 2q23

(3.21)

The values of p̃22 in (3.20) and (3.21) should be equal. Utilizing this and (3.19),
2f1 q12
1
1
4q10 + 4q11 + 2q12
− q22 f2 A = (q20 + q21 + q22 )A −
=B
1 − q13 2
2
1 − q13
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(3.22)

where A =

1
1−q23

+

3
1−q13 .

Therefore,




f1 = f2 = 0





if B = 0

f1 > 0&f2 = 0 if B > 0






 f2 > 0&f1 = 0 if B < 0

(3.23)

Therefore f1 , f2 , and p̃22 are uniquely determined. Using (3.18), Φ12 (p̃22 ) can be derived
uniquely,

Φ12 (p̃22 ) =


v−c
1
(2q10 + 2q11 + q12 (1 + f1 ))
2 − 2q13 −
q12
(p̃22 − c)

(3.24)

By (3.15), p̃ can be derived uniquely, (3.14) determines p̃12 uniquely, and (3.13) provides us Φ23 (p̃12 ) uniquely. However, we should check whether Φ23 (p̃12 ) and Φ12 (p̃22 ) are
between zero and one or not. If not, then this NE candidate is not valid. The distributions
can be found by the process explained previously.
Another possible ordering of lower bounds is when p̃22 ≤ p̃21 . The system of equations
corresponding to this case can be obtained by swapping the index of sellers.
In the case of l1 = 2 and l2 = 0, Figure 3.5 illustrates a schematic view of the support
sets for the unique relative ordering of support sets. Equations can be obtained with a
similar approach to the previous case.
2) l1 + l2 = 3 = d. Note that lk = 3 and lk̄ = 0 can be ruled out since lk should be less
than mk = 3. Thus, l1 = 2 and l2 = 1 (Figure 3.6). The approach to find the equilibria
is similar to the previous cases.
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1st Seller

p̃12

1st Seller

1st Seller
p̃11 = p̃12 = v

p̃11 = v
2nd Seller
c

p̃22

p̃22

2nd Seller
p̃21 = v c

p̃ = p̃13 = p̃23

p̃11 = p̃12 = v

p̃ = p̃13 = p̃23

2nd Seller
p̃21

v

c

p̃ = p̃13 = p̃23

p̃22 p̃21 = v

Figure 3.4: l1 = 1 and l2 = 1Figure 3.5: l1 = 2 and l2 = 0 Figure 3.6: l1 = 2 and l2 = 1

Multiple Nash Equilibria
In Section 3.4, we proved that the symmetric NE exists uniquely. In this section, we
show that an asymmetric market allows for multiple Nash equilibria. Nash equilibria are
computed using the above framework with v = 10 and c = 1 and for different values of
~q1 and ~q2 . Some lead to a unique NE and some others to multiple Nash equilibria. For
instance, the NE is unique, if

~q1 = [0.45, 0.1, 0.4, 0.05]

~q2 = [0.2, 0.2, 0.45, 0.15]

In this case, in the NE strategy, l1 = 1, l2 = 2, p̃12 = 9.0526, p̃ = 8.65, and Φ23 (p̃12 ) =
0.3333, and the second seller has a jump of size 0.625 at price v = 10. However, there are
two Nash equilibria if:

~q1 = [0.05, 0.1, 0.4, 0.45]

~q2 = [0.2, 0.2, 0.4, 0.2]

In both NE, l1 = 2, l2 = 1, and Φ13 (p̃22 ) = 0.4444. In the first NE, f2 = 0.06525, f1 = 0,
p̃ = 5.95, and p̃22 = 7.1875. In the second NE, f2 = 0, f1 = 0.7778, p̃ = 5.8, and p̃22 = 7.
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3.9.4

Proof of Theorem 15

Before going to the proof of Theorem 15, we need to prove some lemmas and theorems.
First we prove that Al,j (x) is (strictly) decreasing for v > x ≥ p̃m−1 when d = m
(Lemma 20). Then, in Lemma 21, we prove that the minimum of the lower end points
is the lower end point of Φm (x), i.e., p̃ = p̃m . Next, using Lemmas 20 and 21, we prove
that p̃i ∈
/ [p̃m , p̃m−1 ) for i ∈ {1, . . . , m − 2}. This establishes the ordering for Φm (.) and
Φm−1 (.). After that we proceed to establish the ordering for the remaining support sets
Φj (.) for j ∈ {1, . . . , m − 2}, knowing that for them p̃j ≥ p̃m−1 . A similar result to the
Property 6 is proved in Property 8. Finally, we prove Theorem 15.
Note that a symmetric NE in a symmetric market is considered in this section. Lets
define Al,j (x) = 1l ul (x) − 1j uj (x). Bl,j (x) is defined such that,
Al,j (x) = (x − c)Bl,j (x)
where,

Bl,j (x) = −

1
l

d−j
X

Φi (x)qi (i − d + l) +

i=d−l+1

m
X
i=d−j+1

1 1
Φi (x)qi (d − i)( − )
l
j

(3.25)

Based on the following lemma, Al,j (x) is (strictly) decreasing for v > x ≥ p̃m−1 and l > j,
when d = m.
Lemma 20. For every l and j, l > j ≥ 1, Al,j (x) is (strictly) decreasing for v > x ≥ p̃m−1
when d = m.
We argued that Bl,j (·) is non increasing and non positive with respect to the price
x. To prove that Al,j (.) = (x − c)Bl,j (x) is strictly decreasing, it is enough to prove
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that Bl,j (·) is negative. We will prove that Φm−1 (x) is included in the summation of
Bl,j (·) and obviously positive for x > p̃m−1 . In addition, its coefficient is negative since
d = m > m − 1. Thus, the result follows.
Proof. It is enough to prove that Bl,j (x) is non-increasing for x ≥ p̃m−1 and negative
for x > p̃m−1 when demand is m. This yields that Al,j (x) = (x − c)Bl,j (x) is strictly
decreasing with respect to x.
Note that in (3.25), Φi (.)’s are non-negative and non-increasing since they are probability distributions. In addition, they have non-positive weights: −(i − d − l) ≤ −1 < 0,
1
l

−

1
j

< 0, and d − i ≥ d − m = 0 (note that d = m). Thus Bl,j (x) is non increasing and

non positive with respect to the price x when l ≥ j. To prove that Bl,j (x) is negative for
x > p̃m−1 , since d − (m − 1) = 1 > 0 and −(i − d − l) ≤ −1 < 0 (possible coefficients
of Φm−1 (x)) , it is enough to prove that Φm−1 (.) is included in the summation of Bl,j (.)
and it is positive, i.e. Φm−1 (x) > 0 for x > p̃m−1 . The later follows from the definition of
p̃m−1 .
Now we prove that Φm−1 (.) is included in the summation of Bl,j (.). Note that l >
j ≥ 1. Thus l ≥ 2, and the lowest index of the (3.25) is d − l + 1 ≤ m − 2 + 1 = m − 1.
The result follows.
To prove the ordering and disjoint properties in the symmetric setting we should alter
the proofs. First we will prove that p̃ = p̃m , i.e. the minimum of lower bounds is the
lower bound of Φm (x). Then we will prove that p̃j ∈
/ [p̃m , p̃m−1 ) for j ∈ {1, . . . , m − 2}.
This proves that the next lowest support set is the support set of Φm−1 (.). After that
using Lemma 18 will prove that the support set of Φl (.) for l < m is a subset of [p̃m−1 , pj ]
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for all integers j ∈ [1, l). These three all together establishes the ordering.
Lemma 21. p̃ = p̃m , i.e. the minimum of lower end points is the lower end point of
Φm (x).
Proof. Suppose not and there exists x > p̃ such that x ≤ p̃m . By Property 5, there exists
an  > 0 and an availability level j 6= m such that [p̃m − , p̃m ] belongs to the support set
of Φj (.) and p̃j < p̃m . Thus uj (p̃m ) = uj (p̃m − ). In addition, Bm,j (x) is the weighted
summation of Φi (.) for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Thus, the distribution Φj (.) is included in the
summation of Bm,j (x), and its coefficient is negative. In addition, Φj (x) > 0 for x > p̃j .
Thus, Am,j (x) is strictly decreasing with respect to x for x > p̃j . Thus Am,j (p̃m − ) >
Am,j (p̃m ). Note that uj (p̃m ) = uj (p̃m − ). Thus, um (p̃m ) = um,max < um (p̃m − ). This
contradicts with p̃m belonging to the support set of Φm (.). The result follows.

Lemma 22. p̃i ∈
/ [p̃m , p̃m−1 ) for i ∈ {1, . . . , m − 2}.
To prove this, we use a contradiction argument. Suppose that there exists p̃j ∈
[p̃m , p̃m−1 ) such that j ∈ {1, . . . , m − 2}. We will prove that no x ∈ (p̃j , p̃m−1 ] is in the
support of Φm (.). Thus there exists u ∈ {1, . . . , m − 2} such that p̃m−1 is in the support
set of Φu (.). We prove that the payoff of the seller when she offers u units with price
p̃m−1 +  is strictly greater than the payoff when offering with price p̃m−1 . This is in
contradiction with p̃m−1 being the best response for player with availability u.
Proof. The lemma follows by vacuity if m ≤ 2. Take m > 2. Note that p̃m−1 < v.
If not there is a jump of size 1 at price v when the seller offers m − 1 units. Since
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2m − 2 > d = m for m > 2, using Lemma 17, um−1 (v − ) > um−1 (v) for  small enough.
This is in contradiction with assigning a positive probability to price v in the equilibrium
when seller offers m − 1 units. Thus p̃m−1 < v.
Suppose there exists p̃j ∈ [p̃m , p̃m−1 ) such that j ∈ {1, . . . , m − 2}. We will prove
that no x ∈ (p̃j , p̃m−1 ] is in the support of Φm (.). Thus (using this and Property 5),
there exists u ∈ {1, . . . , m − 2} such that p̃m−1 is in the support set of Φu (.). Consider
Bm−1,u (x) which is the summation of weighted distributions Φi (x) when i ∈ {2, . . . , m −
1}. Thus, the distribution Φm−1 (.) is included in the summation of Bm−1,u (x) (note
that m > 2), and its coefficient is negative (Note that d − (m − 1) = 1 > 0). Thus,
Am−1,u (x) is strictly decreasing with respect to x for x > p̃m−1 . Thus Am−1,u (p̃m−1 +) <
Am−1,u (p̃m−1 ). Using um−1 (p̃m−1 ) = um−1 (p̃m−1 + ), we can conclude that uu (p̃m−1 ) =
uu,max < uu (p̃m−1 + ). This is in contradiction with p̃m−1 being the best response for
player with availability u. Note that p̃m−1 < v, and every price less than v which belongs
to the support set of a distribution Φi (.) should be a best response for players when
offering i units. The lemma follows.
Now we complete the proof by proving that no x ∈ (p̃j , p̃m−1 ] is in the support of
Φm (.). Suppose not. We will show that there exist an availability level f and two prices
y1 and y2 , such that p̃j < y1 < p̃m−1 , belongs to the support set of Φm (.), and both y1
and y2 belong to the support set of Φf (.). Then we will show that um (y1 ) < um (y2 ),
which contradicts with y1 being in the support set of Φm (.).
Using the contradiction assumption, w is defined as,
w=

inf

x∈(p̃j ,p̃m−1 ] & x ∈ Supp(Φm (.))
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x

Note that w is in the support set of Φm (.). Now consider two cases:

1. w > p̃j : Using continuity, the definition of support sets, and Property 5, there exist
 and f ∈ {1, . . . , m − 2} such that w and w −  is in the support set of Φf (.). Take
y1 = w and y2 = w − .
2. w = p̃j : Using continuity and the definition of infimum, there exists  such that
every w +  belong to the support set of Φm (.) and Φj (.). Take f = j, y1 = w + ,
and y2 = w.

Next, we will prove that um (y1 ) < um (y2 ), which contradicts with y1 being in the
support set of Φm (.). Note that y1 < v, and every price less than v which belongs to the
support set of a distribution Φi (.) should be a best response for players when offering i
units. This completes the proof.
Consider Bm,f (x) which is the summation of weighted distributions Φi (x) when i ∈
{1, . . . , m − 1}. Thus, the distribution Φf (.) is included in the summation of Bm,f (x),
and its coefficient is negative. Thus, Am,f (x) is strictly decreasing with respect to x
for x ≥ p̃f . Thus Am,f (y2 ) > Am,f (y1 ). Using uf (y1 ) = uf (y2 ), we can conclude that
um (y1 ) < um (y2 ). The contradiction argument is complete.

Therefore we established the ordering for Φm (.) and Φm−1 (.). Now we are set to
establish the ordering for the remaining support sets Φj (.) for j ∈ {1, . . . , m−2}, knowing
that for them p̃j ≥ p̃m−1 . The next is the counterpart of the Property 8 in symmetric
setting.
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Property 8. The support set of Φl (.) is a subset of [p̃, p̃j ] ∪ [v] for all integers j ∈ [1, l).
Proof. Consider support sets of Φj (·), Φl (·), and j < l. We will show that ul (a) < ul (p̃j )
for all a ∈ (p̃j , v). Thus, no a ∈ (p̃j , v) is a best response for the seller with availability of
l units. Therefore, the support set of Φl (·) is a subset of [p̃, p̃j ] ∪ [v].
We now complete the proof, by showing that ul (a) < ul (p̃j ) for all a ∈ (p̃j , v):
1
1
ul (a) − uj (a) = Al,j (a)
l
j
Note that if p̃j ≥ v, property follows by vacuity. Now we consider p̃j < v. Since
j < l ≤ m, j ≤ m − 1. By Lemma 22, p̃m−1 ≤ p̃j < a < v, by Lemma 20, Al,j (a) is
decreasing function of a for a ∈ [p̃m−1 , v). Thus, Al,j (a) < Al,j (p̃j ) for a ∈ (p̃j , v). On
the other hand uj (a) ≤ uj (p˜j ) for all a > p̃j , since p̃j is a best response of a seller with
availability j, therefore ul (p̃j ) > ul (a).
Now we will prove Theorem 15:
Proof. Note that the first place that we used the condition d > max{m1 , m2 } (in symmetric setting d > m) instead of d = max{m1 , m2 } (d = m) was in Section 3.2.5. Thus all of
the results before that apply also to the case that d = m. Property 8 provides exactly the
same property in the Property 6 for the symmetric scenario. Thus the corollaries after
the property follows. In addition, results in the Section 3.2.6 follows, since they are based
on results before the Section 3.2.5 and Property 6 and its corollaries. Thus Theorem 13
goes through in the case of a symmetric NE and d = m. The result follows.
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Chapter 4

Non-Neutrality Framework II 1

Quality Sponsored Data
In Chapter 2, we assessed the benefits of different entities for migrating to a non-neutral
Internet. In Chapter 3, we considered a non-neutral framework in which CPs are passive
in the equilibrium selection and are only price-takers. In this chapter, we consider a
non-neutral framework in which, in contrast to the previous work, CPs have an active
role in the market by selecting appropriate strategies. Note that while SPs currently
only provide best-effort services to their CPs, it is plausible to envision a model in near
future, where CPs are willing to sponsor quality of service for their content in exchange
of sharing a portion of their profit with SPs. This quality sponsoring becomes invaluable
especially when the available resources are scarce such as in wireless networks, and can
be accommodated in a non-neutral network. In this work, we consider the problem of
1

Presented in WiOpt 2015 [41] and accpeted for publication in IEEE/ACM Transaction on Network-

ing [42].
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Quality-Sponsored Data (QSD) in a non-neutral network. In our model, SPs allow CPs to
sponsor a portion of their resources, and price it appropriately to maximize their payoff.
The payoff of the SP depends on the monetary revenue and the satisfaction of end-users
both for the non-sponsored and sponsored content, while CPs generate revenue through
advertisement. Note that in this setting, end-users still pay for the data they use. We
analyze the market dynamics and equilibria in two different frameworks, i.e. sequential
and bargaining game frameworks, and provide strategies for (i) SPs: to determine if
and how to price resources, and (ii) CPs: to determine if and what quality to sponsor.
The frameworks characterize different sets of equilibrium strategies and market outcomes
depending on the parameters of the market.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.1, we model the market. Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the sequential game is characterized in Section 4.2,
and the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) of the game is characterized in Section 4.3. In
Section 4.4, we summarize the key results of the chapter and comment on some of the
assumptions and their generalizations. Finally, in Section 4.5, we conclude the chapter.
Additional details and some of the proofs are presented in the appendix of the chapter in
Section 4.6.

4.1
4.1.1

Model
Problem Formulation:

We model the ecosystem as a market consisting of three players: CPs, SPs, and end-users.
We focus on the interaction between SPs and CPs, and not on the competition among SPs
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Figure 4.1: Market when CP has an advertisement revenue model

and CPs. Thus the interaction between one CP and one SP is considered. The strategy
for the CP is to determine how much resources to sponsor (i.e. quality), and the strategy
of the SP is to determine how to price her resources. Decisions are made by the players
based on an estimated demand update function (explained later) at the beginning of every
time-epoch, which captures the typical time granularity of sponsorship decisions2 .
The CP has an advertisement revenue model, and sponsors bt resources (e.g. bits in
an LTE frame) out of a total of N resources at tth time-epoch to sponsor the average
bit
quality of at least ζ ( frame
) for her content, and pays a price of pt per resource sponsored

to the SP. Thus, on average a quality of ζ should be satisfied for the users. If not, the
CP exits the sponsorship program. Note that this does not guarantee the quality of an
individual user to be higher than ζ. An example Schematic picture of the market in this
case is presented in Figure 4.1.
The CP and the SP choose their strategy at time-epoch t after observing the previous
demand, i.e. the number of end-users desiring content from the previous epoch. Obviously,
2

Using the estimate of the demand, players decide on their strategy to maximize an “estimated” payoff

(and not the actual one). Note that the shorter the interval of epochs, the more accurate the estimates,
and the more inconvenient the implementation would be. We will observe that, in our framework, the
algorithm of decision making in NE would be simple. Thus, the decision making can be done in shorter
time intervals, e.g. minutes.
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the demand is non-negative. Note that the demand for the content of the CP changes
over time depending on the satisfaction of users, which in turn depends on the resources
that the CP decides to sponsor and hence the quality. We suppose that the satisfaction
of users depends on the average quality, i.e.

bt 3
dt ,

and the demand for content updates as

follows4 ,

dt+1 =





 dt 1 + γ log(κu dbt ) + if dt > 0
t


 0

(4.1)

if dt = 0

where z + = max{z, 0}, dt is the demand between epoch t and t + 1,

bt
dt

is the rate a

single user receives, and log(κu dbtt ) models the satisfaction of end users: the higher the
rate received by users, the higher their satisfaction. The parameter γ > 0 represents the
sensitivity of end-users to their satisfaction. A higher γ is associated with a higher rate
of change with respect to the satisfaction of users (higher fluctuation in demand). An
instance of this type of users is customers of a streaming website like Netflix that are
sensitive to the quality they receive. Parameter κu > 0 is a constant.
Note that the total available wireless resources (for sponsored and non-sponsored
contents) is limited (N ). This limits the number of sponsored resources (bt ) which in term
determines the upperbound of resources that can be allocated to non-sponsored contents.
3

Note that we are analyzing the model from the perspective of the CP and the SP. Thus, we are

assuming that the CP and the SP see the demand for the content as a whole and want to sponsor an
average sponsored quality. The demand of the individual end-users could be potentially different from
each other.
4

Note that receiving a satisfactory quality, increases the chance of user repeating the visit to the website

and increases the number of new users that are going to use the service. Therefore, a satisfactory QoS
will likely increase the demand for the data in the next session. In addition, we assume that the increase
in the demand would be slower with high rates (a diminishing return behavior).
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This is a key distinction of our work from previous works as the limited resources available
couples the utility of end users for both sponsored and non-sponsored content with the
decisions of the market players. We assume that the number of resources (bits) a CP can
sponsor is bounded above by N̂ (N̂ ≤ N ).
The utility of the CP if she chooses to enter the sponsorship program consists of the
utility she receives by sponsoring the content minus the price she pays for sponsoring the
sponsored bits. The latter is pt bt . The former, i.e. the utility of the CP for sponsoring the
content, depends on the advertisement revenue which in turns depends on the demand for
the content as well as the quality received by the users (throughput is
the utility from advertisement for the CP to be:



bt
 αdt log( κCP
dt ) if dt > 0
uad (bt ) =


 0
if dt = 0

bt 5
dt ) .

We consider

(4.2)

Note that the better the quality of advertisement, more successful the advertisement
would be, and therefore the higher the utility that the CP receives from advertisement.
Thus, the utility of advertisement is dependent on the satisfaction of users. This is the
reason that we use a similar function to (4.1) for the utility of advertisement6 . The
5

Note that

bt
dt

can be the quality of the content, ads, or both. One example of CPs whose revenue

depends on the quality of the ad is a CP that support video ads, e.g. YouTube. Another example is
websites loaded with several “flash ads” for which users may have difficulty loading the ads which can lead
to the decrease of number of clicks on the ads. In addition to these CPs, we can think about scenarios in
which increasing the quality of the content of a website (not only the ads) increases the revenue of this
website. An example of such contents are shopping websites (e.g. Amazon). Improving the quality of the
experience of users, increases the chance of spending more time on these website. This would increase the
chance of a transaction which increases the revenue of the CP.
6

Note that we expect a diminishing return of ad utility based on quality, i.e. after a certain point
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constant κCP in general can be different from κu . The parameter α is a constant that
models the the unit income of the CP for each end-user based on the quality that the
end-user receives: The higher α, the higher the profit of the CP per rates sponsored. An
example of CPs with high α is shopping websites (e.g. Amazon) that in contrast with
streaming websites (e.g. Netflix) have a high profit per user rate.
Thus, the utility of the CP at time t if she chooses to join the sponsorship program
is:
uCP,t (bt ) = uad (bt ) − pt bt

(4.3)

To have a non-trivial problem, we assume κCP ζ > e = 2.72.
The utility of the SP at time t if she chooses to offer the sponsorship program is the
revenue she makes by sponsoring the bits plus the users’ satisfaction function:
uSP,t (pt ) = pt bt + us (bt (pt ))

(4.4)

where the users’ satisfaction function, i.e. us (.), is a function of the number of sponsored
bits which subsequently depends on the price pt . This function consists of two parts: (i)
the satisfaction of users for access to the sponsored content and its quality, and (ii) the
satisfaction of users when using non-sponsored content. This function could be decreasing
or increasing depending on the users, the cell condition, etc. We define the satisfaction
function as follows7
increasing the quality would not significantly increase the utility of advertisement. Thus, we used a log
function to model the ad utility from an end-user (log( dbtt )). Thus, we assume the utility of advertisement
to be

P

dt

constant × log( dbtt ) = constant × dt log( dbtt ). If we consider a linear dependency between quality

and ad revenue, then the utility would be

P

dt

constant ×

bt
dt

= constant × bt . However, we believe that a

function with diminishing return would model the ad utility more closely.
7

Note that in the case of no sponsoring, the demand of the CP should be added to the demand of in the
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N − bt
κSP bt


) + ν2 D log(κSP
)
 ν1 dt log(
dt
D
us (bt ) =


 ν2 D log(κSP N − bt )
Otherwise
D

if dt > 0& bt > 0
(4.5a)

where D is the total demand for all CPs other than the strategic CP8 and κSP is a
positive constant. In addition, v1 and v2 are constants corresponding to the weights that
end-users assign to the sponsored and non-sponsored data, respectively. We considered
the users’ satisfaction function to be a part of the SP’s utility since it is natural to think
that SPs not only care about the money they receive for the sponsored content, but also
about the satisfaction (or the overall quality of experience) of end-users for both sponsored
and non-sponsored content9 . Another reason for considering the satisfaction of users is
best effort categor, i.e. D in (4.5a) should be substituted by dt + D. However, we assume that dt << D,
i.e. the demand for one content is much smaller than the aggregate demand for all other contents. This
often arises in practice. In Appendix 4.6.8, we show that this modification does not alter any results in
essence, and the insights of the model would be the same as before.
8

We now argue why D is considered to be constant. We consider the content of the CP that is willing

to sponsor her content to be different from the content of other CPs, i.e. no competition over the content.
An example of such CP is Youtube (for personal video streaming). This yields that the demands for the
strategic CP (that can be sponsored) and other CPs are independent of each other. Thus, no demand
will be switched from the content of the sponsored CP to other CPs. In addition, since we assume that
other CPs are not sensitive to the quality they deliver, their demand is independent of the quality their
end-users receive. Thus, D can be considered as a constant, and independent of the demand for the
sponsored content.
9

Note that in reality, end-users can switch between SPs if they are not satisfied, and this incurs loss

to the SP they leave. To capture this, we need to consider the competition between SPs which makes the
analysis much more complicated. Instead, we consider only one SP and the user satisfaction function to
be an element in the utility of the SP. This captures some aspects of competition over end-users between
SPs, without complicating the analysis unnecessarily.
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the regulatory policies on the quality of the experience of users who use non-sponsored
contents. Thus, v1 and v2 can be determined by the SP or the regulator10 . The higher
v2
v1 ,

the higher would be the importance of the non-sponsored content.
Note that, despite the dependencies between κu , κCP , and κSP , these parameters

could be potentially different. For example, the ad revenue is paid by an advertiser. This
advertiser may value the quality of the content delivered to the end-users different from
the end-users. Thus, for this reason, κCP might be different from κu . We do not mandate
the parameters to be different from each other and they can be potentially equal.
Recall that we assume if dt = 0 or one of the decision makers exits the sponsoring
program, then the game ends, and we have a stable outcome of no-sponsoring.
A summary of important symbols is presented in Table 4.1.
10

Although in the current set up, the regulator does not provide quality constraints for the SP, one

can envision that in a non-neutral framework, the regulator imposes explicit or implicit constraints on the
behavior of SP toward the sponsored and non-sponsored data. In other words, in a non-neutral regime,
it is natural to suppose that the regulator forces the SPs to take into the account the satisfaction of their
users regardless of the fact that they are using sponsored or non-sponsored data. Thus, the SP wants
to maximize her utility (which depends on the money collected from the CPs) given some constraints.
In this sense, including the satisfaction of users with parameters v1 and v2 is similar to the Lagrangian
penalty (reward) function by which we solve the mentioned maximization. Note that eventually v1 and v2
is set by the SP and not the regulator. However, their value depends on the restriction determined by the
regulator. Therefore, a strict net-neutrality rule, mandates the SP to assign high weights to the quality
of the content of non-sponsored data, i.e. high v2 .
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Symbol

Description

pt

the price per unit of resources sponsored at time t

bt

the number of sponsored bits in an LTE frame at time t

dt

the demand between epoch t and t + 1

ζ

the minimum average quality desired by end-users

γ

sensitivity of end users to the quality they receive.

α

constant, the unit income

κu , κCP , κSP

constants

N̂

the number of available bits for sponsoring

N

the total number of bits (resources) in an LTE frame

us (.)

end-users’ satisfaction function

uad (.)

CP’s advertisement profit

ν1

the weight end-users assign to the sponsored data

ν2

the weight end-users assign to the non-sponsored data

D

the total demand of end-users for non-sponsored data

1
κu

the stable quality, the rate that stabilizes the demand

z &y

the participation factor for the CP and SP, 1 =join, 0 =exit

Table 4.1: Important Symbols
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4.1.2

Preliminary Notations and Definitions:

In this section, we define some notations that we use throughout the chapter. Sectionspecific notations and definitions are presented in the corresponding sections.
Note that, we model the problem of QSD as a sequential game if at least one of the
decision makers is short-sighted, and as a bargaining game when both CPs and SPs are
long-sighted.
Definition 8. Short-Sighted (Myopic) Decision Maker: A decision maker is short-sighted
if she maximizes the myopic payoff knowing the present demand (dt ),11 i.e. does not
involve the evolution of demand (4.1) in her decision making.
Definition 9. Long-Sighted Decision Maker: A decision maker is long-sighted if she
maximizes her payoff in long-run considering the current demand and the evolution of the
demand in (4.1).12
Since we consider an evolving demand of end-users based on their satisfaction, one of
the contributions of this work is to characterize the stability conditions of the market.
Definition 10. Stable Market: We say that the market is stable if and only if the demand
of end-users is asymptotically stable, i.e. if and only if:
lim |dt+1 − dt | = 0

t→∞

Note that it is not apriori clear that the demand would be stable. In fact, we see that in the
short-sighted scenario, under certain parameters, the demand is unstable. The definition
11

Mathematical definitions for the optimization solved by the short-sighted SP and CP are presented

in Equations (4.6) and (4.7), respectively.
12

Mathematical definitions for the payoff of the long-sighted SP and CP are presented in Equations

(4.11) and (4.12), respectively.
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of the stable market and (4.1) yield the following lemma that is useful in determining the
stable outcome of the market.
Lemma 23. The market is stable if and only if the quality

bt t→∞ 1
dt −−−→ κu

is sponsored for

end-users.
Proof. The result follows immediately from (4.1).
Definition 11. Stable Quality and Stable Demand: We refer to

b
d

=

1
κu

as the stable

quality, and d = κu b as the stable demand.

4.2

Sequential Framework: SPNE Analysis

In the sequential game framework, we seek a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
using backward induction.
Definition 12. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE): A strategy is an SPNE if
and only if it constitutes a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of every subgame of the game.
Definition 13. Backward Induction: Characterizing the equilibrium strategies starting
from the last stage of the game and proceeding backward.
In this section, we first present the stages of the game (Section 4.2.1). Then, in
Section 4.2.2, we consider the case in which both the CP and the SP have a short-sighted
(myopic) business model and play the one-shot game infinitely. We characterize the
equilibrium strategies and asymptotic outcome of the game. When parameters of the
market are such that a stable sponsoring outcome is not plausible, considering decision
makers with long-sighted vision about the market may ensure a stable sponsoring outcome
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for the market. Thus, in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, using the sequential framework, we
investigate the cases in which either one of the SP and the CP is long-sighted and the
other is short-sighted. In Section 4.2.5, we present numerical results and discuss about
them.

4.2.1

Stages of the Game:

We suppose a complete information setting for the game. The timing of the game at time
epoch t is as follow:

1. The SP decides on (1) offering the sponsorship program, yt ∈ {0, 1} (with yt = 1
implying offering) and (2) if yt = 1, on the price per sponsored bit in an LTE frame,
pt , by solving the following optimization:

max uSP,t (pt ),

(4.6)

pt

where uSP,t (pt ) is defined in (4.24). The SP sets yt = 0 if u∗SP,t < v2 D log(κSP N
D)
(the payoff is less than no-sponsoring payoff) or dt = 0, and yt = 1 otherwise, where
u∗SP,t is the optimum outcome of the optimization13 .
2. The CP decides on (1) whether to participate in the sponsorship program, zt ∈ {0, 1}
(with zt = 1 implying participation) and (2) if zt = 1 on the number of bits in an LTE
frame (i.e. quality) she wants to sponsor, bt , by solving the following optimization
13

Note that we consider that in the case of indifference u∗SP,t = 0, yt∗ = 1
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problem:
max uCP,t (bt )
bt >0

bt
≥ζ
dt

s.t.

(4.7)

bt ≤ N̂
where uCP,t is defined in (4.3). The first constraint is associated with the minimum
quality that the CP wants to deliver to her end-users. The second constraint puts
an upperbound to the number of bits that a CP can sponsor in an LTE frame. The
CP sets zt = 0 if u∗CP,t < 0 or dt = 0, and zt = 1 otherwise, where u∗CP,t is the
optimum outcome of the optimization14 . In addition, the CP exits the sponsorship
program, i.e zt = 0, if there is no feasible solution for (4.7). Note that, dt =
+
1 + γ log(κu dbt−1
) , and is known as the history of the game is known.
t−1
We use the Backward Induction method to find the Sub game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the game. Thus, first, we find the best response strategy of the CP in the
second stage given the strategy of the SP in the first stage and the history of the game.
This allows the CP to decide on (1) joining the sponsorship program and also on (2) the
number of bits to sponsor. Then, using this best response strategy and the history, the
SP chooses (1) whether to launch the sponsorship program or not, and (2) the optimum
per-bit price, pt , in the first stage.

4.2.2

Short-Sighted CP, Short-Sighted SP

CP’s Strategy: In the second stage, knowing the decision of the SP at stage one, the
CP solves (4.7) at each time-epoch t.
14

Note that we consider that in the case of indifference u∗CP,t = 0, zt∗ = 1
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Figure 4.2: The optimum strategy of the CP presented in theorem 16 for ζ1 (blue) and
ζ2 (red) when 0 < dt ≤

N̂
ζ

and ζ2 > ζ1 .

Theorem 16. Equilibrium Strategy of Stage 2: The strategy of the CP in the SPNE
is as follows:

N̂
if 0 < dt ≤ ,
ζ

(b∗t , zt∗ )

if dt >

=





(N̂ , 1) if







t
 ( αd
pt , 1) if



(ζdt , 1) if







 (−, 0)
if

N̂
or dt = 0,
ζ

pt ≤
αdt
N̂
α
ζ

αdt
N̂

≤ pt ≤

≤ pt ≤

pt >

α
ζ

(4.8)

α log(κCP ζ)
ζ

α log(κCP ζ)
ζ

(b∗t , zt∗ ) = (−, 0)

(4.9)

Remark 7. It is intuitive that the number of sponsored bits is a decreasing function of
the price per sponsored bit. In addition, one can expect that if the price per sponsored
bit is lower (respectively, higher) than a threshold, the CP sponsors all the available bits
(respectively, the amount to satisfy only the minimum quality requested by the end-users).
Moreover, if the price is so high that in case of sponsoring the CP receives a negative
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payoff, the CP would exit the sponsoring program. This also characterize another threshold
for the price per sponsored bit. In theorem 16, we confirm the intuitions, and go beyond
it by characterizing the thresholds on the price per sponsored bit and optimum number of
sponsored bits in different regions characterized by the thresholds. Figure 4.2 illustrates
the optimum strategy of the CP and the regions described in the theorem for two different
values of ζ. Note that the higher the minimum quality requested by end-users, the lower
the thresholds on pt after which the CP sponsors only the minimum quality or exits the
sponsorship program.
In order to prove the theorem, we apply the first order optimality condition since the
utility of the CP is concave. The proof is presented in the Appendix.
SP’s Strategy: Now, having the optimum strategy of the CP in stage 2, we can find
the optimum strategy for the SP:
Theorem 17. Equilibrium Strategy of Stage 1: The optimum strategies of the SP
are:

if

if

0 < dt ≤

dt >

N̂
,
ζ

(p∗t , yt∗ ) =





 argmax{uSP,t (pt ) : pt ∈ P ∗ }, 1 if uSP,t (p∗t ) ≥ uSP,0
if uSP,t (p∗t ) < uSP,0



 (−, 0)

N̂
or dt = 0,
ζ

(p∗t , yt∗ ) = (−, 0)
(4.10)

2D
where P ∗ = { αdt , α log(κζ CP ζ) , α ν1 dνt1+ν
} is the set of candidate optimum pricing strateN

N̂

gies, and uSP,0 is considered to be the utility of the SP in case of no-sponsoring, i.e.
ν1 dt +ν2 D
v2 D log(κSP N
D ). In addition, the necessary condition for the candidate stable point α
ν1 N

to be an optimum is

αdt
N̂

2D
≤ α ν1 dνt1+ν
≤
N

α
ζ.

Note that the variable yt determines whether

the SP offers the sponsorship program or not, with yt = 1 implying the offering.
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Remark 8. The immediate plausible range for the price per sponsored bit that one can
think of is the interval between the lowest price that makes the CP to sponsor all the
available bits and the highest price that makes the CP to sponsor only to satisfy the
minimum desired quality. In Theorem 17, first, we narrow down this interval to prices
between the highest price that makes the CP to sponsor all the available bits and the highest
price that makes the CP to sponsor only to satisfy the minimum desired quality. Then,
we characterize the interior optimum price. This choice is conditional on getting a payoff
greater than or equal to the utility of the SP in case of no-sponsoring. Otherwise, the SP
exits the sponsorship program.
In order to prove the theorem, we use the monotonic behavior of the utility of the SP
in some regions, and apply the first order optimality condition for the remaining regions.
The proof is presented in the Appendix.
Corollary 10. Choosing the price

α log(κCP ζ)
ζ

by the SP, i.e. the highest price by which

the CP sponsors only to guarantee the minimum quality, renders the utility of the CP
to be zero, and the CP to be indifferent between joining or not joining the sponsorship
program.
Proof. Results follow from (4.3), and that from Theorem 17, when pt =

α log(κCP ζ)
,
ζ

d>0

and bt = ζdt (from Theorem 16).
Outcome of the Game: Now that we have characterized the SPNE at each timeepoch for a short-sighted CP and SP, the next step is to analyze the asymptotic behaviour
of the market given the demand update function (4.1) and considering the one-shot game
to be repeated infinitely. The goal is to characterize the asymptotically stable 5-tuple
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equilibrium outcome of the game, i.e. (d, y, p, z, b) (table 4.1), if it were to exist. In
the next Theorem, all possible asymptotically stable outcomes are listed. However, the
existence of such a stable outcome is not guaranteed, and the market can be unstable in
some cases.
Theorem 18. The possible asymptotically stable outcomes of the game are:
1. (−, 0, −, 0, −): no sponsoring is offered, none taken.
2.




κu N̂ , 1, ακu , 1, N̂ : the maximum bit sponsoring; if this is the stable outcome then

κu ≤ ζ1 .
3.




d, 1, α log(κζ CP ζ) , 1, ζd : the minimum quality sponsoring; if this is the stable out-

come then κu =
4.



N κu −

1
ζ

and 0 < d ≤

ν2
ν1 D, 1, ακu , 1, N

outcome, then κu ≤

1
ζ

−

N̂
ζ .

ν2
κu ν1 D



: the interior stable points; if this is the stable

and 0 < b = N −

ν2
κu ν1 D

≤ N̂ .

Remark 9. Since the CP is shortsighted, in every stable outcome of the game, the strategy
of the CP would be a myopic optimum strategy. Thus, using Theorem 16, one can expect
the strategy of the CP to take one of the four possibilities in a stable outcome: (1) no
sponsoring (2) sponsoring the maximum amount available (3) sponsoring only to satisfy
the minimum required quality, or (4) sponsoring an optimum interior amount of bits.
Subsequently, depending on the strategy of the CP, Theorem 17 characterizes the stable
strategy of the SP. In order to prove the theorem we use Lemma 23. The proof is presented
in the Appendix.
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Corollary 11. There is no stable outcome involving sponsoring for the game if the stable
quality is smaller than the minimum quality set by the CP, i.e.

1
κu

< ζ.

Remark 10. Unlike other plausible stable outcomes, the third possible stable point, i.e.


d, 1, α log(κζ CP ζ) , 1, ζd when ζ = κ1u , can assume a range of different values. Whenever
the SP sets p =

α log(κCP ζ)
,
ζ

the CP sets

bt
dt

= ζ, and the market will be stable. By

choosing that price, the SP ensures that she will extract all the profit of the CP and makes
her indifferent between joining the sponsorship program and opting out, i.e. uCP (b) = 0
(using Corollary 10).
In the next theorem, we find the stable demand that maximizes the payoff of the SP
when she chooses the third stable point, i.e. the minimum quality.
1
Theorem 19. Let d∗ = Nζ − (α+ν1 ) log(κ
. The payoff of the SP when the 5-tuple
SP ζ)


d, 1, α log(κζ CP ζ) , 1, ζd (the minimum quality stable point) is the stable outcome of the

market is maximized when either (1) d = min{d∗ , N̂ζ } and d∗ ≥ 0, or (2) d = 0 and
d∗ < 0.
The proof of the theorem is presented in the appendix.
In the next sections, we investigate the case in the SP is long-sighted and the CP is
short-sighted.

4.2.3

Long-Sighted SP, Short-Sighted CP

A long-sighted SP sets the per-bit sponsorship fee in order to achieve a stable market, i.e.
a stable demand for the content, and also to maximize the payoff in the long-run:
USP,Long

T
1X
uSP,t (pt )
T →∞ T

p) = lim
Run (~

t=1
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(4.11)

In this scenario, the SP is the leader of the game and therefore can set the equilibrium
of the game individually by knowing that the CP is a myopic optimizer unit and follows
the results in Theorem 16. Note that the long-sighted SP wants to asymptotically set a
strategy that given the strategy of the CP, yields the highest profit. Thus, even with a
long-sighted SP, the optimum strategy follows Theorem 17, and we can use the result in
Theorem 18.
The difference between this case and the previous case is the ability of the longsighted SP to choose between the candidate stable points in Theorem 18. Thus, the SP
sets appropriate sponsoring fees at the beginning of the sponsoring program in order to
asymptotically lock the stable outcome of the market in the chosen equilibrium.
Note that from Theorem 18, when κu > ζ1 , there is no stable sponsoring outcome, and
if κu < ζ1 , depending on the parameters of the market, the stable point 2, i.e. maximum
bit sponsoring, or 4, i.e. interior stable point, is chosen by the SP. In this case, if ν2 , i.e.
the importance of non-sponsored data for end-users and SP, is high enough, the stable
point 4 is chosen and set by the SP. In addition, increasing the number of resources
available with the SP, i.e. N , makes the stable point 2, i.e. maximum bit sponsoring, to
yield the highest payoff, and thus is chosen by the SP. In the next theorem, we prove that
when κu = ζ1 , the stable point 3 yields the highest payoff.
Theorem 20. If κu = ζ1 , the minimum quality stable point, i.e.




d, 1, α log(κζ CP ζ) , 1, ζd ,

with the demand characterized in Theorem 19 yields the highest payoff for the SP.
Remark 11. Note that in a minimum quality stable point, the CP is indifferent, i.e. all
profit of the CP is extracted by the SP. Therefore, we can expect this stable outcome to
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be the most favorable for the SP. Thus, a long-sighted SP sets this stable point as the
asymptotic outcome of the market when κu = ζ1 .
The proof of the theorem is presented in the appendix.

4.2.4

Short-Sighted SP, Long-Sighted CP

Consider a CP that chooses bt in order to achieve a stable demand and to maximize the
payoff in the long-run:
UCP,Long

T
X
~ = lim 1
uCP,t (bt )
T →∞ T

Run (b)

(4.12)

t=1

In the next theorem, we prove that for a long-sighted CP, the maximum bit sponsorship
yields the highest payoff amongst the stable outcomes characterized in Theorem 18. Note
that if the CP sponsors all the available units at the start of the sponsoring program,
the sudden increase in the demand may push the market to the stable outcome of no
sponsoring. Thus, given that the SP is short-sighted, the CP sets the number of bits for
sponsoring appropriately over time, in order to achieve the demand of κu N̂ eventually.
With this demand and b = N̂ , the market would be stable. However, note that not the
SP is the leader of the game and may chooses a price other than ακu , i.e. the price in the
maximum bit sponsoring. In this case, the CP cannot set the stable outcome she prefers.
Thus, the CP is forced to set a stable outcome that is also preferable for a short-sighted
SP.
Theorem 21. The 5-tuple plausible stable sponsoring points, characterized in Theorem 18, in a decreasing order of the utility they yield to the CP are: maximum bit
sponsorship, interior stable point, and minimum quality.
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Figure 4.3: Market Asymptotic Outcomes with Short-Sighted Decision Makers when κu =
1
ζ

Figure 4.4: Market Asymptotic Outcomes when One of the Decision Makers is LongSighted, when κu =

1
ζ

Remark 12. In order to establish the results, note that the stable point of no sponsoring is
not considered a sponsoring stable point. Thus not listed in the theorem. In addition, since
the CP is indifferent in the minimum quality stable point, this point should be the least
favorite one for the CP. The ordering of the maximum bit and the interior stable points
follows from the fact that the payoff of the CP is strictly increasing in those outcomes.
The proof is presented in the Appendix.

4.2.5

Numerical Results

In this section, we consider at least one of the SP and the CP to have a short-sighted
model, and investigate the effects of ζ, κu , v2 , N , and γ on the asymptotic outcome of the
market. The fixed parameters considered are ν1 = 1, N̂ = 25, D = 50, κSP = κCP = 10,
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and ζ = 0.3. We observe the effect of important parameters such as κu , the sensitivity
of the demand to the quality (γ), the weight an SP assigns to non-sponsored data (ν2 ),
and the total number of available bits in an LTE frame (N ) on the asymptotic outcome
of the market.
Market asymptotic outcomes for the case of κu =

1
ζ

when both decision makers are

short-sighted and when one of them is long-sighted are presented in Figures 4.3 and 4.4,
respectively. Similar plots for the case of κu =

1
2ζ

<

1
ζ

are presented in Figures 4.5 and

4.6, respectively. Recall from Theorem 18 that the asymptotic stable outcome of the game
is one the four candidates: 1. No-Sponsoring, 2. Maximum bit sponsoring, 3. Minimum
quality, and 4. Interior stable point. In the figures, each of the numbers are corresponding
to one of the candidates. We also denote the unstable outcome by 0.
Next, we discuss about the effect of the framework and parameters on the asymptotic
outcome of the game:
Impact of a decision-maker with long-sighted model: Note that in both cases
κu =

1
ζ

and κu < ζ1 , the outcome of the market is independent of the CP or the CP being

long-sighted or the SP being long-sighted. The reason is that in the sequential game the
SP is the leader of the game. Thus, although a long-sighted SP can set the stable outcome
she prefers in the long-run, a long-sighted CP cannot enforce the most preferred stable
outcome, and should choose the stable outcome that is also preferable for the SP. This
yields the same asymptotic outcome for the market as the case that the SP is long-sighted.
Impact of the minimum quality (ζ) and the stable quality ( κ1u ): Theorem
18 implies that depending on the relation between the minimum quality set by the CP
(ζ) and the stable quality ( κ1u ), the market has different stability outcomes in the short206

Figure 4.5: Market Asymptotic Outcomes with Short-Sighted Decision Makers, when
κu <

1
ζ

Figure 4.6: Market Asymptotic Outcomes when One of the Decision Makers is LongSighted, when κu <

1
ζ

sighted scenario. We seek to identify the stable outcomes that arise in each different
parameter ranges:
• Using Corollary 11, If the CP over-provisions the minimum quality for the satisfaction of users (ζ >

1
κu ),

there is no stable sponsoring outcome since the demand of users

grows drastically forcing the SP and CP to exit the sponsoring program. Thus, we do not
study this case through simulations.
• If the CP under-provisions the minimum quality (ζ <

1
κu ),

simulation results in

Figure 4.5 reveal that the market is set on the maximum bit sponsoring stable outcome
for a particular range of parameters. However, the market is unstable or has the stable
outcome of no-sponsoring for the rest of parameters.
• If the CP sets the minimum quality equal to the stable quality (ζ =
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1
κu ),

the market

is set either on the no-sponsoring or the minimum quality stable outcomes. Comparing
Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 reveals that in the case of κu = ζ1 , the market is more likely
to have a stable outcome that involves sponsoring.
Impact of the sensitivity of the demand to the quality, γ: Note that, in
Figures 4.3 and 4.5, and in general, increasing the value of γ shifts the stable outcome of
the market from sponsoring to no-sponsoring. The exception is a range of v2 for the case
κu = ζ1 , which we explain about when we discuss about the impact of v2 later.
Therefore, in a market with short-sighted entities, the sensitivity of the demand to
the quality, i.e. γ, greatly influences the stability of the market. When γ is high, the
satisfaction and subsequently the demand of end-users increases/decreases drastically with
small changes in the rate perceived by them. Thus, players would exit the sponsorship
program since the demand may go down to zero or the demand may exceed dmax =

N̂ 15
,
ζ

i.e. the jump in the demand decreases the quality received by the users below the requested
minimum quality (ζ) which leads the CP to stick to the best-effort scenario. On the other
hand, if γ is small, the market is more likely to be set on a sponsoring stable outcome.
Thus, in order to have a stable outcome of sponsoring, γ should be sufficiently small.
Note that this parameter is small for a CP whose users are less sensitive to the quality
they receive, such as shopping websites. This is in contrast with streaming websites whose
users are sensitive to the quality (high γ). The parameter γ is also small for a CP which
has a well-established end-user side, i.e. a more stable demand, such as Google, in contrast
with the emerging CPs and start ups whose demand usually fluctuate more. Thus, in a
short-sighted setting, the QSD may not be a viable option for streaming websites and
15

the highest number of end-users that can be satisfied with the minimum quality.
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emerging CPs.
In addition, note that the effect of γ would be canceled if one of the decision makers
is long-sighted. This implies that in QSD framework, CPs with volatile demand (high γ)
should be long-sighted to have a market with a stable outcome that involves sponsoring
the content.
Impact of the importance of non-sponsored contents, ν2 : The parameter v2
being large, when v1 is normalized to one, represents the fact that the SP assigns more
weight to the satisfaction of users for using non-sponsored content. Thus, the SP wants
to restrict the number of bits she offers for sponsoring, and the best strategy for the SP is
to set her per-bit sponsorship fee high enough so that the CP sponsors a smaller number
of bits. Thus, we expect the market to have a stable outcome of no-sponsoring when v2
is high.
Results in Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 confirm that the market has the stable outcome
of no-sponsoring when v2 is large. One of the differences between the cases κu =
κu <

1
ζ

is that when κu =

1
ζ,

1
ζ

and

for a certain range of v2 , the stable sponsoring outcome

is 3, i.e. the minimum quality stable outcome, regardless of γ, i.e. the sensitivity of the
demand to the quality. Next, we explain the reason for this behavior. Note that, as we
mentioned, v2 being high is associated with lower bits sponsored. Thus, for a certain
range of v2 , we expect the CP to start the sponsoring program with a quality near the
minimum quality (since the CP wants to sponsor at least the minimum quality). In the
case that κu = ζ1 , (4.1) implies that the demand increases more slowly (the logarithm in
the expression is smaller). Thus, the effect of γ is not significant, and the market can be
stabilized on the minimum quality stable point regardless of γ. However, this does not
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happen for the case of κu <

1
ζ,

since in this case, from (4.1), the demand of end-users

diminishes to zero16 , and the market is set on the stable outcome of no-sponsoring.
Impact of total available resources, N : Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 reveal that
increasing the number of available resources (N ) stretches the regions. In other words, as
N increases, results would be similar to that of smaller v2 ’s.
For example, in Figure 4.3, increasing the number of available bits (resources) increases
the area of no-sponsoring region for small v2 . This is counter-intuitive since one can expect
that increasing the amount of available resources should facilitate sponsoring the content.
This counter-intuitive result is due to the fact that by increasing N , the value of the SP
for each bit decreases and the SP sets a lower sponsoring fee. This leads to sponsoring
more bits by the CP which leads to a significant increase in the demand for the content
when γ is large. This derives the market to the point of no-sponsoring. Therefore, the
outcome is the same as the case in which v2 is very small: the minimum quality stable
point when γ is small and no-sponsoring when γ is large.
Impact of v1 and v2 on the social welfare: If we define the social welfare of the
QSD regime as the sum of the payoffs of the CP and the SP17 , then important parameters
for determining the social welfare of the system are v1 and v2 (can be imposed by the
regulator), and D. In this case, if

v2
v1

or D are high, i.e. when the weight on the content

16

Note that in this case the logarithm in (4.1) is negative for a quality near the minimum quality.

17

Note that the payoff of the SP includes a term for users’ satisfaction function that captures the welfare

of EUs for sponsored and non-sponsored contents (possibly with constants different from v1 and v2 ). In
addition, the effect of the model on other CPs is also hidden in the users’ satisfaction function (the term
−bt
v2 D log(κSP N D
)). Thus, sum of the utility of the CP and the SP (with possibly different v1 and v2 ) is

a good indicator of the social welfare.
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of a non-sponsored content is high, then the SP restricts the number of bits she offers for
sponsoring by quoting a high sponsorship fee (as explained before). Thus, either the CP
reserves a smaller number of bits or exits the sponsorship program. In either cases, the
outcome would be aligned with maximizing the social welfare. Thus, v1 and v2 can be
imposed by the regulator to control the social welfare.
Remark 13. Figure 4.5 and 4.6 illustrate that the stable point 4, i.e. interior stable
point, does not emerge, and only stable points 1 and 2 occur. In other words, in a stable
outcome, when stakeholders of the market are short-sighted, either the CP sponsors all the
available resources or no sponsoring occurs. Note that in the stable point 4, the number of
bits sponsored by the CP in the equilibrium is N − κuν2ν1 D. In addition, a stable sponsoring
5-tuple occurs only when ν2 is small which makes N −

ν2
κu ν1 D

> N̂ for a wide range of

parameters. Thus, the stable point 4 does not emerge in many scenarios. One can argue
that by decreasing N or increasing D, we may have a scenario in which N − κuν2ν1 D < N̂ .
However, note these changes, is similar to having a large v2 . Thus, similar to previous
arguments, in this case, the SP is willing to set a price so high that leads the CP and
market to a no-sponsoring outcome. Therefore, again in the regions that support an
interior sponsoring solution, i.e. when N −

ν2
κu ν1 D

< N̂ , the stable outcome 4 would not

occur. None of the parameters we considered results in such a stable outcome.
In the next section, using a bargaining framework, we investigate the scenario in which
the decision makers have a long-sighted model, i.e. consider the effect of their decisions
on the evolution of the demand and subsequently their payoff.
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4.3

Bargaining Framework: NBS Analysis

In the previous section, we proved that a long-sighted CP and SP can prefer different stable
outcomes, i.e. the stable outcomes that yield the highest payoff for them. If both decision makers are long-sighted, since multiple asymptotic outcomes are plausible, playing
a sequential game may lead to a Pareto-inefficient outcome in the long-run18 . Therefore,
when both of the decision makers are long-sighted, it is natural to consider a bargaining
game framework19 . A bargaining game provides the framework to model the scenario in
which two selfish agents can cooperatively select an equilibrium outcome (possibly among
multiple equilibria) when non-cooperation, i.e. disagreement, yields Pareto-inefficient results Note that both cases (multiple Nash equilibria and Pareto-inefficient outcome) occur
in our modeling in Section 4.2 when at least one of the decision makers is short-sighted.
After selecting the equilibrium, the division of profits can be characterized using the
18

The strategies of the SP and the CP are Pareto-inefficient in the long-run if at least one of the CP

or the SP can increase her payoff, by changing her strategy, without decreasing the other player’s payoff.
An example of an inefficient outcome that occurs in our model is when v2 is small and γ is large and
both players are short-sighted. According to Figure 4.3 the asymptotic outcome of the game would be
the no-sponsoring outcome. On the other hand, in Figure 4.4, with the same parameters, when one of the
decision makers is long-sighted (which means that she chooses different strategies to maximize her longrun payoff), the asymptotic outcome of the market would be the minimum quality sponsoring outcome in
which the SP receives a strictly higher payoff than the previous case. Thus, the outcome of the sequential
game, can be Pareto inefficient in the long-run.
19

We can also consider a bargaining game when decision makers are short-sighted. However, in this

chapter, we consider two extreme scenarios: (1) non-cooperation/at least one decision maker short-sighted
and (2) cooperation/both long-sight-sighted, and compare the outcome of the market in these two extreme
cases.
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bargaining game frameworks considering the bargaining power of each decision maker.
In Section 4.3.1, we formulate and analyze the bargaining game. In Section 4.3.2, we
present numerical results for this framework and discuss about the results.

4.3.1

Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)

Thus, we formulate the interaction between the CP and the SP as a bargaining game,
and use the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) to characterize the bargaining solution to
the problem when both the SP and the CP are long-sighted.
Definition 14. Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS): is the unique solution ( in our case
the tuple of the payoffs of the CP and the SP) that satisfies the four “reasonable” axioms (Invariant to affine transformations, Pareto optimality, Independence of irrelevant
alternatives, and Symmetry) characterized in [53].
Let 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 be the relative bargaining power of the CP over SP: the higher w,
more powerful is the bargaining power of a CP. In addition, uCP and uSP denote the
payoff of the CP and SP respectively, and dCP and dSP denote the payoff each decision
maker receives in case of disagreement, i.e. disagreement payoff. In order to characterize
the disagreement payoffs, we assume that in case of disagreement, the SP and the CP
will interact as short-sighted entities playing the sequential game previously described20 .
Thus, the disagreement payoffs can be found by determining the asymptotic status of the
market: the asymptotic payoff of the CP and the SP if the market is asymptotically stable,
20

The reason is that if in the case of disagreement, the CP and the SP continue their selfish non-

cooperative behavior, they can obtain a payoff higher than or equal to the payoff of no-sponsoring. The
inequality is strict for the cases that a sequential game yields a sponsoring outcome.
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or the average payoffs if the market is unstable. Note that the value of the disagreement
payoff for the CP and the SP can have an effect similar to the bargaining power (w for
the CP and 1 − w for the SP).
Using standard game theoretic results in [53], the pair of u∗CP and u∗SP can be identified
as the Nash bargaining solution of the problem if and only if it solves the following
optimization problem:
max (uCP − dCP )w (uSP − dSP )1−w

uCP ,uSP

s.t.
(4.13)
(uCP , uSP ) ∈ U
(uCP , uSP ) ≥ (dCP , dSP )
where U is the set of feasible payoff pairs. Note that the long-sighted SP and CP want
to set a stable market in the long-run21 , and based on Lemma 23 in a stable outcome
b
d

=

1
κu .

Thus, the expressions for uCP and uSP in a stable outcome (using (4.3) and

(4.24)) are functions of the demand (d) and as follows:
d
κu

(4.14)

d
+ us (d)
κu

(4.15)

uCP (d) = uad (d) − p

uSP (d) = p

where uad (d) = αd log( κκCP
) is the advertisement profit for the CP, and us (d) = ν1 d log( κκCP
)+
u
u
ν2 D log(κSP
21

N − κd
u
D

) is the satisfaction of the end-users of the SP. In addition, p κdu is the

An unstable market makes it difficult for the CP and the SP to make decisions, predict the demand,

or manage the network. Thus, an unstable market has its implicit costs for the CP and the SP. This is
the reason that we assumed that the CP and the SP want to set an stable market.
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side-payment transferred from the CP to the SP in exchange of securing a quality of

1
κu

for the demand (d). Note that in Section 4.1, we introduced uad (.) and us (.) as functions
of the number of sponsored bits (b). Here, we redefine them to be functions of demand
(d) since in a stable outcome d = κu b.
Thus, the maximization (4.13) is over d > 0 and p. In addition, note that the maximum
demand that can be satisfied with maximum available resources of N̂ to provide the quality
of

1
κu

is κu N̂ (d = κu b ≤ κu N̂ ), which constitutes the feasible set. Thus the maximization

is,
max (uCP − dCP )w (uSP − dSP )1−w
d,p

s.t.
0 ≤ d ≤ N̂ κu

(4.16)

uCP ≥ dCP
uSP ≥ dSP
We define p∗ and d∗ to be the optimum solution of (4.16). Note that p∗ and d∗ characterize the optimum division of profit (u∗CP and u∗SP ) and thus the NBS. In addition, we
define the aggregate excess profit to be the additional profit yielded from the cooperation
in the bargaining framework:
Definition 15. Aggregate Excess Profit (uexcess ): The aggregate excess profit is defined
as follows:
uexcess = uCP − dCP + uSP − dSP = uad − dCP + us − dSP

(4.17)

Note that uexcess in independent of p and is only a function of d. We define u∗excess =
uexcess |d=d∗ . Note that the bargaining would only occur if u∗excess > 0, i.e. the framework
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creates additional joint profit that can be divided between the SP and the CP. Thus,
henceforth, we characterize the NBS for the case that u∗excess > 0. We use uexcess in the
following theorem:
Theorem 22. If u∗excess > 0, the optimum solution of the optimization (4.16) is (d∗ , p∗ )
in which d∗ = arg max0≤d≤N̂ κu uexcess , and p∗ is:
p∗ =

 κ 

κu 
u
(1 − w)(u∗ad − dCP ) − w(u∗s − dSP ) =
(u∗ad − dCP ) − wu∗excess
d
d

(4.18)

where u∗ad = uad |d=d∗ , u∗s = us |d=d∗ .
Remark 14. The theorem characterizes p∗ and d∗ which directly lead to the NBS (using
(4.14) and (4.15)), i.e. (u∗CP , u∗SP ). Based on the theorem, before splitting the profit,
the SP and the CP cooperatively set a stable quality and subsequently a stable demand to
maximize the aggregate excess profit, uexcess by solving the concave maximization problem
(maxd uexcess ) with the single parameter d. Subsequently, they decide the split of the
∗

additional profit, i.e. the side payment paid to the SP by the CP (p∗ κdu ), based on (4.18)
which depends on the bargaining power each has (w and 1 − w). The proof of Theorem is
presented in the Appendix.
Remark 15. As we mentioned before, the value of the disagreement payoffs can also play
a similar role as the bargaining power (w). From (4.18): dCP ↑⇒ p ↓, and dSP ↑⇒ p ↑.
Remark 16. Price vs. Bargaining Power: The price per sponsored bit (4.18) is a
decreasing function of w , i.e. the bargaining power of the CP: the higher the bargaining
power of the CP the lower the side payment paid to the SP. It follows from (4.18) that
there exists a threshold on w, wt =

u∗ad −dCP
u∗excess

, such that when w > wt , p∗ < 0, when w < wt ,
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p∗ > 0, and when w = wt , p∗ = 0. In other words, for the CP with a bargaining power
higher than the threshold wt , the flow of money is reversed, and the SP pays the CP. This
counter-intuitive case occurs either due to a high bargaining power of the CP (high w),
or in the scenario that the SP gain significantly more than the CP from the cooperative
scenario (u∗excess >> u∗ad − dCP , i.e. low wt ). For example, a powerful CP, e.g. Google,
which already has a large established demand for the content might be reluctant to cooperate
with the SP unless the SP pays some of the additional profit to it.

4.3.2

Numerical Results

Now, consider the SP and the CP with long-sighted business model that play a bargaining
game as described in this Section. We investigate the effects of bargaining and cooperation
between the CP and the SP in increasing the utility of each of them and stabilizing the
market. In addition, we discuss about the relation between the number of available
resources (N ) and the Nash bargaining price (p∗ ).
We consider w = 0.5, i.e. the CP and the SP have the same bargaining power, and
the values of v1 , N̂ , D, κSP , and κCP to be the same as those considered in Section 4.2.5.
First, we plot the percentage of increase in the payoff of the CP and the SP after
bargaining versus v2 for different values of ζ when κu =

1
ζ

in Figures 4.7 and 4.8. The

percentage of increase in the utility after bargaining is defined as follows:

increase (percentage) =

utility after bargaining-utility before bargaining
× 100
utility after bargaining
(4.19)

Note that when the utility before bargaining is zero and the utility after bargaining
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Figure 4.7: The percentage of increase in the utility of the CP when κu =

1
ζ

with respect

to v2 for different values of ζ.

is positive, then the increase in the utility, using (4.19), is 100 percent, and this value is
zero if the utility after bargaining is equal to the utility before bargaining.
Results in Figure 4.7 reveal that the percentage of increase in the payoff of the CP
is either zero or 100. Note that when κu =

1
ζ,

the market either has a stable outcome

of no sponsoring or a stable outcome of minimum quality sponsoring. In both cases, the
utility of the CP is zero. Thus, if bargaining occurs, the CP would get a positive payoff,
and the percentage of the increase in the utility of the CP would be 100. In Figure 4.7,
we can see a threshold on v2 after which the bargaining does not occur. This threshold
is decreasing with respect to ζ. The reason is intuitive: even in a bargaining framework,
due to limited resources, sponsoring does not occur if the CP needs a high quality to be
sponsored, and/or the quality of non-sponsored data is important for the SP.
Results in Figure 4.8 reveal that the percentage of increase in the utility of the SP after
bargaining is decreasing with respect to v2 . In other words, the higher the importance of
non-sponsored data for the end-users and subsequently the SP, the lower the incentive of
the SP for participating in a bargaining game. Note that the case ζ = 2 is corresponding
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Figure 4.8: The percentage of increase in the utility of the SP when κu =
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Figure 4.9: The percentage of increase in the utility of the CP when κu =
to v2 for different values of ζ.

to a minimum quality stable outcome in the short-sighted framework. Thus, bargaining
does not add greatly to the utility of the SP. On the other hand, ζ = 4 and ζ = 8
are corresponding to a stable point of no sponsoring in the short sighted framework.
Therefore, the increase in the utility of the SP from bargaining is higher in these two
cases than ζ = 2. In addition, the percentage of increase is decreasing with respect to ζ.
In other words, the higher the minimum quality needed to be sponsored, the lower the
incentive of the SP for a bargaining framework.
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Figure 4.10: The percentage of increase in the utility of the SP when κu =

1
2ζ

with respect

to v2 for different values of ζ..

In Figures 4.9 and 4.10, the percentage of the increase in the payoff of the CP and the
SP is plotted when κu =

1
2ζ .

Note that for the case of ζ = 0.2, when v2 is small, the stable

outcome of a short-sighted market would be the maximum bit sponsoring. Since, in this
case, this stable outcome, yields the highest payoff for the SP and the CP, bargaining
cannot create additional profit. Thus, the percentage of increase in the utility of the SP
and the CP is zero up a threshold. For v2 higher than this threshold, and the cases ζ = 4
and ζ = 8, the corresponding short-sighted outcome of the market is no sponsoring stable
outcome. Thus, the results is similar to the previous figures (Figures 4.7 and 4.8).
Note that bargaining can enforce sponsoring for the set of parameters that have no
stable sponsoring outcome in a sequential game. However, the bargaining framework
cannot always enforce sponsoring. In particular, if the CP needs to sponsor a high quality
(high ζ) for the content, or the quality of non-sponsored content is important for the endusers and subsequently the SP (high v2 ), then sponsoring does not occur regardless of the
framework used.
The next set of numerical results investigate the relation between the number of avail220
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Figure 4.11: The price per bit in a Nash bargaining solution versus the available number
of bits when κu =

1
2ζ .

able resources (N̂ ) and the Nash bargaining price (p∗ ). Intuitively, one may expect that
higher number of available resources yields a lower valuation of the SP for each unit of
resources, and subsequently a lower price for each bit. While this line of thought seems to
be true in the sequential framework, numerical results reveal a more complex relationship
between p∗ and N̂ in the bargaining framework: the negotiated price can be increasing,
decreasing, or a combination of both (Figures 4.11 and 4.12).
The reason for this counter-intuitive behavior is the different disagreement payoffs
resulting from different asymptotic outcomes of the game when decision makers are shortsighted. The disagreement payoffs can be considered as a form of bargaining power for each
decision maker, and can affect the excess profit resulted by bargaining. Thus, different
disagreement payoffs lead to different amounts of excess profit and its division between
the CP and the SP, and subsequently different behavior of price per sponsored bit.
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Figure 4.12: The price per bit in a Nash bargaining solution versus the available number
of bits when κu = ζ1 .

4.4

Discussions

First in Section 4.4.1, we present high-level perspective of the results. Then in Section 4.4.2, we discuss about the modeling and assumptions of this the work in this chapter,
their implications, and their generalizations.

4.4.1

Summary of Key Results

We discussed that relation between the minimum quality the CP requests, i.e. ζ, and the
stable quality, i.e.

1 22
κu ,

is an important factor in determining the asymptotic outcome of

the market (Section 4.2.5). In particular if the CP over-provisions the minimum quality,
i.e. ζ >

1
κu ,

when ζ <

1
κu

then there is no stable sponsoring outcome. The stability can be achieved
(under-provision). However, the set of parameters for which the market is

stable is larger when ζ =

1
κu .

Thus, a QSD framework is more likely to emerge for CPs

that know the dynamic of their demand ( κ1u ) and are willing to disclose it (by requesting
ζ =
22

1
κu ).

However, note that in a sequential framework and if ζ =

Recall that the stable quality is defined in Definition 11.
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1
κu ,

the utility of the

CP would be zero, i.e. the additional profit of the CP by sponsoring the content would
be fully extracted if the CP reveals the true value of the stable quality. Thus, the CP
would be indifferent between this scheme and neutrality, while the SP receives a higher
payoff in QSD scheme. While in a bargaining framework (if it happens), both the CP and
the SP receive a higher payoff in comparison to a neutral framework. Thus, a bargaining
framework is preferable especially for the CP.
We showed that a CP with a volatile demand, i.e. a CP whose users are sensitive to
the quality (high γ), leads to a no-sponsoring outcome in a sequential framework (noncooperative scenario) if both the SP and CP are short-sighted. Examples of such CPs
are streaming websites and emerging CPs (start ups). Thus, a QSD framework is not a
viable scenario in long run for these CPs, if the decision-makers are short-sighted. For
these CPs, we can expect a stable QSD framework only if one of the CP or the SP is
long-sighted, or in a bargaining game framework. In addition, we showed that even in a
bargaining framework, an SP who assigns high weights to the satisfaction of users that
use the non-sponsored data (high

v2
v1 ),

chooses to not sponsor the content of a CP who

needs high quality (high ζ).23
Moreover, results reveal that investment by the SP is not always in favor of having a
stable QSD. Increasing the number of available resources for sponsoring (investment by
the SP), when at least one of the decision makers is long-sighted, increases the range of
the parameters by which a stable QSD framework occurs. However, when both the SP
23

As explained in the model, the parameter v2 can also represent the regulatory policies for the quality

of the experience of the users that use the non-sponsored content. In this case, a high v2 is corresponding
to stricter (net-neutrality) rules.
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and CP are short-sighted, increasing the number of resources may lead to a scenario in
which the CP sponsors a large number of resources. If the demand is volatile, this yields
a sudden jump in the demand, and drives the market to a no-sponsoring outcome (the
jump in demand decreases the quality below the minimum quality), and leads the CP to
use the best-effort scenario.

4.4.2

Comments on the Assumptions of the Model

We assume logarithmic functions for the demand update function and utilities owing to
its concavity. However, our analysis and insights are expected to be applicable to other
concave functions with diminishing returns.
Note that the focus of this work is on the interaction between an SP and a CP, and not
on the competition among SPs and CPs. In particular, we consider that only one CP wants
to sponsor a quality for her users, and the rests stick to the best effort scenario. The effects
of other CPs are considered by the SP as part of her utility. Introducing competition
among CPs and SPs would introduce another level of strategic decisions by them. It does
not necessarily alter the high-level intuitions for the interaction of the CP and the SP
provided in this work. For example, we can expect that even under competition, a CP with
a volatile demand would not be a good options for a QSD framework in a non-cooperative
scenario. However, considering the competition among CPs provides intuitions on the
possible structure of the Internet market in future under a QSD framework. For example,
a possible outcome would be the case that competitive CPs divide SPs (and subsequently
end-users) among themselves and each sponsors the quality of the content on only one of
the SPs. Using this, each CP can secure a monopoly over users. This would be a mild
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version of the “Internet fragmentation” which might be an undesirable outcome for users
and from the perspective of the FCC. A possible direction for future work is to consider
the competition over end-users among ISPs and CPs.
In addition, we assume that quality is sponsored by reserving a number of resources,
e.g. LTE time-frames. In general, SPs can sponsor high quality for users of CPs using
various methods, e.g. by prioritization of the content of a CP. Analyzing different methods
of sponsoring the quality of a content is beyond the scope of this work.

4.5

Conclusion

We introduced the problem of quality-sponsored data (QSD) in cellular networks and
studied its implications on market entities in sequential and bargaining game frameworks
in various scenarios. The direct coupling between the scarce (wireless) resources and
the market decisions resulting from QSD has been taken into account, Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium and Nash Bargaining Solution of the problem is characterized, and the
market dynamics and equilibira have been investigated. We provided strategies for (i)
SPs: to determine if and how to price resources, and (ii) CPs: to determine if and how
many resources to sponsor (what quality). In this work, we focused on the interaction
between ISPs and CPs. A possible direction for future work is to consider the competition
over end-users among ISPs and CPs. Another direction is to consider the effects of QSD
on the payments of user to SPs, and its implications on the results.
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4.6

Appendix

4.6.1

Proof of Theorem 16

First we consider the case in which dt >

N̂
ζ .

In this case, ζdt > N̂ . Therefore, there is

no feasible solution for bt . Thus, as we mentioned previously after (4.7), in this case of
infeasibility, the CP exits the sponsorship program, i.e. zt∗ = 0. In addition, from (4.3),
dt = 0 yields uCP,t (bt ) < 0 for every bt > 0, and subsequently zt∗ = 0. This completes the
proof of (4.9).
Thus, henceforth, we consider 0 < dt ≤

N̂
ζ .

Clearly, the utility of the CP (4.3)

is concave. Thus, the first order optimality condition provides us with the candidate
optimum answer for (4.7). The first order condition yields that b̂t =

αdt
pt .

In order to be

an optimum answer, b̂t should be feasible, i.e. ζdt ≤ b̂t ≤ N̂ . This characterizes a region
for pt ,

αdt
N̂

≤ pt ≤

α
ζ.

In order to determine z ∗ , we should check non-negativity of u∗CP,t .

The utility of the CP with b̂t =
α
ζ

<

ακCP
e

αdt
pt

is non-negative if pt ≤

ακCP
e

. Since ζκCP > e,24

. Therefore, a feasible solution for (4.8) yields a non-negative payoff. Thus,

zt∗ = 1. This is the second region from top in (4.8).
If pt ≤

αdt
,
N̂

then the top boundary condition b∗t = N̂ is the optimum answer of (4.8).

In addition, since in this region uCP,t (N̂ ) is positive, zt∗ = 1. This is the first optimality
region of (4.8). On the other hand, if pt ≥

α
ζ,

then the lower boundary condition, i.e.

b̄t = ζdt , is the optimum answer of the optimization. The condition for uCP,t (b̄t ) ≥ 0 and
therefore zt∗ = 1 is pt ≤
pt >
24

α log(κCP ζ)
,
ζ

α log(κCP ζ)
ζ

which yields the third optimality region in (4.8). If

uCP,t (bt ) < 0. Thus, zt∗ = 0. This concludes the proof.

The condition to have a non-trivial problem stated in Section 4.1.
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4.6.2

Proof of Theorem 17

Theorem 16 implies that if dt >

N̂
ζ ,

or dt = 0, or pt >

α log(κCP ζ)
,
ζ

the CP does not

participate in the sponsoring program. Thus, the value of yt∗ does not affect the outcome
of the market in these cases. Without loss of generality, we assume that in these cases
the SP does not offer the program, i.e. yt∗ = 0.
Thus, henceforth, we consider 0 < dt ≤

N̂
ζ

and pt ≤

α log(κCP ζ)
.
ζ

Note that in this

region, by Theorem 16, bt > 0. Thus, the SP maximization problem is,
max uSP,t (pt ) = max pt b∗t + ν1 dt log
pt



pt

κSP b∗t
dt



N − b∗t
+ ν2 D log κSP
D


where b∗t is the equilibrium outcome of the second stage. Let pt ≤

!

αdt
.
N̂

,

(4.20)

Then from

Theorem 16, b∗t = N̂ . Thus, uSP,t (pt ) is a strictly increasing function of pt . Therefore,
all prices less than

αdt
N̂

yields a strictly lower payoff than p∗1,t =

candidate pricing strategy. Next, let

α
ζ

≤ pt ≤

α log(κCP ζ)
.
ζ

αdt
,
N̂

which is the first

Thus, from Theorem 16,

b∗t = ζdt . Again, in this region, uSP,t (pt ) is a strictly increasing function of pt . Thus,
p∗2,t =

α log(κCP ζ)
ζ

strictly dominates all other prices in this interval, which yields the

second candidate pricing strategy25 . For the case that
b∗t =

αdt
pt .

αdt
N̂

≤ pt ≤

α
ζ,

from Theorem 16,

In this region, the first order condition on uSP,t (pt ) provides us with the local

extremum,
p∗3,t = α

ν1 dt + ν2 D
ν1 N

(4.21)

Since the second order derivative can be negative or positive, the first order condition
provides us with only a candidate optimum answer, which is the third candidate pricing
25

Note that p∗2,t =

α log(κCP ζ)
ζ

yields a payoff of zero for the CP. However, since we have assumed that

the indifferent CP chooses to join the sponsorship program, zt∗ = 1 and subsequently yt∗ = 1.
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strategy. This candidate strategy should satisfy the condition

αdt
N̂

≤ p∗3,t ≤

α
ζ.

If not, it

would not be an optimum answer since, as we discussed earlier in the proof, every price less
than (respectively, higher than)
α log(κCP ζ) 26
) .
ζ

αdt
N̂

(respectively,

α
ζ

) is dominated by

αdt
N̂

(respectively,

Note that these candidate strategies are optimum only if they yield a payoff

higher than the payoff of the SP in the case of no-sponsoring, i.e. v2 D log(κSP N
D ). The
result follows.

4.6.3

Proof of Theorem 18

We characterize the possible stable outcomes of the game when at each time t, the SP and
the CP choose their strategy to be the SPNE of the game characterized in Theorems 16
and 17.
The first candidate stable outcome is trivial: as soon as one of the CP or SP exits the
sponsorship program, or dt >

N̂
ζ ,

or dt = 0, the program will not be resumed.

Now consider the case that sponsoring occurs. In this case, y = 1 z = 1, and from
Theorem 17, the SP chooses one of the candidate optimum pricing strategies from the
2D
set P ∗ = { αdt , α log(κζ CP ζ) , α ν1 dνt1+ν
}. We show that the first, the second, and the third
N

N̂

candidate pricing strategies are corresponding to the second, the third, and the fourth
stable outcome, respectively. Note that when choosing these prices, by Theorem 17, the
demand should be feasible, i.e. 0 < dt ≤

N̂
ζ .

In addition, recall that by Lemma 23, the

demand is stable when d = κu b.
Now, we obtain the second stable outcome by considering that p =

αd
N̂

and 0 < dt ≤

N̂
ζ .

In this case, from Theorem 16, b = N̂ . Thus p = ακu since d = κu N̂ . The feasibility
26

Note that from Theorem 16, prices higher than

α log(κCP ζ)
ζ
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leads to no sponsoring on the CP side.

condition yields that d = κu N̂ ≤

N̂
ζ

⇒ κu ≤

1 27
.
ζ

Next, we obtain the third stable outcome by considering p =
N̂
ζ .

α log(κCP ζ)
ζ

and 0 < dt ≤

In this case, from Theorem 16, b = ζd, and subsequently from the stability condition,

d = κu b = κu ζd. Therefore, this case occurs if κu ζ = 1. Note that the demand could be
any positive value less than or equal to

N̂
ζ

(feasibility condition), and with this demand,

0 < b = ζd ≤ N̂ .
αd α
2D
Finally, the fourth possible stable outcome happens when p = α ν1 d+ν
, ζ]
ν1 N , p ∈ [
N̂

(from Theorem 17), and 0 < dt ≤

N̂
ζ .

In this case, from Theorem 16, b =

αd
p .

In order to

2D
, d = N κu −
have a stable outcome, d = κu b ⇒ p = ακu . Thus, from p = α ν1 dνt1+ν
N

and b = N −

ν2
ν1 κu D.

ν2
ν1 D

Note that b should satisfy 0 < b ≤ N̂ , and from Theorem 17, we

2D
is optimum if it is in the interval [ αd , αζ ]. The latter yields that
know that p = α ν1 d+ν
ν1 N

N̂

αd
N̂

≤ p = ακu ≤ αζ , which yields that κu ≤

1
ζ

and b =

automatically lead to a feasible demand: from b =
Thus, in this stable outcome, κu ≤

4.6.4

1
ζ

αd
p

αd
p

≤ N̂ . Note that these conditions
≤ N̂ , then d ≤

N̂ p
α

= N̂ κu ≤

N̂
ζ .

and 0 < b ≤ N̂ . The result follows.

Proof of Theorem 19



By (4.24), the utility of the SP when choosing the tuple d, 1, α log(κζ CP ζ) , 1, ζd is:
uSP



N − ζd
= αd log (κSP ζ) + ν1 d log (κSP ζ) + ν2 D log κSP
D

First, note that the expression of the utility is concave in d. Thus, the first order
condition gives the optimum answer. The solution of the first order condition is:
d∗ =
27

N
1
−
ζ
(α + ν1 ) log (κSP ζ)

Note that d = κu N̂ > 0.
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Based on Theorem 18, for d∗ to be the demand corresponding to the minimum quality
stable outcome, it should satisfy the constraint 0 < d∗ ≤
concavity implies that the optimum is d =

4.6.5

N̂
ζ

N̂
ζ .

If d∗ >

N̂
ζ

or d∗ < 0, the

or d = 0, respectively.

Proof of Theorem 20

First, note that in Theorem 18, when κu = ζ1 , the stable points 2, 3, and 4 can occur.
In addition, the demand is fixed in the stable point 2 and 4, while it can take a range of
values for the stable point 3, including the fixed demands in the other two stable points.
On the other hand, the price is fixed in all these three stable points. In these stable
points, the stable quality is
uSP

b
d

= ζ. Thus, by (4.24), the payoff of the SP is:



N − ζd
= pζd + ν1 d log (κSP ζ) + ν2 D log κSP
D

Therefore, for a fixed demand, the payoff of the SP in this case is an increasing function
of the price p. Note that the third stable point, i.e. minimum quality stable point, has
the highest price among the possible stable points since log(κCP ζ) > 1.28 In addition,
it can take a range of demand including the fixed demands of the stable point 2 and 4 .
Thus, the third stable outcome of the market yields the highest payoff for the SP. The
optimum demand is chosen by Theorem 19 as discussed before. The result follows.

4.6.6

Proof of Theorem 21

First note that from Corollary 10, the minimum quality stable point, i.e.




d, 1, α log(κζ CP ζ) , 1, ζd ,

yields a payoff of zero for the CP. From Lemma 23, in both the maximum bit sponsorship,




i.e. κu N̂ , 1, ακu , 1, N̂ , and interior stable point, i.e. N κu − νν12 D, 1, ακu , 1, N − κuν2ν1 D ,
28

In Section 4.1, we assumed that in order to have a non-trivial problem κCP ζ > e
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the stable quality ( db ) is

1
κu .

Thus, using (4.3), the payoff of the CP in these plausible

stable outcomes is:




uCP = αd log

κCP
κu




−1

Note that from the condition for plausibility of these stable points (κu ≤
previous assumption that κCP ζ > e,29

κCP
κu

1
ζ ),

and our

> e. Thus, the payoff of the CP in the

maximum bit sponsorship and the interior stable point is strictly greater than zero, and
is strictly increasing with respect to the demand. Given that the quality

b
d

=

1
κu ,

and is a

constant, the higher the number of sponsored bits, the higher the demand, and therefore
the higher the payoff of the CP would be. In addition, note that the number of sponsored
bits in the maximum bit sponsorship point is greater than or equal to the number of
sponsored bits in the interior stable point. Thus, the utility of the CP in the maximum
bit sponsoring point is greater than or equal to the utility in the interior stable point.
The result follows.

4.6.7

Proof of Theorem 22

dCP and dSP are independent of d and p. In addition, uexcess = (uCP −dCP )+(uSP −dSP )
is independent of p, and is only a function of d. Thus, for a given d, using equation (2)
of [49], the optimum value of p is such that:
uCP − dCP
uSP − dSP
=
w
1−w
29

The condition to have a non-trivial problem.
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if the solution for p satisfies other constraints. Thus, by plugging the expressions for the
CP and the SP ((4.14) and (4.15)), the candidate optimum p as a function of d is:

p∗ =

 κ 

κu 
u
(1 − w)(uad − dCP ) − w(us − dSP ) =
(uad − dCP ) − wuexcess
d
d

(4.22)

Substituting (4.22) in the objective function of (4.16) and using (4.14) and (4.15) yield
the new objective function:
ww (1 − w)w (uad − dCP + us − dSP ) = ww (1 − w)w uexcess
Substituting (4.22), (4.14), and (4.15) in the constraint uCP ≥ dCP , yields the new
constraint uad − dCP + us − dSP ≥ 0. Similar substitutions for uSP ≥ dSP yields the same
constraint. Thus, the optimization can be written as,
max uexcess
d

s.t.
(4.23)
0 ≤ d ≤ N̂ κu
uad − dCP + us − dSP = uexcess ≥ 0
The theorem follows from above and (4.22).

4.6.8

Comments on the Approximations in the Model

Note that in our model, we have assumed that either the CP sponsor a quality for her
end-users or she uses the best effort scenario (both cannot happen together). This means
that in the second case (no sponsoring) the demand of the CP would be added to the
pool of the demand for the best effort scenario, i.e. would be added to D. In our model,
we do not considered the augmentation since we naturally expect the demand for a CP
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to be much smaller than the total demand for all CPs. In this section, we discuss if and
how the results change if we consider this augmentation.

Change in the Model
The augmentation in the demand can be accommodated as follows:
The SP:

uSP,t (pt ) = pt bt + us (bt (pt ))

(4.24)

where now the users’ satisfaction function, i.e. us (.), becomes:





N − bt
κSP bt


+ ν2 D log κSP
 ν1 dt log
dt
D


us (bt ) =

N
−
b
t

 ν2 (D + dt ) log κSP
Otherwise
(D + dt )

if dt > 0& bt > 0
(4.25a)

Note that (4.25a) is the same as (4.5a). Thus, the only change is for the case of no
sponsoring (dt = 0 or bt = 0) (4.25a) in which dt is added to the total demand of the best
effort scenario, i.e. D. Note that (4.25a) becomes similar to (4.5a) when dt << D.
The CP:
Note that we have considered that the CP receives a payoff of zero in the case of no
sponsoring. This is justified as in many cases in which if the CP does not sponsor the
data, then she will only transmit the content with a best effort scenario and because of
limited bandwidth do not transmit advertisements. An example of this can be seen in
Youtube: If the quality of the content is low, then Youtube automatically skips the ad.
Thus, in this case, when the CP transmits with best effort, it receives zero ad revenue.
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Change in the Analytical Results
This change may only affect the results when (i) the exact expression of us (bt ) in the
case of no sponsoring, i.e. (4.25a), or (ii) the expressions for the optimum strategies of
the SP, i.e. p∗t is used. Note that in Theorem 1 we do not use any of (i) and (ii). Thus,
the Theorem would be similar to before. In the next paragraph, we will argue that the
expressions for p∗t in Theorem 2 would be the same as before. In Theorem 3, we only use
the expression for p∗t . Thus, the results of Theorem 3 would be the same as before. In
Theorems 4 and 5, we use (4.25a) (which is similar to (4.5a)) and the expression of p∗t
(which are the same as before). Thus, the the results for these theorems also would be as
before. For the long-sighted case, we do not use the exact expression of us (b). Thus, all
the results of long-sighted would be as before.
Now, we argue that the expressions for the optimum strategies of the SP in Theorem
2 would be the same as before. The first paragraph of the proof would be the same
as before since we do not use (4.25a). In addition, in the next paragraph of the proof
and when characterizing the optimum strategies of the SP, we focus on 0 < dt ≤
pt ≤

α log(κCP ζ)
.
ζ

N̂
ζ

and

With these conditions, bt > 0 and sponsoring occurs. Thus, we use the

expression of uSP (pt ) for the case of sponsoring (4.25a) which is the same as before, i.e.
(4.5a). Thus, the expressions for the optimum strategies of the SP would be the same as
before.
Note that the only change that should be applied to Theorem 17 is to the expression
of uSP,0 , i.e. the utility of the SP in the case of no sponsoring. This utility should be
N
changed from (4.5a) to (4.25a), i.e. uSP,0 = v2 (D + dt ) log(κSP D+d
).
t
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Change in the Simulation Results
Since the SP now receives a greater utility in the case of no sponsoring (compare (4.5a)
with (4.25a)), the option of no-sponsoring becomes more attractive for the SP. We have
redone all the simulations with the new model. We comment on all the changes in the
numerical results, and present the results for one sample scenario (Figure 4.13).
Changes to Figures 3 to 6: In the numerical results, we observe that these figures
will remain similar in general. The only change is that the region of no sponsoring for
large v2 slightly increases (since the no-sponsoring is now more attractive for the SP).
Thus, the insights associated with these figures would be the same as before.
Changes to Figures 7 and 9: Now, consider the numerical results for the longsighted scenario. In this case, for Figures 7 and 9, we observe the thresholds for the jump
to no-sponsoring region slightly decreases (as we expect because of the explanations in the
first paragraph of Appendix 4.6.8). Otherwise, the figures would be the same as before.
This is because of the fact that the utility of the CP is the same as before.
Changes to Figures 8 and 10: We plot the counterpart of Figure 8, in Figure 4.13.
Note that the results are similar. The only difference is that the percentage of increase
in the utility of the SP decreases in some regions (regions in which short-sighted yields
no sponsoring). This is because of the increase in the utility of the SP in the case of
no sponsoring. The same happens to Figure 9. Thus, the insights associated with these
figures remain the same.
Changes to Figures 11 and 12: Recall that p∗ is the price of sponsored bits in the
bargaining framework, and is distinct from p∗t which is the price of sponsored bits in the
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Figure 4.13: The percentage of increase in the utility of the SP when κu =

1
ζ

with respect

to v2 for different values of ζ (new model).

short-sighted framework. Results reveal that the insights associated with these figures
follow the same trend as before. Note that p∗ depends on the disagreement payoff which
is the payoff of short-sighted framework. Thus, the only change to the value of p∗ happens
when the disagreement yields no sponsoring. In this case, since the payoff of disagreement
increases slightly (4.25a), p∗ increases slightly.
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Figure 4.14: The percentage of increase in the utility of the SP when κu =
to v2 for different values of ζ (old model).
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1
ζ

with respect

Chapter 5

Conclusion
5.1

Summary

In this thesis, we considered economic frameworks to investigate different questions about
the departure toward a non-neutral regime and its possible consequences. We assessed
whether different entities of the market have the incentive to adopt a non-neutral pricing
scheme; what are the pricing strategies they choose; and how these changes affect the
Internet market. To answer these questions, we modeled, analyzed, and characterized a
non-neutral Internet market under different scenarios and parameters.
First, in Chapter 2, we investigated the incentives of different entities of the Internet
market for migrating to a non-neutral regime. We considered a diverse set of parameters
for the market, e.g. market powers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs), sensitivity of
End-Users (EUs), and Content Providers (CPs) to the quality of the content. The goal
was to obtain founded insights on whether there exists a market equilibrium, the structure
of the equilibria, and how they depend on different parameters of the market when the
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current equilibrium (neutral regime) is disrupted and some ISPs have switched to a nonneutral regime. We considered a system in which there exists two ISPs, one “big” CP,
and a continuum of EUs. One of the ISPs is neutral and the other is non-neutral. We
considered that the CP can differentiate between ISPs by controlling the quality of the
content she is offering on each one. We also considered that EUs have different levels of
innate preferences for ISPs. We formulated a sequential game, and explicitly characterized
all the possible Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of the game. We proved that if
an SPNE exists, it would be one of the five possible strategies each of which we explicitly
characterized. We proved that when EUs have sufficiently low innate preferences for
ISPs, a unique SPNE exists in which the neutral ISP would be driven out of the market.
We also proved that when these preferences are sufficiently high, there exists a unique
SPNE with a non-neutral outcome in which both ISPs are active. Through numerical
analysis, we observed that the neutral ISP receives a lower payoff and the non-neutral
ISP receives a higher payoff (most of the time) in a non-neutral scenario. However, we
identified scenarios in which the non-neutral ISP loses payoff by adopting non-neutrality.
We also showed that a non-neutral regime yields a higher welfare for EUs in comparison
to a neutral one if the market power of the non-neutral ISP is small, the sensitivity of
EUs (respectively, the CP) to the quality is low (respectively, high), or a combinations of
these factors.
Then, we investigated frameworks using which ISPs and CPs select appropriate incentives for each other, and investigated the implications of these new schemes on the
entities of the Internet market. Thus, we considered a market consisting of ISPs, CPs,
and EUs in which ISPs sell the bandwidth to CPs in exchange of financial incentives. We
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analyzed two non-neutral frameworks:
In Chapter 3, we studied the price competition in a duopoly with an arbitrary number
of buyers. In this case, ISPs was considered to be sellers selling/leasing a number of
their resources to buyers, i.e. CPs. Each seller can offer multiple units of resources
depending on the availability of the resources which is random and may be different
for different sellers. Sellers seek to select a price that will be attractive to the buyers
and also fetch adequate profits. A seller may only know the statistics of the number of
available resources to her competitor. We analyzed this price competition as a game, and
identified a set of necessary and sufficient properties for the Nash Equilibrium (NE). The
properties reveal that sellers randomize their price using probability distributions whose
support sets are mutually disjoint and in decreasing order of the number of availability.
We proved the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric NE in a symmetric market, and
explicitly computed the price distribution in the symmetric NE. In addition, we proposed
a heuristic pricing strategy for sellers in a symmetric oligopoly market which satisfies the
necessary and sufficient properties identified for a NE in a symmetric duopoly. Numerical
evaluations reveal that our proposed strategy constitutes a good approximation for the
NE of the symmetric oligopoly market. Note that in this case, CPs have a passive role, in
the sense that they cannot alter their demand in accordance with the price set by ISPs.
However, CPs have the ability to choose amongst the ISPs based on their price.
In Chapter 4, we considered a non-neutral framework in which CPs have an active
role in the market, and decide on the number of resources they want to reserve/buy from
the ISPs based on the price ISPs quote. In our model, ISPs allow CPs to sponsor a
portion of their resources, and price it appropriately to maximize their payoff. The payoff
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of an ISP depends on the monetary revenue and the satisfaction of end-users both for
the non-sponsored and sponsored content, while CPs generate revenue through advertisement. Moreover, in this work, we considered the coupling between limited resources and
the strategies of the decision makers. We analyzed the market dynamics and equilibria
in two different frameworks, i.e. sequential and bargaining game frameworks, and provide strategies for (i) SPs: to determine if and how to price resources, and (ii) CPs: to
determine if and what quality to sponsor. The frameworks characterize different sets of
equilibrium strategies and market outcomes depending on the parameters of the market.

5.2

Future Works

Although different models and problems were presented and analyzed in this thesis, several
additional questions remain open. In this section, we present some of the extensions and
new questions that can be addressed in the future:
CPs:
Note that in Chapter 3, we considered a random number of identical CPs that are
price-takers. On the other hand, in Chapters 2 and 4, we considered a single strategic CP
while the rest of the CPs are passive and their effects can be captured by constant parameters. A possible direction for future work is to consider multiple number of “strategic”
CPs that are of different types. These CPs not only interact with ISPs but also compete
with each other to attract EUs and to reserve/buy the resources of ISPs. The effects of
this competition on the pricing of the Internet market and resources are not apriori clear.
One might think about scenarios in which a competition between CPs leads to higher
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prices quoted by ISPs for resources and subsequently heavier discounts for EUs. Thus, a
better welfare for EUs might be expected if this outcome occurs. On the other hand, a
“fragmented” Internet might be another outcome of the market. In this case, each CP
picks an ISP and provides her content with premium quality exclusively on that ISP to
avoid competition and also to secure a monopoly over EUs. This is not desirable from
the perspective of a policy maker since it may have negative effects on the social welfare
of the market.
The first step in extending our work toward this direction is to consider multiple CPs
that belong to two broad types, e.g. those with high market power such as Google and
Netflix, and those with low market power such as start-ups. It is interesting to investigate
under what conditions migration to a non-neutral Internet would drive the CPs with low
market power out of the market and how a regulator can prevent from this. Using this
model, we can also compare between inter-type cooperations/competitions with crosstype cooperations/competitions. In other word, we can investigate whether CPs with low
market power prefer to cooperate among themselves to be able to compete with those
with high market power or they prefer to team up with powerful CPs in their competition
with other small CPs.
ISPs:
Another possible direction, is to consider the effects of investment decisions by ISPs
on the outcome of the market. In this case, ISPs invest the additional profit on their
infrastructure and can compensate the cost through CPs or EUs. For example, in the
model of Chapter 2, investment decisions can be accommodated by considering different
levels of premium quality, each corresponding to different costs. The non-neutral ISP
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would select a level of quality based on the cost and other parameters. It is of interest to
investigate how the quality-cost relationship can affect the results of that chapter.
In addition, note that in the models presented in this thesis, we focused on either
one (Chapter 4) or two ISPs (Chapters 2 and 3). A possible extension is to consider
more than two ISPs and the interaction among them. In Chapter 3, we provided a
heuristic algorithm to compute NE strategies for the case of a symmetric oligopoly, i.e.
more than two identical ISPs. We provided numerical results on the performance of this
algorithm. However, providing analytic results on the structure of equilibria in the case of
an asymmetric oligopoly is a topic of future work. As previously mentioned, computing
Nash equilibria in this case is considered to be an open problem. Thus, finding possible
structures on the equilibria may at least provide approximate solutions if not solve this
open problem.
Another possible direction to expand this work is to enable ISPs to share resources
among themselves. The interplay between cooperation and competition among ISPs can
change the pricing strategies for the CPs and EUs, and subsequently affect the social
welfare of the market. In [38], we investigate this interplay in the context of the interaction between Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) and Mobile Virtual Network Operators
(MVNOs).
EUs:
Note that in Chapter 2, we considered EUs to have different reluctance for ISPs. The
lower the reluctance for ISPs, the easier an EU can switch between ISPs. Thus, high
reluctance is associated with EUs that are locked-in with ISPs. A possible future work is
to take into the account the duration of the contract that EUs have with ISPs. A possible
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extension that can be applied to the work in Chapter 4 is to consider end-users that can
switch between ISPs. Note that in Chapter 4, we assumed that end-users are locked with
ISPs due to contracts.
The Regulator:
In the models presented in this thesis, we do not explicitly consider the strategic
decisions a regulator can make. Instead, whenever possible, using the results of the
models, we commented on the role of the regulator in affecting the equilibrium outcome.
A future work is to consider the regulator as one of the decision makers of the market
alongside the ISPs, CPs, and EUs. The decision of the regulator could be to select the
amount of incentive (for example through tax breaks) or penalty (for example through
increasing tax) for the decision makers in order to control the equilibrium of the market.
Game Frameworks:
In this thesis, we mainly considered a myopic interaction among entities (except for
the model in Chapter 4). Investigating a long-run interaction among decision makers
using repeated game is a topic of future work. Through analyzing a repeated framework,
we can find out whether CPs or ISPs with high market power are able to secure monopoly
power over the market by driving their competitors out of the market through adoption
of sub-optimal strategies for a limited time.
In addition, in most of the models analyzed in this thesis, we considered non-cooperative
sequential game frameworks (except for one part of Chapter 4). It is of interest to investigate the equilibrium outcome of the models using cooperative or bargaining game
frameworks, and to compare the results with the results of this thesis.
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